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The proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) amidst the stagnation of 
multilateralism in the recent years has led to overlapping free trade zones or pair-wise hub-
and-spokes (HAS) throughout the world. Many countries including the United States, Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region are no exception 
to this phenomenon. Being avid subscribers to FTAs, these countries have become trade 
hubs to their partners, which are in turn relegated to spoke status. 
We ask whether being a hub is welfare optimal for a small and open economy when it 
can choose to join a single FTA, an exclusive free trade zone or support global free trade 
instead. Using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) software suite developed by 
Purdue University, we examine the welfare impact of a triangular trade relationship between 
the United States of America, Singapore and Japan facilitated by the US-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement (USSFTA), the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JSEPA), and a hypothetical US-Japan free trade agreement within this context. We also 
extend our analysis to incorporate “super-hub” effects that recognize the spoke countries 
(that is, the US and Japan) as trade hubs in other pair-wise HAS systems. Our experiment 
reveals that Singapore is always better off from the benchmark and playing hub is welfare 
optimal. Japan loses more than the US when both are relegated to spoke status. As a 
consequence, they have economic motivation to form a bilateral that neutralizes the 
detrimental effects of the HAS. These findings prove robust in sensitivity analyses involving 
the market structure, production technologies, “super-hub” effects, the depth of integration, 
and uncertainties in key behavioural parameters. 
Next, we introduce a partial equilibrium model to examine the issue of overlapping 
FTAs further. We find that, if the product endowment structure is symmetric across regions, 
every economy would prefer hub status over all other trading arrangements including global 
free trade. Replicating the case of US-Singapore-Japan, hub preference continues to hold in 
the asymmetric case. The theoretical model thus lends weight to our GTAP analysis. 
 vi
Several implications arise from our research. First, although we have established the 
economic incentives for regions to form FTAs either proactively or as a defensive response 
to others’ FTA pursuits, we express our doubts that these interactions will lead to a global 
free trade outcome that is beneficial to the world community. However, given the current 
stalled WTO negotiations, discriminatory trade pacts are second-best remedies for 
economies highly reliant on trade for survival. Even so, complementary policies would be 
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The growth of free trade agreements (FTAs) worldwide has accelerated since the mid-
1990s. By March 2006, there are 193 regional trade agreements (RTAs) reported to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), of which 66% or 127 are FTAs in force under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV and the 
Enabling Clause1. If services agreements and partial agreements are ignored, about 93% of 
RTAs are FTAs (WTO, 2006a). 
Panagariya (2000) attributed this explosion in the population of RTAs to the difficulty 
of negotiating multilateral trade liberalisation given the size and diversity of member 
countries today. Furthermore, FTAs create their own logic whereby outsider countries that 
are discriminated against in major export markets would seek their own preferential deal 
either by joining existing RTAs or forming new ones (Busse, 2000). The fewer 
commitments required by FTAs may explain why they are numerically superior to another 
type of RTA, the customs unions (CUs)2. For example, FTA members need not adhere to a 
common external tariff (CET) nor do they need to seek the consensus of other members 
when they form RTAs with outsiders.  
Many economists harbour both fears (and hope) about this recent proliferation of FTAs. 
At the time of the formation of the GATT in 1948, RTAs were viewed as a step towards 
global free trade. Provided new RTAs do not raise trade barriers vis-à-vis the Rest of the 
World (RoW), they result in an overall lowering of trade barriers in the world economy and 
this was regarded as benign (Lloyd and Maclaren, 2004). However, Viner (1950) changed 
perspectives with his notions of trade creation and trade diversion that arise from an RTA. 
The former results when the importing country substitutes a lower cost source of supply 
                                                 
1  While the WTO/GATT advocates non-discrimination in trade, there are exceptions to this fundamental 
principle. Paragraphs 4 to 10 of Article XXIV, GATT allows for RTAs, which facilitate trade and do not raise 
trade barriers on non-members. The Enabling Clause provides similar exceptions that apply to agreements 
among developing countries and it allows a partial free trade across a subset of goods. 
 
2 As of March 2006, there are 10 CUs compared to 127 FTAs notified to the WTO. 
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within the free trade area for domestically produced goods, benefiting members and the 
world as a whole. In contrast, trade diversion occurs when a more costly source of supply 
within the area substitutes for a less costly source outside. When the trade-diverting effect of 
an RTA dominates, members and the world at large suffer. Since an RTA can be trade-
creating in some products and diverting in others, we cannot determine whether RTAs in 
general improve welfare. 
Kemp and Wan (1976) enhanced the understanding of RTAs by showing that if a CU 
fixes the initial extra-union trade flows, it’s CET adjusting endogenously, and a lump-sum 
compensation mechanism among its members is instilled, then both members and outsiders 
are at least not worse off from the union. This proposition demonstrated a universal 
possibility of gain to outsiders and the world as a whole from a new CU. Panagariya and 
Krishna (2002) extended the Kemp-Wan theorem to FTAs. Since FTAs do not require CET, 
they proposed that each member country adjust its tariff rates to keep the volume of its trade 
with outsider countries unchanged3. However, in practice, this is not always met. 
Up to the early 1990s, FTAs were, with only a few exceptions, a set of non-intersecting 
areas. 4  The above literature and their spin-offs might have satiated curiosity on what 
happens to welfare when a country signs an FTA. However, an increasing number of 
countries and even RTAs have become members of more than one FTA, placing them at the 
centre of two or more “overlapping” preferential trade areas. Analysing an FTA in isolation 
would generate conclusions that have little to speak about these networks of FTAs and could 
even mislead on the welfare impact of that FTA under scrutiny, as we will explore shortly. 
Meanwhile, the issue at hand calls for a proper framework to analyse overlapping FTAs. 
 
                                                 
3 This applies when member countries also produce the goods imported from RoW, but within-FTA 
demand exceeds within-FTA supply. The resulting FTA is necessarily welfare improving. When 
there is no internal production, the only way to maintain the volume of trade with RoW is to fix each 
member’s external tariffs at the initial rates and adopt rules of origin whereby goods consumed within 
the FTA cannot be imported via the member with the lowest external tariff. This FTA will neither 
improve nor lower welfare. 
 
4 Exceptions include the FTAs that the EC established with Switzerland and Liechtenstein (January 
1973), Iceland (April 1973), Norway (July 1973), Algeria (July 1976) and Syria (July 1977). 
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1.1 Overlapping FTAs and the Hub-and-Spoke System 
The hub-and-spokes (HAS) concept, which is prevalently used in the transportation 
industry and first introduced to the international trade literature as a ”two-sided triangle” by 
Wonnacott (1975) in Canadian Public Policy, has become a common framework for 
unravelling this noodle bowl of FTAs. The HAS system is unique to FTAs because, a 
country or group of countries (collectively) is not restricted to the number of FTAs it can 
sign with RoW. As a result, the region acts like a “hub”, linking up several free trade areas 
and trading on preferential terms with every “spoke” region in each FTA. 
A hub is formed when a member of an existing FTA forms a new one with a non-
member (Wonnacott, 1996b). As an illustration, shortly after the 1989 Canada-US FTA was 
in place, the US entered into negotiations toward a similar agreement with Mexico. This 
scenario (two FTAs with the US at the centre) would have set up a system of FTAs in which 
the US acts as a hub 5 . A hub can also arise when a country, almost simultaneously, 
negotiates bilaterals with a number of countries such as in the case of Chile, or attaches 
itself to two existing multi-member RTAs like what Mexico did (Lloyd and Maclaren, 
2004) 6 . The various ways to become a hub are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
Singapore has concluded 7 bilateral FTAs within a short span of time since 2001, on top of 
being a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was established in 1992. 
To facilitate further discussion, we identify a HAS system as “pair-wise”. That is, the 
system arises as the hub facilitates trade between a pair of regions. To illustrate, suppose a 
hub Country j  has bilateral FTAs with n  countries. Any one of the n  countries, say 
Country  should then have less then i 1−n  bilateral FTAs with the rest (excluding its trade 
pact with j ) so that, at any time, j  would be serving its role with respect to country i  and 
                                                 
5 However, this was not realised because the three-way, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between the US, Canada and Mexico was established in 1994, creating a single North American market. 
 
6 In 2004 alone, Chile concluded bilateral FTAs with the United States, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and the Republic of Korea. Mexico established an FTA with the EC in August 2000 and another FTA 
with EFTA in August 2001. It is also a member of NAFTA. 
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at least one other country. Accordingly, if 4=n , then there would be a maximum of 
6)!2(!2! =−nn  pair-wise HAS systems.  
The HAS system exemplifies the overlapping nature of FTAs and introduces an extra 
dimension which is not captured when we analyse a singular FTA. The spoke countries will 
have less market access than the hub, because the hub enjoys preferential access to all 
spokes but each spoke has preferential access to the hub only. Thus a pair-wise HAS 
arrangement effectively creates two layers of discrimination instead of one as in the case of 
a singular FTA. For example, consider Regions A , B  and . In a singular C BA −  FTA, 
 would have poorer access to C B  compared to . In a HAS system with A BA −  and 
 FTAs, not only will Spoke C  have poorer access to C−A B  than Hub , Spoke A B  also 
has poorer access to C  compared to A . When two or more HAS systems intersect, the 
discrimination becomes multilayered (Lloyd and Maclaren, 2004). One also has to consider 
the costs incurred by the hub from the administration of multiple and usually complex sets 
of tariffs and rules of origin (ROOs) arising from its many FTAs. 
Case studies based on the HAS concept include Wonnacott (1996b) on US-Canada-
Europe trade relations, Busse (2000) on EU’s HAS strategy in East Europe, South Africa 
and Latin America following the deadlock in WTO talks, as well as, Kowalczyk and 
Wonnacott (1992) on US trade policy in the Americas. These studies expressed optimism 
for the economic welfare of the hub and the contrary for spokes, although as Busse (2000) 
pointed out, spokes may have consented to the integration in the first place because of 
political gains. The EU FTAs, for example, provide East European countries a better chance 
of securing full membership in the union. They also reduce the US’ sphere of influence in 
the Americas, an effect that Latin American countries desire.Early theoretical models that 
explore what happens in a HAS include Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) and Krugman 
(1993). In the former, the first difference of real income function is used to measure the 
terms of trade (TOT) and volume of trade (VOT) effects as a participant country moves 
from a single FTA to a HAS and then to a free trade zone caused by a spoke-spoke FTA. 
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Kowalczyk and Wonnacott conclude that countries prefer the status of a trade hub to any 
other position, but the welfare impact on spokes is ambiguous. This is because although 
spoke i  gains from its own bilateral agreement with the hub, it may be hurt by an agreement 
that the hub signs with Spoke j . The overall welfare impact would depend on whether the 
latter agreement is a complement of or a substitute for the former. If the Spoke j -Hub 
agreement increases the demand for goods produced by Spoke i  (which is an outsider), then 
it is a complement. However, if i ’s goods compete with those produced and traded within, 
then the agreement is a substitute. Even so, the trade diversionary effect may be offset by an 
increase in members’ income (and therefore their demand across all goods), thus Spoke i  
may still gain. 
Using a monopolistic competition model, Krugman (1993) demonstrates the 
formation of a trade hub through the concentration of industries with scale economies. 
Easier access by one location to other locations, characterised by lower transportation costs, 
can turn it into a hub if the gains from increasing returns and larger scale production more 
than offset the transportation costs. Otherwise, firms would find it more profitable to 
produce directly in the non-hub locations. Although Krugman make no mention of FTAs, 
their effects are akin to the lowering of transportation costs in that both improve asymmetric 
access, thus allowing hub formation under increasing returns assumption. 
Recent contributions to the HAS literature include Deltas, Desmet and Facchini 
(2005) and Hur (2006). Using a 3-sector, 3-region model, where countries are symmetrical 
in their attributes and complementary in their comparative advantages, Deltas et al (2005) 
analysed how trade between a pair of countries is affected by the wider network of FTAs 
each one is connected to. They demonstrated that the country is better off being a hub in a 
HAS than a member in a singular FTA. However, its gains are reduced if the spokes sign an 
FTA among themselves. This is because the “excess trade” created by spokes trading 
through the hub generates additional gains for the latter compared to a singular FTA, and the 
loss of this “indirect arbitrage” with the advent of a spoke-spoke FTA is what made the hub 
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worse off. Even in the presence of ROOs that prevent the hub from being used as a 
backdoor by outsiders, Deltas et al assert that indirect arbitrage gains are still possible 
because the hub can always export its produce to members in one FTA at a higher (but still 
competitive) price, while importing the same good for self-consumption at a lower price 
from the more-efficient outsider country, which is its trading partner in another FTA. 
Using a three-country, four-commodity product endowment, partial equilibrium 
model, Hur (2006) examines a more comprehensive set of trade configurations: a single 
FTA, a HAS system, a two-country CU and global free trade. Hur assumes a symmetric 
endowment structure and that each government chooses tariff rates that maximise regional 
welfare. FTA shocks are introduced as zero tariff constraints within these optimisation 
problems. Hur found that countries will prefer membership in the exclusive CU to the single 
FTA because CU members charge a higher external tariff than FTA members and are better 
off for it, while participation in global free trade is better than membership in an exclusive 
CU. However, being at the centre of a HAS generates even higher returns to being in a 
tariff-free world. Hur suggests that the desirability of hub status might explain the 
predominance of FTAs over CUs, which we observed at the beginning of this chapter, as 
well as, the lack of concerted efforts to resume stalled multilateral talks. In summary, Hur 
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One significant difference between the static models of Deltas et al (2005) and Hur 
(2006) is the absence of arbitrage opportunities for the hub in the latter; perfect competition 
ensures prices (inclusive of tariffs) equalise so a region continues to import from all sources 
post-FTA; there is no excess trade through the hub. Despite of this, the trade hub remains a 
coveted position due to TOT and VOT gains. 
1.2 Objectives, Motivation and Method 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comparison study of the welfare returns from 
different trade configurations that of a single FTA, a HAS system and a free trade zone 
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comprising all HAS participants. Within this context, we examine the triangular trade 
relationship between the United States of America, Singapore and Japan. The 
aforementioned configurations would arise from the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership 
Agreement (JSEPA), the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) and a 
hypothetical US-Japan Free Trade Agreement.  
Estimating the effect of any configuration of FTAs on any participant, outsider and the 
world at large is a computational challenge. This is because, in the real world, more than 
one country can be a trade hub and any country can assume the roles of hub and spoke at the 
same time given the wide repertoire of FTAs. We meet this challenge by utilising the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and 
database for a counter-factual analysis. They are maintained by Purdue University, USA.  
In layman’s terms, a CGE model is a set of simultaneous equations that replicates an 
economic equilibrium through the specification of production and demand parameters by 
incorporating actual data of the economy. As such, it allows for a firsthand study of the 
issue within a consistent framework at minimum loss of realism. Furthermore, a CGE study 
can account for the complexities and interactions between economic agents and sectors that 
partial equilibrium models are unable to account for, which can severely limit analyses of 
the effects of trade policy implementation. 
Although CGE simulations are not uncommon tools for analysing international trade 
issues, there is only a modest amount of research on the HAS system. One such study is 
conducted by Brown, Kiyota and Stern (2004) who carried out a static CGE analysis of the 
welfare effects of FTAs that the US and Japan are involved in, using the Michigan Model of 
World Production and Trade and the GTAP 5.4 (1997) global database.7 They examined 
several scenarios but reported the case in which the FTA(s) concerned would completely 
eliminate the tariffs on commodities and the barriers to services trade. They found that, 
                                                 
7 The base year is projected to 2005 and services trade barriers are estimated and built into the database. The 
agriculture sector is assumed perfectly competitive, while the markets for manufactures and services are 
modelled as monopolistically competitive. In monopolistically competitive sectors, each firm produces a 
differentiated product and sets a profit-maximising mark-up of price over marginal cost. Free entry and exit of 
firms ensures zero profits. 
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“while partner-FTA countries may gain directly from their FTAs… they may be adversely 
affected by other FTAs that have been negotiated (by the trade hub, US or Japan)".  
In another study, Zhai (2006) utilised the static Linkage model developed by the World 
Bank and the GTAP 6 (2001) database to explore the economic effects of alternative HAS 
configurations in Asia, rotating between Japan, China and the ASEAN as potential hubs.8 In 
each scenario, all bilateral distortions to hub-spoke trade in merchandise including tariffs 
and export taxes are eliminated, while those for spoke-spoke trade are left unchanged. The 
Asian HAS centred on China is found to produce net welfare gain for the world twice as 
much as that from the ASEAN hub and three times of that from the Japanese hub. However, 
China is worse off from being a hub, while Japan and the individual ASEAN members gain 
when they are hubs. When Zhai account for “deeper integration” through services trade 
liberalisation and trade facilitation, there are no losers from the HAS arrangements.9 
Contrary to Brown et al (2005) and Zhai (2006) whose HAS systems centre on 
economically large countries, the pair-wise HAS systems in our study are made up of large 
country-small country FTAs with the economically small country (Singapore) acting as the 
hub.10 This is so because we define a “trade hub” as a region that is better endowed with 
“connectedness” through it’s subscription to FTAs, compared to the “non-hubs” (that is, the 
outsiders and spokes) such that there is greater ease for goods to come from and send to all 
places. Thus any country is a trade hub candidate. The emergence of many small economies 
such as Chile, Korea, Singapore, Mexico, and Thailand as centres of FTA networks, some 
of which involving large economies in the likes of Japan, the US and EU, tells us that HAS 
                                                 
8 The analysis involves 19 countries and 14 sectors. The CGE model incorporates scale economies, imperfect 
competition and firm heterogeneity in productivity. Agriculture, mining and public administration sectors are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
 
9 Services trade liberalisation and trade facilitation reduce variable trade costs and fixed exporting costs. Some of 
the cost savings benefit non-members as well. For example, simplifying customs clearance procedures reduces 
the costs of imports from all sources. It is this “non-discriminatory practice” that makes agreements with deep 
integration the building blocks of global trade liberalisation. 
 
10 From Table 1.1, we observe that the Singapore economy is very small relative to Japan and the US in its share 
of global gross domestic product (GGDP). 
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systems comprising economically small hubs and large spokes warrant attention.11 Our case 
study of US-Singapore-Japan trade relations serves as a vehicle to analyse such a particular 
form of the HAS system. 
Besides the disparity in economic size in our sample of countries, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the extent of their dependence on external trade and how important they are 
to each other as trading partners. Due to her lack of resources and small domestic market, 
Singapore is highly outward-oriented with trade flows 1.5 times of its gross domestic 
product, while the final demands in the US and Japan are much less reliant on trade and 
more dependent on their huge consumer markets. In addition, although Japan and the US are 
Singapore’s major trading partners between 2000 and 2005 (refer to Figure 1.1), the 
converse is not true - Singapore’s annual shares in American and Japanese total trade were 
modest, averaging 1.9% and 2.9% respectively from 1997 to 2004. Meanwhile, Japan 
figured a much higher 26.6% of US’ total trade for the same period while the latter made up 
24.1% of the trade conducted by the former, indicating significant mutual trade dependence 
between the spoke countries (refer to Table 1.2). As a result, the conclusions drawn from 
our study may not apply to every HAS system. In particular, no lessons may be drawn for 
nations unwilling to adopt unilateral free trade as Singapore did (Baldwin, 2004, 48). Still, if 
our analysis concludes that the hub position is optimal for Singapore, then it would explain 
why relatively small open economies would prefer to expend their resources on establishing 
FTAs rather than pursuing membership in an exclusive free trade zone or supporting global 
free trade in a present-day world of overlapping FTAs. 
Singapore’s bilateral trade initiatives with the US and Japan are also of particular 
interest because the small island state is highly dependent on trade with these two economic 
superpowers. Entering into broad-ranging trade pacts with them not only ensures better 
access to their markets, but also creates a way to avoid future protectionist measures. Any 
trade tensions that may arise can also be resolved through orderly dispute settlement 
                                                 
11 For one, if countries become signatories to an increasing number of FTAs, especially with big market trade 
partners, then this would reduce the perceived marginal benefits from implementing a global trade deal. 
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mechanisms established under the FTAs rather than according to the laws of the jungle 
(Rajan et al, 2003). The two FTAs are also landmark victories for proponents of preferential 
trade. Although the US has established several FTAs in the past, USSFTA is the first trade 
pact with an Asian country, promising more of such engagements in the region. Meanwhile, 
JSEPA signals Japan’s waning support for strictly non-discriminatory multilateral approach 
to achieve global free trade, a stand it had stubbornly stuck to for years. 
In conjunction with our analysis, we shall conduct an extensive test of the assertion by 
Deltas et al (2005), that trade between countries “depends not only on whether there is free 
trade between them, but also on the wider network of FTAs each member is connected to”. 
As discussed earlier, Brown et al (2004) found some supporting evidence in the cases of US 
and Japan-centred HAS systems albeit limited, because they only considered Japan and US 
FTAs and not those belonging to their spoke partners. Nonetheless, this is the reason why, at 
the beginning, we contended that analysing an FTA in isolation could lead to misleading 
conclusions when FTAs overlap. We shall refer to the influence of the other FTAs that a 
HAS member belongs to as “super-hub” effects, because, by the definition of pair-wise 
HAS, the countries of primary concern (Singapore, the US and Japan) would each serve as 
trade hub to more than one pair of countries given their current portfolios of FTAs.12 In 
essence, our case study allows us to analyse a HAS system or any other trade configuration 
in which not one but many of the participants are hubs. 
In addition, we quantify the barriers to services trade and use them to measure the 
welfare effects of deep integration similar to Zhai (2006). The incorporation of "super-hub" 
effects and varying depths of economic integration in our CGE experiment can be regarded 
as robustness checks of the simulation results. Along this line of thought, we also vary the 
underlying assumptions on the market structure and production technology. Uncertainty is 
introduced to the values of model parameters and shocks. These extensions of our analysis 
provide a “comprehensive touch” that is crucial in rendering CGE findings credible.  
                                                 
12 Lloyd and Maclaren (2004, 459) also refer to countries or RTAs with a large number of spokes due to their 
involvement in multiple FTAs as “super-hubs”. 
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To manage complexity, we have omitted a plausible scenario, that of, multilateralism. 
After the CGE experiment, we utilise the product endowment model in Hur (2006) to 
analyse the asymmetric case involving a hub-aspiring, small and open economy vis-à-vis 
two economic hegemonies – settings akin to the US-Singapore-Japan trade relations. We 
will then compare the welfare outcomes of global free trade with that under the HAS and the 
exclusive free trade zone. These three trade configurations are what we will likely end up 
with in a world of overlapping FTAs. 
1.3 Organisation of the Study 
Prior to our CGE experiment, we survey in the following chapter the bilateral FTAs and 
trade relations to date between Singapore, the US and Japan. We shall also discuss if a US-
Japan EPA is on the horizon. In Chapter 3, we introduce the standard GTAP model which is 
utilised in our CGE analysis. We present our experimental design and discuss the 
benchmark data in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 reports our simulation results and Chapter 6, the 
outcomes of relevant systematic sensitivity analyses. In Chapter 7, we explore the 
theoretical fitness of our simulation results using a product endowment model. Chapter 8 
discusses the insights from our findings and presents some policy recommendations. In 
















AN OVERVIEW OF SINGAPORE, THE UNITED STATES  
AND JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS  
 
Prior to our CGE experiment, we survey the bilateral trade relations to date among our 
countries of primary interest. Emphasis is placed on the preferential trade deals – USSFTA 
and JSEPA. We shall also discuss the plausibility of an FTA between Japan and the US.13 
2.1 The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 
The USSFTA, entered into force on 1st January 2004, was the first free trade pact 
concluded between the US and an Asian country. This Agreement sets out the obligations of 
both parties to liberalize bilateral trade through the elimination of import tariffs, export 
taxes, trade restrictions and processing fees for originating goods. Liberalisation of services 
trade would include lower entry barriers for retail banking, harmonised standards for 
licensing and certifying professional service providers (especially architects and engineers), 
greater mobility for business visitors and professionals, as well as, mutual access to public 
telecommunications networks. Both parties are also committed to a wide range of issues 
including heightened intellectual property (IP) protection, better foreign investment 
facilitation, dispute settlement procedures, competition policy, environmental protection, 
and mutual recognition of conformity assessments for telecommunications equipment. 
2.1.1 Merchandise Trade 
Figure 2.1 plots the value of exports from Singapore to the US between 1994 and 2004 
at the sectoral level. The major classes of exports include electrical products, office and data 
processing machines, chemicals and related products, as well as, mining, petroleum and coal 
products. Chemicals and related products has experienced steady export growth, increasing 
                                                 
13  FTA facts and figures draw mainly from Rajah and Tann (2004) for the USSFTA, Rajan et al (2003) and 
METI (2006) for JSEPA, and MTI (2006a) and Wong (2004) for both FTAs. 
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almost fourfold from US$584 million in 1994 to US$2.02 billion a decade later. In contrast, 
exports of electrical products have fluctuated widely during the same period, while office 
and data processing machines has declined in importance since 1996 from US$13.28 billion 
to US$7.21 billion in 2004.  
The export sectors in Singapore that benefit from the FTA include electronics, 
chemicals and petrochemicals, processed foods, instrumentation equipment, textiles and 
mineral products. Before the FTA was established, 44.4% of electronics and IT products, 
74% of chemical and petrochemical products, 85% of processed foods, 52% of 
instrumentation equipment and 70% of textiles and apparel exported by Singapore into the 
US were dutiable. Post-FTA, the US immediately lifts tariffs on 92% of the goods 
originating from Singapore, with the remaining to be phased out over eight years. Products 
in each sector are grouped under four categories, which determine how soon the tariff will 
be removed (immediately, by 2008, by 2012 or by 2014). In return, Singapore commits 
herself to zero tariffs on all imports from the US with immediate effect, including beer and 
stout - the only items that are subjected to tariff protection. 
Only goods that satisfy the rules of origin (ROOs) are entitled to tariff concessions.14 
Goods wholly produced in the territory of one or both parties are deemed originating goods. 
In the case of manufactures, they must have undergone “substantial transformation” in one 
or both parties. Substantial transformation takes place if there is a change in the 
manufacture’s tariff classification, if the local content (or value-add) rule is met, or if the 
process rule is satisfied. 15  Specific ROOs apply for different types of products. Under 
USSFTA, goods originating from Singapore are also exempted from the Merchandise 
Processing Fee (MPF) imposed by the US on all her imports.16  
                                                 
14 The reason for ROOs is to prevent any backdoor entry by outsiders to take advantage of an FTA. 
 
15 Local content refers to the proportion of local value that makes up the final value of the finished product. The 
process rule applies to certain chemical and petrochemical products, where a specified process such as a 
chemical reaction, must occur in the exporter country during production. 
16 The MPF is a non-refundable fee charged by the US customs for processing an imported shipment. The MPF 
is currently 0.21 percent ad valorem for imported merchandise valued over $2,000, subject to a minimum fee of 
$25 and a maximum fee of $485 per shipment. For merchandise valued at less than $2,000, the MPF is a set fee 
ranging from $5 to $9 per shipment. 
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Modifications to ROOs are made to accommodate the concepts of outward processing 
(OP) and Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI). OP involves companies outsourcing part of 
their production (usually low value-added activities) to neighbouring areas. This practice 
has been encouraged in Singapore and constitutes an important part of her manufacturing 
sector. To account for OP, the revised ROOs designate the country of origin not only as the 
country where substantial transformation to the product is made, but also where the last 
manufacturing activity has taken place. Enterprises operating under the Outward Processing 
Arrangement face an alternate value add rule. Meanwhile, the core principle of ISI is that 
certain goods, although not made in Singapore, will be deemed originating from there if 
they are imported into the US from Singapore. The ISI is confined to about 266 finished 
products, mainly IT equipment and some medical and instrumentation equipment. Since 
goods on the ISI list already enter the US duty-free, companies that can declare their 
products under ISI benefit only from the waiver of MPF accompanying the USSFTA. 
 The FTA also aims to reduce non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade between the 
members. For one, traders can expect to enjoy faster customs clearance for their goods 
following measures to increase transparency in the procedures involved and speedier release 
of their imports. In addition, both countries shall take steps to implement the APEC Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement for the Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications 
Equipment (APEC TEL MRA) with respect to each other.17  
2.1.2 Trade in Services 
Since Singapore can offer few tariff concessions, much of the negotiations over the FTA 
concern US access to her services market. In general, impediments to services trade are 
rarely explicit and do not take the form of border measures.18 They are often embedded in 
domestic regulations, so the liberalisation of services trade may often entail reforms of these 
                                                 
17 The MRA is a non-binding arrangement, established by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 
June 1998. It contains procedures by which two or more APEC economies mutually recognize laboratory test 
reports and equipment certifications. 
 
18 One exception where a tariff is imposed on services involves ship repairs. US ships that underwent ship repairs 
anywhere outside the US would be levied a Vessel Repair Duty by the US authorities. This duty was lifted for 
ship repairs in Singapore after the USSFTA is formed. 
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regulations. Under the USSFTA, each country will give treatment to the other country’s 
services suppliers at par with its own suppliers or other foreign suppliers under like 
circumstances. In addition, there will be no requirement for local presence as a condition for 
the cross-border supply of a service. All payments and transfers pertaining to services trade 
are to be made freely and without delay. Market access commitments are also given for a 
wide range of services including construction, telecommunications, engineering, financial 
services such as banking and insurance, professional services, and distribution services such 
as wholesaling, retailing and franchising.19 
2.1.3 Other Important Areas of Cooperation 
One of the key hallmarks of the USSFTA is the heightened protection of intellectual 
properties with Singapore committed to upgrade its IP regime further to bring it more in line 
with that of the US. The enforcement of IP rights is expected to benefit the US as their 
intellectual properties including software, music and books are afforded more protection in 
Singapore. Singapore also gains from the job creation that ensues, as IP protection 
encourages the growth of knowledge-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, the life 
sciences and biotechnology.20  
With regards to foreign investment, Singapore and the US will accord “full protection 
and security” and “fair and equitable treatment” to each other’s investors. They are to be 
regarded no less favourable than the locals (known as “national treatment”) and investors 
from other countries (“most-favoured-nation treatment”). Furthermore, any deals that one 
member offers on investment issues in future FTAs may be extended to the other member. 
2.2 The Japan-Singapore New-Age Economic Partnership (JSEPA) 
Negotiations between Japan and Singapore for an Economic Partnership Agreement 
were concluded in October 2001 and the JSEPA came into force on 30 November 2002. The 
JSEPA is expected to enhance Singapore’s attractiveness as a destination for multinational 
                                                 
19 Exceptions involve sectors that usually require government certification (such as lawyers and accountants) or 
involve government institutions (such as airports and public hospitals). 
 
20 Meanwhile, parallel importation practices in Singapore are not prohibited under the FTA, except for patented 
pharmaceutical products, thus related traders are not seriously affected. 
 16
corporations to set up their operations. This is because foreign subsidiaries in Singapore will 
be given the same treatment as indigenous Singaporean firms in the Japanese market. 
2.2.1 Merchandise Trade 
Figure 2.2 reports the value of exports from Singapore to Japan between 1994 and 2004 
by sector. Similar to Singapore-US trade, major exports hail from the following classes: 
electrical products, office and data processing machines, chemicals and related products, as 
well as, mining, petroleum and coal products. There was also a relatively high level of 
export in telecommunications and sound recording apparatus from 1994 to 1997, but they 
have since declined in importance. Although the export of office and data processing 
machines has been decreasing since 1995, it was still the leading export sector at US$1.48 
billion in 2004, followed by electrical products (US$1.34 billion), mining, petroleum and 
coal products (US$ 986 million), and chemicals and related products (US$576 million). 
Unlike the USSFTA, not all products enjoy zero-tariff concessions. Although Singapore 
grants zero tariff rates on all Japanese imports as of entry into force of the FTA, Japan 
increases its zero-tariff commitments from 34% (under the WTO) to only 77% of total tariff 
lines. Even so, the percentage of Singapore’s exports entering Japan tariff-free will rise from 
84% to approximately 94% post-JSEPA. Out of the 6938 zero-tariff concessions offered by 
Japan, 6928 will take immediate effect, while the remaining 10 petrochemical products will 
be liberalised by 2010 on a gradual basis. There is a 14% increase in the number of Japan’s 
zero-tariff commitments with regard to agricultural products from its commitments in the 
WTO. However, Singapore has little economic interest in agriculture. Current agricultural 
exports constitute only about 2% of all domestic exports.  
Only goods that satisfy the product-specific ROOs would be eligible for preferential 
tariff treatment. In essence, the ROOs require that substantial transformation has taken place 
in Singapore such that there is a change in tariff classification. For example, the final 
product, motor spirit (Harmonised System or HS 4-digit heading 2710) is different from the 
raw material, crude oil (HS 2709). Then motor spirit is considered a Singapore product and 
eligible for tariff concessions. Additional flexibility to address OP is obtained for 264 tariff 
 17
lines, which accounted for approximately 68% of total domestic exports to Japan in 2000. 
These products qualify for preferential tariff treatment as long as their Singaporean content 
is at least 60% of the selling price. They include 40 chemical products, which attracted 
applied tariff rates of 2.2% to 7.9% before the JSEPA was formed. Since these products 
enjoy duty-free access to the Japanese market under JSEPA, Singapore stands to gain 
because chemicals companies over the world will find it more competitive to site their 
operations on the island country. Other sectors that will benefit from tariff cuts are 
petroleum products, electrical and electronic products, plastic products, pharmaceuticals, 
instrumentation equipment, transport equipment and fabricated metal products. 
Tariff barriers aside, both parties are committed under the FTA not to impose any non-
tariff measure on merchandise trade except those that are permitted by the WTO. Both 
countries are prohibited from maintaining any export duties. In addition, Singapore and 
Japan will cooperate in simplifying and harmonising custom procedures through 
information exchange. Technical barriers are further reduced with a MRA. Manufacturers 
and exporters of electrical and electronic products, telecommunications equipment, and 
pharmaceutical products can simply send their goods for testing and certification locally 
without having to undergo these procedures again in the importing country. The benefits to 
each country arise from related cost savings and shortened product dissemination time, 
which in turn make businesses more competitive. 
2.2.2 Trade in Services 
The number of committed sectors, for which the country concerned would make 
regulations on trade in services more transparent, was enlarged from the one in GATS by 
both countries.21 Japan committed an additional 32 sectors, totaling 134 or 86% of the 155 
services sectors classified under GATS. For Singapore, an additional 77 sectors are 
committed beyond GATS, leading to increased transparency in regulation for 139 or 90% of 
                                                 
21  The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), entered into force in January 1995, is the first 
multilateral agreement to cover trade in services. It ensures transparency and predictability of rules and 
regulations pertaining to and promotes progressive liberalisation of services trade. All WTO members (some 140 
economies at present) are at the same time GATS members and, to varying degrees, have assumed commitments 
in individual services sectors. 
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services sectors. Examples of services sectors involved are business services (R&D, services 
incidental to manufacturing, rental/leasing services), telecommunications, health-related and 
social services, distribution, finance (fund asset management, insurance and banking), 
education, environmental services, and transportation (maritime and road transport services, 
and freight transport agency services).  
A number of initiatives are put in place to enhance bilateral cooperation in the 
promotion of financial sector and capital market development. Special attention is also paid 
on developing media and broadcasting technologies, promoting tourism, as well as, 
facilitating trade in information and communication technological (ICT) products and 
services. For example, in the latter, the FTA encourages the on-going expansion of e-
commerce transactions. Trade in services invariably involve the complementary movement 
of persons. JSEPA grants Singaporeans and permanent residents of Singapore guaranteed 
entry and stay in Japan, while Japanese professionals will be able to practise in Singapore. 
Measures have also been taken toward the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.  
2.2.3 Other Areas of Cooperation 
There are efforts to reduce the costs of IP protection. For example, an applicant, who 
provides the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore with the examination results of the 
patent application filed in Japan, will be granted a patent in Singapore at a reduced fee for 
the same invention. The estimated saving per patent application in Singapore is S$2,170. 
With regards to foreign investments, national treatment is offered to each member’s 
investors, but no commitment is made for MFN treatment. 
2.3 Prospects of a United States-Japan FTA 
The pattern of Japan’s trade relations with the world is characterized by a heavy reliance 
on the US market, and vice versa. Japan’s export dependence on the US was 31 percent of 
the total value of exports in 1970, 24 percent in 1980 and 32 percent in 1990. From Table 
2.1, we observe that exports designated for the US between 1994 and 2004 continued to 
average a high 28.5 percent. Figure 2.3 indicates that transport equipment, industrial 
machinery and equipment, electrical products, office and data processing machines, and 
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professional and scientific instruments were the major merchandise traded during that 
decade. In particular, automobiles (30.8 percent), machinery and mechanical appliances 
(23.0 percent), and electronic goods (19.2 percent) made up, on average, 73 percent of 
Japan’s total exports to the US.22 Meanwhile, American exports constituted 29 percent of 
the total value of Japanese imports in 1970, 17 percent in 1980 and 22 percent in 1990. 
Between 1994 and 2004, almost one-fifth of Japanese imports originated from the US (See 
Table 2.1). The leading US exports were agricultural goods, chemicals, electronic products, 
as well as, mining, petroleum and coal products. There was also a steady increase in the 
export of industrial machinery and equipment during that period. Other important export 
sectors include electrical products and chemicals and related products. Refer to Figure 2.4. 
Agricultural produce such as meat, fish, grains, soybeans and citrus fruits, as well as, raw 
materials including mineral fuels and metals comprised, on average, 28.3 percent of Japan’s 
total imports from the US, while transport and defence equipment, mechanical appliances 
and electrical equipment contributed another 38.9 percent of Japanese imports.  
Over 90% of US’ imports from Japan are manufactured goods at the higher end of the 
technology spectrum, while a substantial portion of Japan’s imports from the US are 
agricultural goods and raw materials. This imbalance in the pattern of trade has generated 
trade surpluses for Japan vis-à-vis the US. As a result, past US administrations had called 
for restrictions on the imports from Japan and exerted pressure to further liberalize and 
deregulate its economy. Such pressure has been brought to bear through a range of bilateral 
engagements during the 1980s and early 1990s. The 1985 Market-Oriented Sector-Specific 
(MOSS) talks aimed to improve market access for American firms in the Japanese market 
and the Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA) of 1986 under which a market share target 
was set for foreign semiconductor consumption in Japan. In 1989, the Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII) was formed to address macroeconomic policies and Japanese 
business practices as barriers to trade. Agreements such as to deregulate the Japanese 
                                                 
22 This has yet to account for the fact that electronic products exported by the rest of East Asia to the US are 
often produced by Japanese offshore production facilities (Hook et al, 2005, 122). 
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distribution system were subsequently reached in 1990. However, the SII ended in 1993 to 
make way for a US-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership, which calls for 
significant reduction in Japan’s global current account surplus and addresses issues such as 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the eastern archipelago. The negotiations collapsed from 
a lack of consensus over the quantitative targets for US’ exports to Japan (Hook et al, 2005). 
Currently, a framework known as the Japan-US Economic Partnership for Growth is in 
force. Inaugurated in 2000, it involves regular intergovernmental dialogue on specific fields 
such as regulatory reform, competition policy and investment. Tapping bilateral channels is 
not therefore new to US-Japan trade relations, albeit with one-sided interest.  
The possibility of an FTA between them heightens when we consider that they are also 
no strangers to the practice of preferential trade. The USA began to establish FTAs since 
1988 and currently has a portfolio of seven agreements reported to the WTO. Japan is also 
more receptive of preferential trade pacts after joint studies with South Korea (in 1998), 
Mexico (1999), and Singapore (2000) concluded in favour of bilaterals (Hatakeyama, 2002). 
The country now has EPAs with Singapore and Mexico, and is currently exploring or 
negotiating EPAs with South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines (METI, 2006). Japan is 
also involved in officially sanctioned studies of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) 
with ASEAN, China and Korea, better known as ASEAN+3 (Bergstern, 2004). 
While the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) motivated 
Japan to launch an EPA with Mexico and move production facilities there to secure better 
access to the North American market, the recent safeguard tariffs imposed by the US on 
steel imports (which hit Japan but exempted NAFTA partners) shows that Japan is still at 
risk of being discriminated.23 Furthermore, Japanese firms that lack the resources to shift 
their production to Mexico, such as the textile manufacturers in East Asia, will continue to 
suffer (Hook et al, 2005). During the 43rd Japan-USA Business Conference held in 
November 2006, Nippon Keidanren, also known as the Japan Business Federation, called 
                                                 
23 The safeguard measure was imposed in March 2002 under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act. Three-year 
tariff rates of 8 to 30 percent were applied on a range of steel imports, but were lifted in December 2003 when 
Japan and other affected countries successfully petitioned the WTO under the dispute settlement mechanism. 
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for a joint study for a Japan-US EPA amid concerns that the Japanese businesses are losing 
their competitiveness to their counterparts in Singapore, Chile, Australia, Canada and 
Mexico in the US’ market (Nippon Keidanren, 2006).24 This situation will worsen when the 
US-Korea FTA is concluded and brought into effect.  
An US-Japan EPA can also provide a counterweight to rising economic power China in 
East Asia and boost investor confidence in Japan given its enhanced trade relations with the 
US (Bergstern, 2004). According to Bradford and Lawrence (2004), there are gains of about 
3% of total GNP for Japan from any initiatives that could produce convergence between its 
high prices and the much lower levels that prevail in the US and other industrialised 
countries. For the US, an EPA with a major trading partner, especially a large purchaser of 
its agricultural products, would be very attractive. Moreover, an agreement that benefits 
Japan also strengthens the most important US alliance in the region and helps to sustain 
political support for American engagement in East Asia. Meanwhile, any Japanese FTA 
with other Asian countries or coalitions (such as ASEAN) can have sizable repercussions on 
the US as trade and investment could be diverted from North America to the free trade area. 
The US may enter an FTA with Japan later, but at higher costs or less favourable terms. 
However, the US-Japan EPA seems as remote as twenty years ago when the then US 
ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield mooted the idea. A major challenge that has to be 
overcome is the domestic resistance in Japan to liberalise its non-competitive agricultural 
sector and key services sectors, which the US would likely require in order to conclude the 
EPA. The strong opposition is partly due to food security concerns and a weak Japanese 
agro industry (Hatakeyama, 2002). Second, while the bilateral fast-track authority, as 
amended by the US’ Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, requires her trading partners to initiate 
negotiations for an FTA, Japan increasingly prefers to deal with the US in the WTO rather 
than through bilateral means (Bergstern, 2004; Pekkanen, 2005, 71 – 73; Araki, 2006; 
                                                 
24 Nippon Keidanren is an economic organization established in May 2002 by the amalgamation of the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organizations and the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations. Its membership of 
1,662 comprised 1,351 companies, 130 industrial associations, and 47 regional economic organizations as of 
June 2006. It is one of the three major economic organisations in Japan, the other two being the Japan Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, and the Japan Committee for Economic Development. 
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Saxonhouse and Stern, 2006). From the late 1990s, Japan has relied more on the 
adjudication by third parties under the legalised WTO dispute settlement mechanism instead 
of bilateral “negotiations” to manage trade disputes with the US especially on market access 
issues. Of the 26 WTO dispute settlement cases involving Japan between 1995 and 2005, 14 
were related to trade with the US (Pekkanen, 2005, 72). 7 of the 11 complaints filed by 
Japan against her trading partners as at June 2004 were targeted at the US. 8 of these 
complaints managed to reach the panel/appellate stage in which the US was the respondent 
in 6 cases (Araki, 2006, 785). Japan has also defended cases so far brought mainly by the 
EU and US against its import measures (6 complaints from each party). It is thus unlikely 
that Japan prefers to settle disputes via a mechanism established under a bilateral FTA to 
that offered by the WTO given the concern on unbalanced negotiating position. On the other 
hand, Japan’s “aggressive legalism” through the WTO platform cannot rule out a potential 
trade pact with the US, for even NAFTA members have often had recourse to the WTO 
dispute settlement process after the FTA is established. The same can be said of 
MERCOSUR partners, Argentina and Brazil.  
Finally, there are worries about the impact on the global trading system when two of the 
largest economies extend preferential treatment to each other (Schott, 2004). However, in a 
different perspective, an US-Japan EPA can spur the currently moribund APEC prospects 
for achieving “free and open trade and investment” within the region by 2010, a target set in 
the 1994 Bogor Declaration. For the same reason that a trade bloc of two hegemonies 
arising from the US-Japan EPA hurts the rest of the world, it also garners support from 
outsiders to resume multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, an EPA reduces the risk that the 
current FTA strategies of the US and Japan will create two mega trade blocs in Asia-Pacific, 
an outcome that can create instabilities in overall relations among countries in this region.  
If a US-Japan EPA were to be established, what aspects should be covered? The US still 
imposes substantial tariffs on Japanese goods such as pickup trucks and other commercial 
vehicles (25 percent), titanium sponge and wrought titanium materials (15 percent), bearings 
(4.4 percent to 9.9 percent), and flat-screen TVs (5 percent). On the Japanese side, goods 
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such as cables (4.8 percent), plastic products (3.9 percent to 4.8 percent), and aluminium 
products (4.1 percent) are subject to tariffs, and since there are no domestic substitutes for 
these products, the costs incurred by the importing companies are increased and their profits 
are squeezed. Thus the dismantlement of tariffs remains a vital, core element of the EPA. 
However, the agreement is expected to also resolve ongoing issues such as the exemption of 
nationals from visa requirements, the mutual recognition of patents, and a hassle-free system 
through which Japanese firms can help enhance the security of the import supply chain into 
the US. For an US-Japan EPA to take off, measures have to be taken to enhance the 
competitiveness of the Japanese agricultural sector so that it can survive the competition 
brought by foreign producers in the domestic market. The Japanese government should also 
liberalise legal services, education, healthcare, finance, civil aviation, and energy services - 
sectors which the American business community is interested in. As a step forward, an 


















THE GTAP MODEL: STRUCTURE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Our study uses the GTAP model (Version 6.2) developed by the Center for Global 
Trade Analysis, Purdue University. It is a multi-country, multi-sector model of the global 
trading system and has been used for quantitative analysis of international policy issues 
since 1993. This chapter presents the model’s structure and underlying assumptions. 25 
3.1 Economic Agents and Production Factors 
Each region has three types of economic agents: private households, firms and the 
government, and is endowed with primary factors that can be disaggregated up to five 
categories: skilled and unskilled labour, natural resources, capital and land. Labour and 
capital are perfectly mobile between sectors in a region, while natural resources and land are 
sluggish in adjusting to changes in their relative returns (Hertel, 1997, 34; Hertel and Tsigas, 
1997). In addition, labour and capital are needed by all industries, but land is useful only in 
agricultural production. The model is built on the Walrasian general equilibrium system. 
The central idea is all markets clear at a set of relative prices. Thus primary factors are fully-
employed at every solution. The model assumes neoclassical behaviour on the part of agents. 
3.2 Production and Firm Behaviour 
On the supply side, firms use intermediate inputs alongside primary factors for their 
production. The derived demands for inputs are based on the profit-maximizing behaviour 
of firms. All markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive so firms make zero profits. 
The output are exported or sold domestically to private households, governments, the 
investment sector (for capital goods only), and other firms (in the form of intermediate 
inputs). While the supply of primary factors is fixed in each region, firms can procure 
intermediates from overseas (Kawasaki, 2003). 
                                                 
25 Refer to Hertel (1997) and Dimaranan (2006) for a more comprehensive coverage of the GTAP model and 
database. Modifications since its inception are documented in Itakura and Hertel (2001). Technical papers about 
this model are available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/. 
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The production in every sector exhibits constant returns to scale and is divided into two 
levels. Figure 3.1 illustrates the nested production structure. First, domestic and imported 
intermediates are used to produce a composite intermediate. Primary factors (land, labour 
and capital) are also used to produce a new item called value-added. This level is 
characterized by no substitution possibilities between the intermediate inputs and the 
primary factors. However, substitution is possible among the primary factors and among the 
intermediates. 26  The demands in each case are represented by a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function. These elasticities differ between sectors but are assumed to be 
the same for any pair of primary factors or intermediates, and are not region-specific. At the 
final level, both the value-added and the composite intermediate are used to produce the 
final output assuming a Leontief production function. With this technology, inputs are 
required in fixed proportions and thus there is no substitutability between the value-added 
and composite intermediate (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997; Piermartini and Teh, 2005). 
Table 3.1 reports the CES values for each of our sectoral aggregate.27 The first column 
[ESUBVA] is the elasticity of substitution among primary factors in the production of 
value-added.28 As an example, observe the low elasticity of substitution between each pair 
of primary factors in agricultural production (ESUBVA = 0.235). With the supply of 
agricultural land fixed in the model, the ability to expand farm output is thus directly linked 
to the ease of substituting labour and capital for land. As such, aggregate supply response 
will be limited. [ESUBD] and [ESUBM] are the CES between domestic and imported 
intermediate inputs, and among imported intermediates respectively. 29  The last column 
[ESUBT] shows that the composite intermediates and the value added by primary factors 
cannot substitute for each other at all in production. 
                                                 
26 The imported intermediate is a composite good made up of imports from individual trade partners. The 
demand for imports from various sources is also characterised by a CES function. 
 
27 These are plug-in values. For information on the sources, refer to Table 4.3 in Jomini, P., J. F. Zeitsch, R. 
McDougall, A. Welsh, S. Brown, J. Hambley and J. Kelly. 1991. “Model Structure, Data Base, and Parameters” 
SALTER: A General Equilibrium Model of the World Economy, Vol. 1. Canberra, Australia: Industry 
Commission. An explanation on our aggregation of economic sectors will be covered in the next chapter. 
 
28 For reference, we report logical names used in the computer version of the GTAP model in square brackets. 
 
29 ESUBM is twice the value of ESUBD. According to Hertel (1997, 126), this is an “empirical regularity”. 
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3.3 Households and the Government 
Households are the consumers, as well as, the owners of land, labour and capital. As 
owners of production factors, they receive endowment income (rent, wages and interest) 
paid out by the firms. All endowment incomes earned within a region accrue to the 
households in that same region. The government functions to collect taxes and tariffs, 
disburse subsidies and purchase goods and services. Changes to government policy 
instruments such as import tariffs and income taxes, provide the exogenous shocks that lead 
to adjustments in the rest of the economy. Tax revenue collected by the government accrues 
to the households within the same region and is spent like any other income.  
On the demand side, each “regional household” (a representative regional decision-
maker), at the top-most level, maximizes a Cobb–Douglas utility function constrained by a 
budget made up of the tax revenue and endowment incomes of agents residing in this 
region. Since profits equal zero, firms do not feature in the budget. The utility maximization 
behaviour fosters demand equations, which are constant shares of the regional household 
income. Each region’s income is totally exhausted on consumption by the private 
households, spending by the government, and savings. The utility from government 
spending proxies the welfare generated from the provision of public goods and services. 
Savings enters the utility function because households benefit from current net national 
saving (national saving less depreciation of physical capital) which increases their future 
consumption. The incorporation of savings also helps to capture the capital accumulation 
effect of policy reforms. We will elaborate on this in Section 3.5.  
The allocation of government spending across composite goods is based on a Cobb-
Douglas utility function, while private household preferences rely on a constant difference 
of elasticities (CDE) implicit expenditure function.30 Composite demand is then allocated 
between imports and the domestically produced good, as well as, among imports at the 
border, subjected to the same CES values reported in Table 3.1; the substitution parameters 
                                                 
30 Total differentiation of this function and use of Shephard’s Lemma allow for the derivation of the relationship 
between minimum expenditure, utility and prices. 
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are not use-specific. Figure 3.2 illustrates the overall structure of regional, government and 
private household behaviours (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997; Piermartini and Teh, 2005). 
3.4 International Trade 
In the standard GTAP model, all products are differentiated by origin (also known as 
the Armington assumption). Although it does not address the heterogeneity in goods or 
services originating from a source, this assumption allows for the cross hauling of similar 
products between countries observed in actual behaviour or what is termed, intra-industry 
trade (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997; Kawasaki, 2003; Piermartini and Teh, 2005). This 
assumption has a few implications to our analysis. First, only one region supplies each 
product. Conversely, there is no domestic supply of imports. Second, the Armington 
substitution elasticity determines the degree of imperfect substitution between the domestic 
product and import from each region [ESUBD], as well as, among imports from different 
sources [ESUBM]. This was covered in the preceding sections. As such, the world prices of 
products from the same sector but different origins need not equalise, because they do not 
substitute for each other perfectly. Third, the production of a good cannot move from one 
region to another and thus while the model captures the gains from exchange, complete 
specialization is not possible (Brown et al, 2004).31 
Each region, depending on transportation costs, participates in the trade with other 
regions. The international trade of merchandise and services requires freight (disaggregated 
into air, sea and land), as well as, insurance. These are supplied by national trade and 
transport sectors, and exported to a mythical global transport sector. All demands are then 
met with the same pool of services. There is also trade in investment goods to facilitate 
regional savings and investments, which we will discuss next. 
3.5 Savings and Investment 
A “global bank” ensures that the global demand for savings equals the global demand 
for investment in the post-solution equilibrium. It assembles savings and disburses 
                                                 
31 We relax the Armington assumption to incorporate a different market structure in some scenarios. This issue 
will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4. 
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investment through the sales of a homogenous savings commodity to regional households in 
order for them to purchase a composite investment good and hold shares in a portfolio of net 
regional investments (that is, gross investment less depreciation). Savings and investment 
need not be equal at the regional level. A region saves by buying the savings commodity at a 
price [psav] that varies by region. At the same time, it produces capital goods (or invests) at 
a price [pcgds] different from psav. These capital goods are sold, after accounting for 
depreciation, by the global bank together with other regions’ capital goods as a portfolio in 
the form of a composite investment good [GLOBINV]. Savers claim shares in this portfolio 
depending on how much of the savings commodity they buy. 
The allocation of investment by the global bank is determined by the binary coefficient 
[RORDELTA] and coefficient [RORFLEX] in the GTAP model. When RORDELTA equals 
zero, investment is allocated across the regions to maintain the existing composition of 
capital stocks following a shock. Correspondingly, RORFLEX will be infinite, indicating 
that a very small increase in the region’s capital stock will cause the net rate of return on 
capital to plummet drastically, so investments do not respond to the differing rates of returns 
between regions. When RORDELTA equals one, the global bank’s allocation of investment 
across regions will equate the expected rates of return, thus giving rise to cross-border 
capital mobility.32 This means that RORFLEX must be less than infinity. We adopt the 
default value of RORFLEX = 10. That is, the net rate of return on capital in a region will 
fall by 10 percentage points for every 1 percent increase in the region’s capital stock. This is 
a useful assumption, because trade liberalization may boost the production of capital-
intensive manufactures, thereby increasing the rate of return to capital. It will be interesting 
to consider the case where the global bank’s investment portfolio can respond to changes in 
the relative rates of return across regions. In addition, an efficiency-enhancing reform (such 
as trade liberalization) would shift upwards the economy-wide production function. Existing 
amounts of primary factors can now produce more than before, thus increasing income. This 
is the static effect of the reform. However, the positive relationship between trade, 
                                                 
32 We mean savings in this case. In contrast, physical capital is immobile across regions. 
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investment and growth does not end here due to capital accumulation. With fixed saving 
rates, part of the income increment is saved and invested to form new capital stock, which 
boosts productive capacity, leading to further income gains. This multiplier effect is allowed 
to run its course in the model (Itakura and Hertel, 2001; Francois et al, 1996). 
3.6 General Equilibrium and Model Closure 
The GTAP model is built on the Walrasian general equilibrium system. Following a 
shock, the returns to land, labour and natural resources adjust so as to equate demand to an 
exogenous supply of each factor. However, the productive stock of capital available to firms 
can change post-shock due to the effect of capital accumulation. If a unique general 
equilibrium solution is to be attained by the model, then there must always be equal 
numbers of endogenous variables and independent equilibrium conditions (Hertel and 
Tsigas, 1997). Hence, if a model has n independent equations and m variables, where m > n, 
then one way of interpreting closure is that it involves which n of these m variables are to be 
set endogenous (Piermartini and Teh, 2005).  The choice of model closure is determined by 
the specific nature of the problem at hand and by the variable the modeller intends to shock. 
In our study, the FTA shocks would involve tariff cuts for merchandise trade and reductions 
in tariff equivalents of services trade barriers. Accordingly, the variable, import taxes [TMS] 
is set exogenous. In most trade models, goods and factor prices, production, consumption, 
exports, imports and welfare are endogenous variables. On the other hand, factor 
endowments - the size of the labour force and natural resources, technological change, as 
well as, trade policy measures such as quotas and tariffs are exogenous variables. Appendix 
A reports the list of exogenous variables in the standard GTAP model closure.33 
3.7 Implementation 
We utilise the GTAP 6 data package with the model. In our experiment, each FTA 
shock involves the complete elimination of all agriculture and merchandise tariff barriers 
                                                 
33 In short, the 30 exogenous variables are the regional population (E1), a numeraire variable - world price index 
of primary factors (E2), selected slack variables (E3 – E8), technology (E9 – E20), input-neutral shift in utility 
function (E21), consumption distribution parameters (E22 – E23), saving distribution parameter (E24), output 
and income taxes, a uniform consumption tax, import tariffs and export subsidies (E25 – E30), and the quantity 
of endowments (E31). The rest of the variables in the model are endogenous. 
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between members without raising tariffs against ROW. This is in accordance with GATT 
Article XXIV. We also simulate the liberalisation of services trade between members to 
account for the effects of deep integration. The source-specific ad valorem tariff (for 
agriculture and merchandise trade) and tariff equivalent (of services trade barriers) imposed 
by region s on region r for commodity or service i, [tms(i,r,s)] is set exogenous in our model 
and shocked to a target rate of zero for this purpose. The standard GTAP model is 
implemented and solved using Release 8.0 of the General Equilibrium Modelling Package 
(GEMPACK) software suite. In particular, we use the visual interface, RunGTAP (Version 
3.40) to analyse scenarios under perfect competition. Windows for GEMPACK or WinGEM 
(Version 2.62) is used when imperfect competition is assumed.34 TABLO and GEMSIM are 
used to prepare the computer files for and to run the simulation respectively. Changes made 
to the GTAP model, shock and closure files are done using TABmate. All data are exported 
via ViewHAR and ViewSOL to MS Excel for further analyses. 
GEMPACK is a suite of general-purpose economic modelling software used for 
formulating and solving general equilibrium models. It is developed at the IMPACT Project, 
Monash University under the direction of Kenneth Pearson, with support from the 
Australian Industry Commission. The user specifies the economic behaviour in algebraic 
form and supplies data defining some initial solution of the model. GEMPACK then finds 
new solutions of the model corresponding to different values for the exogenous variables. 
Another popular software suite for implementing and solving general equilibrium models is 
the Generalised Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). It is originally developed for linear, 
non-linear and integer programming by Alexander Meeraus, formerly of the World Bank. 
The Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium (MPSGE), a modelling 
language specially designed by Thomas Rutherford for solving Arrow-Debreu economic 
equilibrium models can be used as a GAMS subsystem. Thomas Rutherford has, in recent 
years, also developed a set of programs GTAP6GAMS, which allows economists who 
program in GAMS to use GTAP in their applied work. It includes tools for translation of the 
                                                 
34 Alterations to the market structure in the standard GTAP model will be covered in the next chapter. 
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GTAP files in GEMPACK programming language into GAMS readable form, as well as, 
GAMS programs for dataset aggregation, filtering and the imposition of alternative tax rates 
on trade or domestic transactions. 
The solutions of the standard GTAP model can be obtained using the Johansen, Euler or 
Gragg method (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997, 17). The Johansen approach treats the non-linear 
GTAP model as a linear system. This approach to measure the effect of shocks is the 
simplest and quickest computationally. However, linearised around the initial solution, the 
Johansen solution is not quite accurate except for small shocks (Horridge, 2005). In 
particular, the solution procedure tends to overstate the efficiency gains and underestimate 
the deterioration in TOT for a country that lifts its tariffs (Hertel, 1997, 70). Breaking the 
shock into two parts and updating the equilibrium after the first shock can considerably 
enhance the accuracy of the linearised model. This is the Euler’s solution method via 
linearised representation. By increasing the number of steps, one can obtain an increasingly 
accurate solution of the non-linear model. Since Euler’s contribution, this approach of 
relinearising the model has been considerably refined to yield a solution as close to the true 
values as possible. The Euler 1000-Steps, 1-Solution method is chosen for simulations 
involving monopolistic competition.35  Otherwise, Gragg’s 2, 4, 6-Steps and 3-Solutions 
method is adopted. In this latter approach, the model is solved several times, each time with 
a successively finer grid. An extrapolated solution is then formed based on these results 





                                                 
35 This method was advised by Joseph Francois of Tinbergen Institute, who modelled monopolistic competition 
for GTAP. The purpose is to prevent nonsensical results like negative quantities and prices, which are observed 
when solution methods involving extrapolation are applied. For accuracy of results, the number of steps involved 
in solving the model should preferably be 500 or more. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND BENCHMARK DATA 
 
The purpose of our experiment is to examine whether the hub position is superior 
compared to other trading arrangements in a generalized setting with many goods, factors 
and regions under realistic conditions about the extent of economic integration, the 
prevailing market structure and the production technologies involved. The design of our 
experiment should also allow us to test, in a robust manner, the assertion made by Deltas et 
al (2005) that trade between a country pair “depends not only on whether there is free trade 
between them, but also on the wider network of FTAs each member is connected to”.36 In 
this chapter, we present our design of scenarios that captures the welfare implications of the 
different trading arrangements while accounting for super-hub effects. We also discuss 
about the database utilised in our simulation exercise. We demonstrate how services trade 
barriers can be quantified to simulate deep integration. Finally, we explain how imperfect 
competition and economies of scale can be introduced to the standard GTAP model.  
4.1 Scenario Design 
Our scenarios are based on the analytical framework used by Deltas et al (2005) and 
Hur (2006). We consider first, a single bilateral FTA in a group of three countries, then a 
HAS with one of the FTA members as a hub to the other two and finally, a “threesome” free 
trade scenario facilitated by overlapping bilaterals. The Agreements of primary concern are 
the USSFTA, the JSEPA and a non-existent but potential FTA between Japan and the US, 
which we shall use the abbreviation, USJFTA. Three basic scenarios are considered,  
 
(S1) JSEPA only,  
(S2) USSFTA and JSEPA,  
(S3) USSFTA, JSEPA and USJFTA 
 
                                                 
36 In Section 1.2, we referred to this as “super-hub” effects. 
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Scenario 1 represents the single FTA case.37 In Scenario 2, Singapore serves as a trade hub 
to spoke countries, US and Japan. Scenario 3 accounts for the breakdown of this hub-and-
spokes system by a hypothetical FTA between the latter two.38  
To enhance realism, we also consider all the bilateral FTAs that Singapore has 
concluded in order to examine if their inclusion will significantly change outcomes. Refer to 
Figure 4.1 for the network of FTAs involving Singapore, Japan and the US. Our scope of 
analysis will expand to include the Singapore-Australia FTA (SAFTA), the EFTA-
Singapore FTA, the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(CECA), the Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic 
Partnership (ANZSCEP) and the Korea-Singapore FTA (KSFTA), 
 
(S4) S1 | SAFTA, EFTA-SING FTA, ANZSCEP, CECA, KSFTA 
(S5)  S2 | SAFTA, EFTA-SING FTA, ANZSCEP, CECA, KSFTA  
(S6)  S3 | SAFTA, EFTA-SING FTA, ANZSCEP, CECA, KSFTA 
 
Scenarios 4 and 5 are analogous to 1 and 2 respectively, except that now we have a “super-
hub” Singapore trading on preferential terms not only with the US and Japan, but also with 
five other regions. Scenario 6 holds a similar interpretation as Scenario 3 in that the US and 
Japan sign an FTA with each other, but now Singapore continues to play hub for other 
spokes. The next step comes naturally; we analyse how sensitive the simulation output is to 
the “noise” caused by the US and Japan being hubs themselves to other countries in RoW. 
One approach is to include the countries having FTAs with the US and Japan (depicted in 
Figure 4.1) as separate regions from RoW and implement trade liberalisation shocks as 
proposed in Scenarios 7 to 9, and then contrast the outcomes with those of Scenarios 1 to 3 
or Scenarios 4 to 6 respectively. 
 
                                                 
37  Since JSEPA entered into force in November 2002 and the USSFTA in January 2004, therefore by the 
criterion of chronological order, JSEPA is chosen for the solo FTA case. 
 
38 Unlike the stylised 3-country models of Deltas et al (2005) and Hur (2006), we do not achieve global free 
trade in S3, because we have included trade with RoW to close the GTAP model. 
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(7) S1 | FTAs that Singapore, US and Japan have with other countries  
(8) S2 | FTAs that Singapore, US and Japan have with other countries 
(9) S3 | FTAs that Singapore, US and Japan have with other countries 
 
Table 4.1 lists the FTAs involving Singapore, the US and Japan that will feature in our 
simulations. All of these FTAs came into force between January 2001 and March 2006.39 To 
shed further light on our scenario design, Figure 4.2 illustrates all the nine scenarios and 
their respective benchmarks. For Scenarios 1 to 3, the benchmark is simply the baseline data 
without alteration. For the rest of the scenarios, the benchmarks have taken into account the 
varying degrees of super-hub effects in advance, forming alternative backgrounds for 
analysing the trading regimes comprising of our three primary FTAs. 
Our experiment involves thirteen economic regions including RoW: Singapore, the US 
and Japan, as well as, their FTA partners (Korea, the EFTA, Australia, New Zealand, India, 
Morocco, Chile, Mexico and Canada). We assume five types of primary factors: land, 
skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital and natural resources. Products are aggregated to 
                                                 
39 We highlight an issue here concerning the interpretation of the scenarios: The benchmark data incorporates, on 
top of MFN tariffs, the preferences as at 2001 arising from RTAs established prior to this base year. We observe 
that total tariff elimination across all commodities (required by the WTO) has yet to be achieved by some FTAs 
established before 2001, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) of which Singapore is a member, while 
economic integration is more complete within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) at the time the 
protection data is collected. Working with base data that already accounts for pre-existing RTAs like NAFTA, 
we thus cannot interpret that Scenarios 1 to 3 exclude all FTAs that Japan and the US had with countries in RoW 
and contrast them with Scenarios 7 to 9 that do. This would raise data contamination issues. Nor is it meaningful 
that we realise the outstanding concessions of pre-2001 FTAs like AFTA (through shocks) on top of 
incorporating the relevant post-2001 primary FTAs (USSFTA, JSEPA, USJFTA) in each scenario. If this were 
the case, it will be unclear whether a welfare change actually arises from the FTAs of primary concern or from 
the remnant concessions of pre-2001 FTAs that have came into effect. 
 
To maintain consistency in the interpretation of simulation results between the three sets of scenarios, we assume 
that the only difference between Scenarios 1 to 3 and Scenarios 4 to 6 is the presence of post-2001 FTAs that 
Singapore has established with countries in RoW. Along the same line of argument, in Scenarios 7 to 9, post-
2001 FTAs that Singapore, the US and Japan have established with countries in RoW is the only difference from 
Scenarios 1 to 3. To address our second concern, the only difference each scenario has from the respective 
benchmark (thus to which welfare change is accrued), is the presence of the three primary FTAs. 
 
There are two further implications from our scenario design. In Scenarios 5 and 6, Singapore is a hub to 
Australia and the US through the SAFTA and USSFTA. When the FTAs that the US has established with 
countries in RoW are also accounted for (including the Australian-US FTA) in Scenarios 7 to 9, Singapore’s hub 
position with respect to the two countries is eroded. We note this implication when comparing between 
Scenarios 5, 6 and Scenarios 8, 9 respectively. In another similar observation, Canada has an FTA with Chile in 
1997 and with the US (through NAFTA) in 1994. The benchmark data captures Canada’s hub position with 
respect to Chile and the US. When we account for the US-Chile FTA in Scenarios 7 to 9, the US should gain 
from the erosion of Canada’s hub position. Again, we note this implication when comparing Scenarios 7 to 9 
with Scenarios 4 to 6 or Scenarios 1 to 3 (where Canada’s hub position is preserved). Observe that the US gains 
from both implications. 
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fifteen goods sectors and five service sectors. These include agriculture, textiles, wearing 
apparels, petroleum, electronics, construction services and utilities. Table 4.2 provides a 
sense of what products are in each sectoral aggregate. 
4.2 Measuring the Welfare Changes 
The welfare effects of Scenarios 1 to 3 can be directly computed from the baseline data. 
However, to measure the welfare implications of the various trading regimes involving 
Singapore, the US and Japan arising from Scenarios 4 to 9, we need to first find the welfare 
change (relative to the baseline data) of the setting where Singapore or all of the three 
countries are super-hubs independent of the FTAs established amongst them. Then we 
subtract this from the welfare change (again, relative to the baseline data) arising from the 
corresponding stipulated scenarios.  
As an example, we measure the welfare change when Singapore, the US and Japan are 
super-hubs, but with no FTAs amongst them. This is the benchmark for Scenarios 7 to 9. 
Next, we compute the welfare change when they are super-hubs and having bilateral FTAs 
with each other. Finding the difference of these welfare changes, we filter out the effects of 
these three countries acting as hubs due to their FTAs with countries in RoW, and obtain the 
welfare implications of free trade among them in the context that they are super-hubs as in 
Scenario 9. This approach allows for the evaluation of the single FTA (Scenarios 1, 4 and 
7), the HAS system (Scenarios 2, 5, and 8) and the exclusive free trade zone (Scenarios 3, 6, 
and 9) involving the three primary countries, while controlling for the existence of other 
FTAs (established after 2001) in the background. 
4.3 Benchmark Data 
Like most CGE models, our data come from published sources. The main source is 
GTAP 6.0 Beta (Release 5, Nov 2004) Data Package. The database provides disaggregated 
data up to 86 regions across a maximum of 57 sectors. All monetary values of the data are 
expressed in US dollar (millions) and the reference year is 2001. From this source, we have 
extracted the following data aggregated to our sectors and regions,  
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(A)  Bilateral trade flows (including to and from RoW) 
(B)  Bilateral protection data for merchandise trade 
(C) Input/output (I-O) tables for the 13 regions involved 
(D) Factor substitution elasticities (ESUBVA, ESUBT) 
(E) Source substitution (Armington) elasticities (ESUBD, ESUBM) 
(F) Behavioural parameters for households 
(G) Factor transformation elasticities (ETRAE) 
 
For (A), the source for merchandise data is United Nations COMTRADE and for 
services, the International Monetary Fund balance of payments statistics (McDougall, 
2006). Tables 4.3A – 4.3F report the bilateral import and export figures of Singapore, the 
US and Japan for the reference year. In the case of (B), applied protection data originates 
from the MAcMap database according to the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) 
classification.40 The data takes into account of unilateral preferences and concessions under 
RTAs on top of MFN tariffs. Ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) are computed for each 
instrument of protection (specific tariffs, mixed and compound tariffs, tariff rate quotas, 
prohibitive tariffs and anti-dumping duties) for analytical purposes (Francois et al, 2005, 
365; Bouët et al, 2006). In our simulations, we set the ad valorem rate of import taxes by 
source [tms] to zero to reflect the elimination of all tariff barriers between FTA members 
following the Agreement(s). Table 4.4 reports the bilateral tariff rates imposed by 
Singapore, the US and Japan on each commodity in 2001. The tariff revenues received in 
total and from each other for that year are presented in Tables 4.5A and 4.5B. 
The single-country I-O tables in (C) were contributed by researchers worldwide for the 
reference year. They provide information about individual economies on their usage of 
imports and domestically produced goods as intermediate inputs or as final products 
(demanded by private households, the government and for gross fixed capital formation), as 
                                                 
40 The MAcMap database is a joint effort by the International Trade Centre (ITC) and the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) to systematically collect detailed and exhaustive 
information on the level of applied trade barriers. 
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well as, industry payments to primary factors of production, and taxes (Hertel, 1997; 
Walmsley and McDougall, 2006). The factor and source substitution elasticities (ESUBVA, 
ESUBD and ESUBM) are taken without alterations from SALTER.41 The standard GTAP 
model assumes a Leontief production function; there is no substitution between the value-
added and composite intermediate (ESUBT = 0). Table 3.1 reports the values of all 
elasticities. For (F), commodity and region-specific income and own-price elasticities of 
consumer demand are derived from cross-country demand studies, and from the procedure 
and formula outlined in Zeitsch et al. (1991) respectively. With regards to (G), as ETRAE 
takes on larger negative values, the more responsive is the supply of factors to the relative 
returns between sectors. Thus when ETRAE is close to zero, the allocation of factors across 
sectors is nearly fixed. Labour and capital are assumed perfectly mobile between sectors 
(ETRAE ), while natural resources (ETRAE = -0.001) and agricultural land (ETRAE 
= -1.0) are “sluggish” factors (Dimaranan, McDougall and Hertel, 2006). 
−∞→
4.4 Incorporating Barriers to Services Trade 
In the GTAP database, the barriers to services trade are not quantified. This is as good 
as assuming that impediments are non-existent in international services transactions, which 
is unrealistic. Many service sectors remain highly regulated, facing restrictive policies such 
as entry or visa fees, discriminatory access to local distribution networks, licenses, 
environmental standards and market share restrictions that are designed to limit the access 
of foreign services suppliers to the domestic markets. 
Although members of the WTO have agreed to liberalise their service sectors under the 
1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), commitments differ significantly 
from one member to the other.42 In addition, Article V of the GATS permits members to 
                                                 
41 Refer to Footnote 27 for information about SALTER. 
 
42 The GATS entered into force in January 1995 and extends the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment to 
services trade. The tariff schedules under the GATT in which countries bind their tariff concessions on 
merchandise imports find their counterpart for services trade in the schedules of specific commitments, which 
define the relevant trade conditions for services.  Article XX requires from each member such a schedule, but 
does not prescribe the sector scope or the level of liberalization. Thus, while some members have limited their 
commitments to less than a handful of sectors, others have listed several dozens. Furthermore, any of the entries 
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enter into agreements on a bilateral or plurilateral basis to further liberalize services trade 
provided that they involve “substantial sectoral coverage" and remove all discrimination 
between participants (WTO, 2006b). ). From Table 1, we observe that all the FTA partners 
have some form of service agreement with each other under this provision. Taking services 
trade liberalisation as an indicator that the trade pact concerned promotes deeper integration 
beyond tariff elimination, it will be interesting to find out what happens to regional welfare 
in each trading regime under different assumptions about services trade barriers.  
To be concise, we shall run all scenarios thrice, once assuming that there are no pre-
existing services trade barriers (that is, we take the default GTAP data without any 
adjustment) and, in the next run, we estimate, incorporate and maintain post-1995 services 
trade barriers. That is, only trade in goods is liberalised and the service sectors serve to 
measure any spillover effect of the FTA(s). In the last run, these built-in services trade 
barriers are eliminated between the FTA partners. 
Estimation of services trade barriers have been conducted by Hoekman (1995), Francois 
and Hoekman (1999), Kalirajan (2000) and Warren (2000a, 2000b). According to Dihel 
(2003), many CGE studies employ the estimates constructed by Hoekman (1995) although it 
is a pioneering work on using indices to measure the restrictions on services trade. This is 
because the coverage of service sectors in this study is, by far, one of the most extensive 
(McGuire, 2003, 51). Likewise, we shall adopt Hoekman’s method.43 
Hoekman (1995) estimates the relative restrictiveness of policy regimes pertaining to 
services by assuming that the coverage of each country’s GATS schedule of commitments 
on national treatment and market access is an indicator of the policy stance pursued. The 
higher is the coverage ratio of a nation’s schedule, the more liberal it is relative to others. 
                                                                                                                                         
may vary within a spectrum whose opposing ends are full commitments without limitation and full discretion to 
apply any measure falling under the relevant GATS Article (WTO, 2006b). 
 
43 Refer to Dihel (2003, 129 -140) for a list of recent studies using the estimates from Hoekman (1995). As a 
summary of what the other studies did, Francois and Hoekman (1999) estimated the tariff equivalents of trade 
barriers in business services, finance and construction services by taking the difference between the actual and 
predicted imports as indicators of trade barriers existing in the analysed sector. The predicted “liberalised” 
imports are calculated on the basis of a free trade benchmark. Kalirajan (2000) quantified government 
restrictions on trade in distribution services and estimated the effect that such restrictions have on the price-cost 
margins of food distributors. Warren (2000a, 2000b) estimated the impact of services trade barriers in the 
telecommunications sector on the quantities delivered. These are subsequently transformed into price impacts. 
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Each country’s coverage ratio is then related to a benchmark “guesstimate” of what the tariff 
equivalent of services trade barriers in the most protectionist nation might be to get a 
country-specific tariff equivalent. As the term suggests, the tariff equivalent list for this 
most restrictive country is completely arbitrary. A value of 200 percent was assigned for 
sectors where access tends to be prohibited by most countries and which do not appear in 
most schedules, such as air transport proper, postal services and voice telecommunications. 
The rest vary between 20 and 50 percent. 
A three-category weighing methodology is used to calculate the coverage ratios for each 
GATS member: “None” implies no restrictions are applied on either market access or 
national treatment for a mode of supply of a scheduled GATS sub-sector, “Unbound” means 
no commitment is given in the schedule for the mode of supply, and “Others” implies a 
mode of supply is subjected to bound restrictions.44 For quantification purposes, a value of 1 
is assigned to “None” instances, 0.5 for “Others” and 0 for “Unbound” cases.  
To be useful for empirical work, it is necessary to use a standard industrial 
classification. Hoekman first concorded the GATS list to the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, First Revision (ISIC). The weights 
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Where  is the assigned weight for one mode of supply i in ISIC sector j, ∑  is the 









iy is the total coverage possible for sector j. 
For example, if a GATS sub-sector (with four modes of supply) is equivalent to an ISIC 




                                                 
44 The GATS covers four modes of supply for each of the 160 services sub-sectors. They are (1) services 
supplied from one member into the territory of another member (cross-border trade) such as distance learning, 
(2) services supplied in one member to consumers such as tourists and students of any other member 
(consumption aboard), and services offered by a service supplier of one member in the territory of another 
member either through (3) commercial presence (for instance, a local subsidiary of a bank) or (4) the presence of 
natural persons such as consultants and health workers. 
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To derive the country-specific tariff equivalents for all ISIC sectors, multiply the vector 
of  for a country by the benchmark vector of tariff equivalents, 






Annex 2 in Hoekman (1995) reports the assumed benchmark “tariff equivalents” for all 
ISIC sectors, the sectoral weights used for aggregation to 1-digit and 2-digit ISIC, and the 
computed “tariff equivalent” dataset for selected GATS members. However, since the 
sectoral aggregation used in the study differs from ours, adjustments have to be made.  
Table 4.6 shows the re-aggregation of the ISIC sectors to our sectoral aggregates. We 
sum up the 2-digit weights ( ) of the ISIC sectors that fall within each sectoral aggregate 
. The share of an ISIC sector in the sectoral aggregate ( ) is then obtained by expressing 
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where . If there is any shortcoming to this treatment, then it must be that we 
have effectively assigned equal weights to all 2-digit ISIC sectors in our sectoral 
aggregation. The region-specific “tariff equivalent” of services trade barriers for sectoral 










k tvt ∑=  
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Due to data constraints, the figures for EFTA are approximated by the unweighted 
average of those for Norway and Switzerland. In the case of RoW, the “tariff equivalent” of 
a sectoral aggregate is the unweighted average of thirty-six representative countries in RoW 
reported in Hoekman (1995).45 Since the services agreements among NAFTA members, 
between Canada and Chile, and between Chile and Mexico were established before 2001 
(which is our base year), we let the corresponding services trade barriers be zero in the 
modified database.46 Table 4.7 reports the computed ad valorem “tariff equivalent” values. 
Next, we adjust the GTAP database to incorporate these tariff equivalents using the 
method by Malcolm (1998). We assume that all regions supplying a service face the same 
amount of obstacles in an importer region. We shock the exogenous variable, [tms] for 
service sectors from their default values of zero to levels commensurate with the estimated 
tariff equivalents, and solve a variant of the standard GTAP model for the updated database, 
which then acts as the benchmark for our simulations.47 The technical documentation of this 
procedure is summarised in Appendix B.  
For simplicity, we assume that the services counterpart of FTAs allowed under GATS 
Article V completely liberalises all service sectors in the participant regions. As an 
illustration, in Scenario 3, we shock [tms] to a target rate of zero for the services trade 
among Singapore, Japan and the US, in addition to the merchandise and agricultural tariff 
cuts. We close this section with a caveat: one shortcoming of Hoekman’s methodology is 
that the service sectors subjected to “no commitment” are taken to be most restrictive 
although there may actually be no or little restriction on access, but, for some reason(s), they 
were excluded from GATS. Furthermore, a limitation (to a commitment made) such as a 49 
percent limit on foreign ownership is taken to be as restrictive as another involving a 
screening process for FDI (Dihel 2003; McGuire, 2003).  
                                                 
45 These countries include the EU and China, South American nations like Argentina and Brazil, as well as, 
representative nations from Africa, Middle East and Asia. The complete list will be furnished upon request. 
 
46 The services agreement under NAFTA came into force in April 1994. Canada and Chile had a services 
agreement in July 1997, while that for Chile and Mexico came into force in August 1999. 
 
47 The variable [tms(I,r,s)] is the ad valorem tariff rate imposed on merchandise i on Region r by Region s. Now, 
it is also the tariff equivalent of services trade barriers imposed by s on r. 
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4.5 Alternative Market Structure: Monopolistic Competition 
Many empirical studies have found evidence of scale economies and imperfect 
competition in non-agricultural sectors (Helpman, 1986; de Melo and Tarr, 1992; Tybout, 
1993; Antweiler and Trefler, 2002).48 As a consequence, we want to test the robustness of 
our simulation results to a variation in the market structure and production technologies 
from the default GTAP settings of perfect competition and constant returns. To be succinct, 
we model scale economies internal to firms and Chamberlinian “large group” monopolistic 
competition in an experiment separate from the control, based on Francois and Roland-
Horst (1997) and Francois (1998). Their approach builds on the theoretical foundations laid 
by Ethier (1982), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Venables (1987).  
Relaxing the Armington assumption, we assume goods and services are differentiable at 
the firm level in the monopolistically competitive sectors. Each firm in sector j  of region i  
produces a unique variety and, is a monopolist in its chosen market niche because of less-
than-perfectly elastic demand. However, with a contestable market pricing rule (whose 
fundamental feature is free entry and exit), the firm is forced to price at average cost (AC) 
and make zero profits in the long run.49 
We assume that scale economies arise from fixed costs ( ). That is, some subset of a 
firm’s inputs is committed a priori to production and its costs must be covered regardless of 
FC
                                                 
48 Using 1972 - 1992 data on 34 industries in 71 countries, Antweiler and Trefler (2002) found evidence of 
modest scale economies if industries are assumed to exhibit the same degree of returns to scale. When 
heterogeneity among industries is factored into the analysis, they found strong evidence that 1/3 of all industries 
(including pharmaceuticals and machinery) face scale economies. Another 1/3 of the industries face constant 
returns and for the remainder, data are not sufficiently informative for making inferences about scale. 
Meanwhile, de Melo and Tarr (1992, 146) demonstrated, using econometric and engineering estimates, that there 
were unexploited economies of scale in the US steel and automobiles industries during the 1980s.  
 
The monopolistic competition model of Helpman and Krugman (1985) predicts that much trade will be intra-
industry when endowments are similar. Helpman (1987) found that, in cross-country comparisons, the larger the 
similarity in factor composition, the larger the share of intra-industry trade. In time series data, the more similar 
the factor composition of a group of countries becomes over time, the larger is the share of intra-industry trade 
within the group. These findings suggest that market competition may be imperfect. Tybout (1993) downplays 
the importance of scale efficiency gains when there are internal increasing returns to scale (IIRS) and attribute 
any welfare improvement arising from a trade policy to the fact that increasing returns lead to imperfect market 
structures, which in turn, open the possibility that the policy will enrich product menus for consumers, shift rents 
between countries (since IIRS creates trade barriers and profits) and reduce waste. In the provision of services, it 
is usually safe to assume that sectors like utilities and transportation are run by the public sector for reasons such 
as security, and not subject to market forces, especially foreign players. 
 
49 The form of competition assumed here is related to the contestable-markets model (Helpman and Krugman, 
1985) because both are based on free entry and average-cost pricing. However, the number of product varieties 
here is endogenously determined by the interplay between returns to scale and market size (Tybout, 1993). 
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the output level (Y ).  As Y  increases, AC falls, realizing internal scale economies. The 
firm thus faces an AC function of the form, 
MC
Y
FCAC +=  
A condition for equilibrium in the monopolistically competitive sector defined by AC-
pricing, monopoly pricing and increasing returns at the firm level is that, the price elasticity 
of demand for a variety in that sector, ij ,ε  is related inversely to the firm’s cost 










where  and ij,α ij ,β  are the fixed and marginal costs respectively for a firm in sector j of 
region i, and Y  is its output level.ij,
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We let the number of firms populating a monopolistically competitive sector ( ) be 
arbitrarily large. From the complete set of equilibrium conditions, 
ijn ,
ij ,ε  is fixed and equals 
the elasticity of substitution between varieties ( jσ ) (see Francois, 1998, 12). CDR  is fixed 
as well, because it is the inverse of ij ,ε . We assume that the firms in each sector share the 
same cost function, thus one set of values for CDR , ij ,ε  and jσ  suffice for every sector.  
                                                 
50 The CDR is a measure of unrealized economies of scale (de Melo and Tarr, 1992). Depending on its value, an 
industry may be facing economies/ diseconomies of scale or it may be operating at the minimum efficient scale. 
Re-expressing the ratio, we have 
SAC
MCCDR 111 −=−=  
where .  For an industry facing increasing returns to scale, AC exceeds MC and AC falls as output 
rises. With constant MC, CDR decreases toward zero as output increases. Thus if CDR > 0, there are scale 
economies; if CDR < 0, there are diseconomies of scale; and if CDR = 0, then the firm is operating at the 
minimum efficient scale. 
MCACs /=
 
51  Solving the following three equations simultaneously yields the equilibrium condition. 
Monopoly pricing by a firm in region i :  fi ( ) fifififi PMCP ε/1/ =−  
AC pricing by a firm in region i :   fi
fifi ACP =  
Cost function of a firm in sector j  in region i :  
ijijijijij PzYxC )()( ,,,, βα +=  
where  is the price of a bundle of primary and intermediate inputs,  used by a firm in sector j of region i.  





Next, a new parameter SCALE  and variable OSCALE  are introduced to the standard 
GTAP model. The latter is set exogenous for sectors whose firms compete monopolistically 
and face internal scale economies in production, while  is a function of , SCALE CDR
CDR
CDRSCALE −= 1  
When trade barriers are removed, consumers and firms gain better access to foreign 
varieties. The resultant increase in demand and free entry will encourage firm participation. 
The new entrants will not affect the size of incumbents since CDR  is fixed, and the 
industry expands as a result of an increase in the number of identically-sized firms. 
Welfare gains accrue from the increase in the menu of varieties that consumers face 
usually alluded to as “love-of-variety” effect. In addition, when an economy lifts its import 
tariffs, domestic firms’ profits will fall relative to their foreign counterparts, and the 
domestic industry contracts with free exit. As industries expand in some regions and capture 
an increasing share of the global market, the same industries in others may shrink, thus 
leading to the geographical specialisation of activities and therefore specialisation gains.52  
Not all of the pro-competitive gains discussed in Section 3.7 are realised. This is because the 
production scale of firms is fixed, so they do not enjoy the cost savings generated by 
increasing output and internal scale economies. Such a setting is required to motivate “large 
group” monopolistic competition. 53  Nonetheless, new entrants intensify competition, 
squeezing the incumbents’ mark-up of price over marginal cost. The fall in prices will 
benefit consumers. In short, we capture the gains from specialisation, “love-of-variety” 
effects and (some) pro-competitive effects on top of the allocative efficiency and TOT 
effects of the standard GTAP model following a policy change (trade liberalisation). 
                                                 
52 Complete firm exit and thus the collapse of a sector is possible but not probable. We rule out corner solutions 
of this type. This is accomplished by the choice of solution method. Appendix E provides the details. 
 
53 Following freer trade, firms may take advantage of internal scale economies to gain an edge over their 
competitors. In the process, they become more efficient (AC falls) and prices can decrease further. However, in 
our model, by assuming CDR is fixed, scale economies remain unrealised and firm size does not change. Fixed 
firm size is introduced to motivate “large-group” monopolistic competition. If firms can increase their scale of 
production, then increasing returns may result in only a handful of firms or a single firm. 
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After modifying the model, re-calibration ensures that the benchmark continues to be 
obtained as the equilibrium solution. Re-calibration, in our case, involves inferring the 
price-cost mark-up per sector ( ) for the monopolistically competitive sectors. These 
mark-ups are then used to compute the Implied CDR and substitution elasticities of 




MUCDR 1−=  
Substitution Elasticity, CDRj  Implied
1=σ  
We obtain plug-in estimates for  adjusted to our sectoral aggregation from Martins, 
Scarpetta and Pilat (1996), Francois (2000) and Francois, Meijl and Tongeren (2005). The 
implied CDR is then used to compute the values for . We assume that the same set 
of estimates applies to all regions for every sector. Refer to 
jMU
SCALE
Table 4.8 for the data.54  
In our experiment, we run all scenarios twice, once assuming that markets are 
characterised by perfect competition and constant returns (the default GTAP assumptions) 
and, in the next run, we assume all sectors except agriculture face “large-group” 
monopolistic competition. This approach is also adopted by Brown et al (2006). Appendix C 
provides the technical documentation for this section. 
4.6 Organisational Issues 
Due to the multitude of simulations carried out, we categorise each simulation exercise 
according to the underlying assumptions made. Refer to Table 4.9. Every exercise involves 
the three primary scenarios (S1 to S3) and the other six that account for the “super-hub” 
effects (S4 to S9). In our opinion, the assumptions for Exercise E are most realistic.55 
                                                 
54 The Armington substitution elasticities (ESUBD, ESUBM) continue to hold in the perfectly competitive 
agricultural sector, but are now set equal to each other (Francois, 1998). For products differentiated at firm-level, 
only jσ applies (between varieties). Whether they are sourced from aboard or domestically no longer matters. 
 
55 Simulation results in Excel format will be furnished upon request. For orderliness, the results are coded as 
follow: Exercise/ Service Barriers/ Market Structure/ Scenario. For example, ExB_SvcsH_PC_S9 refers to the 
simulation exercise “B” where the services (Svcs) trade barriers are built in and stay unchanged or hold (H) 
following a shock. All sectors are perfectly competitive (PC), and Singapore, the US and Japan liberalise trade 





5.1 An A Priori Welfare Analysis 
This section provides the intuition for what is happening in the simulation by examining 
the various possible effects that could have taken place as the US-Singapore-Japan trade 
relationship develops. Under certain settings, we are able to determine in an offhanded 
manner which effect(s) plays a dominant role at each stage of the development. For the 
more complex cases, empirical vigour is essential, and the results of which we cover in 
Sections 5.2 to 5.4. 
5.1.1 Sources of Welfare Change 
When markets are perfectly competitive, the welfare impact on a region due to trade 
policy changes (either of its own or its trading partners’) can arise from adjustments in the 
terms of trade (TOT), allocative efficiency and the relative prices of savings and investment. 
A TOT gain occurs when there is an incomplete pass-through of a newly imposed tariff to 
domestic prices. This happens when foreign exporters absorb some of the tariff burden. This 
may occur when the importer country is economically large like the US and its demand is 
relatively elastic. The importer region is better off because the world price of its imports 
falls. In other words, its TOT improves. Unilateral tariff cuts work in the reverse and the 
country concerned suffers a TOT loss. However, when tariff liberalisation is reciprocal like 
in an FTA, the cost of imports is reduced for members and an exchange gain results. In 
addition, as industries expand in some regions and capture an increasing share of the global 
market, the same industries in other regions may shrink, thus leading to the geographical 
specialisation of activities and therefore specialisation gains. The removal of price distortion 
caused by tariffs re-directs production factors to sectors where they are valued the most. A 
more efficient allocation of resources is expected to raise welfare. Meanwhile, those regions 
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that are net suppliers of savings to the global bank will benefit from a rise in the price of 
savings, relative to investment goods.56 
When we incorporate firm-level product differentiation in the model via “large group” 
monopolistic competition, regional welfare changes may also result from changes in the 
number of varieties that consumers face (usually alluded to as “love-of-variety” effect). 
When an economy lifts its import tariffs, domestic firms’ profits fall as they enjoy less 
protection from their foreign counterparts. The free entry and exit of firms thus become the 
means through which countries gain from specialisation. However, the scale of production is 
fixed in our model, so firms do not enjoy the cost savings that come with realising internal 
scale economies. Such a setting is required to motivate “large group” monopolistic 
competition. Nonetheless, new entrants intensify competition, squeezing the incumbents’ 
mark-ups, thus generating some pro-competitive gains (refer back to Section 4.5 on AC-
pricing in contestable markets). The resultant decrease in prices benefits the consumers. 
5.1.2 An Application to the US-Singapore-Japan Case Study 
Table 5.1 provides a decomposition of the change in welfare at each stage of 
development for three generic trading partners A, B and C, as they proceed from a single 
bilateral to a HAS and then to an exclusive free trade zone. The predicament of hub-aspiring 
Country C is analogous to the case of Singapore. We shall refer to this table periodically and 
determine in an offhanded manner which welfare implication plays an important role at each 
stage of development.57 As the impacts of large-group monopolistic competition, services 
trade liberalisation and “super-hub” effects are more complex issues to address, we omit 
them from Table 5.1 but will bring them to mind later. 
                                                 
56 The global bank sells a homogenous saving commodity at region-specific prices [PSAV(r)] to saver regions, 
and disburses the funds collected to investor regions at region-specific prices [PCGDS(r)]. A region is a net 
supplier of savings if it saves (lends) more than it borrows to invest. When a shock raises the price of savings 
relative to investment, net savings increases in value relative to the benchmark. Since current national saving 
augments future household consumption, the net saver region is better off. 
57 Our CGE experiment measures the welfare effect of the three trading regimes relative to the benchmark. We 
do not measure the welfare gains and losses as we move from one trading system to another. However, in this 
section, we approach the regimes in a sequential manner to better understand what welfare effects occur or are 
eroded along the way. This highlights the differences between regimes regarding their welfare impact. 
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First, we consider USSFTA and JSEPA. Since Singapore is a relatively open economy, 
she can give few tariff concessions to her FTA partners. The producers in Japan and the US, 
which are less efficient than those in RoW, are therefore unlikely to gain an edge through 
pricing and supply more to Singapore. Any least-cost American or Japanese exporter who 
has all along dealt with Singapore also receives limited preferential treatment through the 
FTAs. Thus we do not expect Singapore to suffer a significant TOT loss on the import side. 
That is, the welfare effects (H2), (H5), (H8) and (H11) in Table 5.1 are likely to turn out 
modest. On the contrary, Japan and the US have imposed substantial tariff barriers on 
selected goods originating from Singapore prior to the FTAs. As at 2001, the US imposes 
tariff rates exceeding 5 percent for non-metallic mineral products, leather products, textiles 
and wearing apparels. Japan also imposes high trade barriers on Singapore for these 
products in addition to food, beverages and tobacco. Refer to Appendix B for the details. As 
a result, tariff liberalisations by the US and Japan can lead to an increase in the price 
competitiveness of Singapore’s exports. Therefore the TOT gains for Singapore indicated by 
(H6) and (H12) are probably significant. 
Protectionist measures such as import tariffs distort domestic prices and causes 
deadweight loss. When a country lowers its tariffs vis-à-vis some trade partners but not on 
others, which happens in discriminatory trade pacts like an FTA, an artificial incentive is 
created for the residents to switch their purchases away from the non-favoured to the 
favoured trade partner. Nevertheless, since the average price will adjust downward 
domestically, import demand will increase toward the efficient zero-tariff level and 
domestic resources can be re-allocated to more productive uses rather than for substituting 
imports. This generates allocative efficiency gains. However, Singapore has not provided 
much tariff concessions to her FTA partners. Thus there would not be much improvement in 
this aspect. Related welfare gains (H3) and (H9) are therefore likely to be insubstantial. 
Along the same line of reasoning, Singaporean producers will enjoy little improvement in 
their access to inputs originating from in the America and Japan, and so the gains described 
in (H1) and (H7) are also inconsequential. 
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To take stock, Singapore is better off from an improvement in her TOT on the export 
side, but enjoys little allocative efficiency gains and suffers little TOT loss on the import 
side. This is the conclusion when we analyse JSEPA and USSFTA independently of each 
other. Considering that USSFTA “overlaps” JSEPA in a two-sided trade triangle, (H6) and 
(H12) translate into a competitive edge for Singapore vis-à-vis each spoke country in the 
other spoke country’s market. In addition, another gain, which is risk-free, may also arise in 
the HAS as Singapore facilitates “indirect two-way trade” between Japan and the US. This 
indirect arbitrage gain may be realisable even in the presence of rules of origin (ROOs) that 
are a common accessory of FTAs. Refer to Effect (H13) for the details. However, if the US 
and Japan form a bilateral FTA with each other, then the advantages that Singapore has as a 
trade hub over each spoke in the other spoke’s market will be eroded. This “preference 
dilution effect” overshadows any optimism about the accumulation of preferences gathered 
under RTAs (Das et al, 2006, 37) and is captured by (H15) and (H16). Furthermore, if the 
exports from Singapore substitute for those traded within the FTA, then as an outsider, 
Singapore can be worse off due to trade diversion. The net effect will depend on whether the 
FTA generates more income for its members and if it does, whether the subsequent increase 
in their demand for goods (including those originating from Singapore) will more than 
offset the substitution effect. This is summarised by (H17). 
In Chapter 2, we have observed that the major exports from Singapore to Japan and the 
US between 1994 and 2004 comprised electrical products, office and data processing 
machines, petroleum and coal products (for Japan only), and chemicals and their related 
products (refer back to Figures 2.1 - 2.2). Meanwhile, Figures 2.3 - 2.4 indicate that 
electrical products, chemicals, and petroleum and coal products were also the top American 
exports to Japan, while the US imports significant amounts of electrical products and office 
and data processing machines from the latter. This suggests that there could be a high level 
of substitutability between the exports from Singapore and those traded between Japan and 
the US. However, without more disaggregated data, this evidence is suggestive but not 
conclusive. This is because the goods produced and traded between the US and Japan may 
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be of a different level of quality or belong to a different subset under each aforementioned 
product category, compared to those exported by Singapore into the free trade area. Even if 
the spoke-spoke FTA is a substitute, welfare effect (H17) remains ambiguous because the 
size of the income effect due to the free trade area cannot be ascertained ex ante.  
At this point, we expect JSEPA to generate net benefits for Singapore through TOT 
gains. Following USSFTA, Singapore benefits further through another TOT gain vis-à-vis 
the US, as well as, from the two-way indirect arbitrage due to her hub position with respect 
to Japan and the US. If the latter form an FTA, then Singapore is unable to reap arbitrage 
profits and may even suffer from trade diversion. When we extend our analysis to 
incorporate the other FTAs that “super-hub” Singapore has established with countries in 
RoW, additional indirect arbitrage opportunities present themselves. Japan and the US can 
trade through Singapore with her other spoke partners whom they have not established trade 
pacts with. If a USJFTA is formed, Singapore loses the indirect arbitrage gains from 
facilitating trade between the US and Japan, but still benefits from facilitating trade between 
this country pair and her other spoke partners. The inclusion of the “super-hub” effect 
therefore makes Singapore comparatively better off when transiting from hub status to being 
a member of the “threesome” free trade zone (this is reflected in our analysis by contrasting 
Scenarios 2, 3 with Scenarios 5, 6 respectively).  
The situation becomes complex when we account for the other FTAs that Japan and the 
US establish with RoW so that we have multiple “super-hubs” in the US-Singapore-Japan 
HAS (as in Scenarios 7 to 9). Singapore continues to be a tariff-free route for trade between 
the US or Japan with her other spoke partners. On the other hand, Singapore is relegated to 
spoke status because the US and Japan each becomes a hub facilitating trade between 
Singapore and one of their own spokes. In addition, Singapore together with Japan and/or 
the US would create a tariff-free route linking trade between the spoke countries of one with 
the spoke countries of another, which is a useful route when direct trade is prohibited or 
very expensive. As an illustration, rather than trading directing with India, which is a spoke 
partner of Singapore, a spoke belonging to the US such as Chile can circumvent trade 
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barriers through the tariff-free route facilitated by the Chile-US FTA, USSFTA, and the 
India-Singapore FTA. Of course, if ROOs are in force, then every consignment of goods 
must meet the local content rules to qualify for tariff concessions. With multiple linkages 
such as these, arbitrage gains are very unlikely.58 
Assuming “large-group” monopolistic competition adds an extra dimension to our case 
study. With firm-level product differentiation, industries in a free trade area may expand as 
producers are attracted by tariff concessions and the sizable market within. In contrast, 
outsider countries risk facing an exodus of factories due to this “size” effect. At the same 
time, freer trade, albeit discriminatory in nature, should encourage further specialisation in 
members’ production and enhance their welfare. The reduction of trade barriers can also 
generate gains due to pro-competitive effects; with free entry and exit, the monopolistic 
practices of domestic firms are kept in check by increased foreign competition. Only the 
love-for-variety effect is less clear-cut. If countries were in autarky and now trade freely, 
then the number of varieties available to consumers (and therefore their welfare) must 
increase. This is despite that the fiercer competition from aboard would force unprofitable 
producers to cease operations and lowers the global count of varieties. However, moving 
from restricted trade to free trade may not lead to the same outcome. In textbook autarky 
cases, consumers, for some reason(s), are barred from accessing foreign varieties so they 
can only choose from domestic alternatives. Under restricted trade, consumers can access 
foreign varieties at the outset. It is just that they pay more because trade is restricted by 
(non-prohibitive) import tariffs and/or other barriers. When trade is liberalised, the varieties 
they face lessen as competition intensifies. With fewer choices, consumers are worse off.  
As a trade hub, Singapore would have preferential access to the markets in Japan and 
the US. This can cause a substantial size effect as firms relocate their operations from 
outsider countries to Singapore. Following USJFTA, some firms may decide to shift their 
                                                 
58 In Scenario 8, Singapore, the US and Japan form a tariff-free route through which spoke countries in the US 
HAS can trade indirectly with those belonging to the Japanese hub. Then Singapore suffers an additional loss 
when Japan and the US form an FTA in Scenario 9, which effectively “cuts short” this trade route. However, the 
spoke countries of Japan and the US continue to trade with the spokes of Singapore through the super-hubs. 
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operations away from Singapore because they no longer need to use the country as a 
stepping board to gain preferential treatment in both the Japanese and American markets; 
they can do so by directly operating in either one of the markets and save on transportation 
costs. Intensified competition between the Japanese and American producers leading to firm 
exit also mean a decline in the number of varieties for the consumers in Singapore. As a 
result, while we expect Singapore to become worse off in a free trade zone than in a HAS, 
the welfare disparity between these two situations is likely to be more acute when products 
are differentiated at the firm level because of the adverse size and variety effects.  
When services trade is liberalised too, we expect positive economic impact on the 
industries that use services as intermediate inputs, and negative for those competing with 
export-oriented services sectors for production resources. The deep economic integration 
compared to mere tariff cuts may entail greater specialisation among the member countries.  
Given the multitude of effects that can arise from a trading regime, determining its net 
impact on welfare requires empirical vigour, the results of which we cover next. 
5.2 Welfare Effects 
As a measure of welfare change, we report the equivalent variation (EV) that arises in 
each scenario. The regional EV can be interpreted as the amount of income that if given to the 
region at the initial state, would have exactly the same effect on its welfare, as the move to the 
alternative state. If EV is positive, then the counterfactual state is preferred to the benchmark. 
We also find out the impact of each trading regime on the world community. A global EV, 
computed as the simple summation of the regional EVs, gives us with a gauge. If global EV 
turns out to be positive, then it is hypothetically possible for those regions that stand to gain to 
compensate the losers using some lump-sum re-distribution scheme. Thus a potential Pareto 
improvement in world welfare is possible. These figures are reported in Table 5.2 (assuming 
all markets are perfectly competitive) and Table 5.4 (when manufactures and services 
sectors face “large group” monopolistic competition). The EVs are also decomposed into 
the various contributing factors which we discussed in the previous section. Their relative 
importance is reported in Tables 5.3A – 5.3C and Tables 5.5A – 5.5C respectively. Under 
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perfect competition, these factors include changes in allocative efficiency (figures reported 
under the heading, “alloc”), terms of trade (“tot”) and the relative prices of the savings and 
investment goods (“IS”). With monopolistic competition, changes in efficiency accrue 
mainly from resource re-allocation and pro-competitive effects (these are summed up under 
“eff”). In addition, there are changes in TOT (“tot”) and love-for-variety effects (“tech”).  
In Section 5.3, we proceed to industry-level data and pinpoint major output changes to 
grasp the sectoral effects. The impact on primary factors is best reflected by the changes to 
their real returns. We report these in Section 5.4. During the process, we do not emphasize 
the magnitude of impacts, but their direction and “relative magnitude”. For the latter, we 
mean the following; compared to the US, Japan gains less from the US-Singapore-Japan 
free trade zone, compared to transportation equipment, electronics gains more from 
USSFTA, or compared to joining a single bilateral, Singapore is better off playing hub.59 
5.2.1 Welfare Implications for Singapore 
Table 5.2 reports the EV for cases under perfect competition. The nine scenarios (in 
columns) are divisible into three subsets depending on whether the other FTAs which 
Singapore, Japan and the US signed with RoW (i.e. the “super-hub” effects) are accounted 
for or not. 60  All nine scenarios were ran thrice (Exercises A, B, C) to account for the 
presence of services trade barriers and if these are eliminated via services agreements. Table 
5.4 presents similar results for cases under “large group” monopolistic competition.  
We observe that, if all sectors are perfectly competitive, then it is in Singapore’s best 
interests to play hub to Japan and the US. Even if a “threesome” free trade zone results 
because the spoke countries decide to establish an FTA, Singapore is still better off than 
subscribing to JSEPA only; the latter arrangement being superior to having no FTA at all. 
This conclusion is robust regardless of the “super-hub” effects (See Scenarios 2, 5 and 8). 
Deep integration through the elimination of services trade barriers on top of tariff cuts 
                                                 
59 Policymakers have made use of CGE results within this context because the magnitudes tend to be sensitive to 
parameter data and model assumptions. We thank Shujiro Urata for his comments on this matter. 
 
60 Compare Scenarios 1 to 3 with Scenarios 4 to 6 (super-hub SING) and Scenarios 7 to 9 (multiple super-hubs 
SING, US and JAP) respectively. 
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serves to amplify Singapore’s welfare gains in each scenario. The country is better off by 
US$426m to US$546m (0.40% to 0.63% of benchmark GDP) if liberalisation is restricted to 
merchandise trade. When services trade is liberalised as well, Singapore reaps welfare gains 
between US$1603m and US$2672m (1.46% to 3.10% of benchmark GDP). From Tables 
5.3A to 5.3C, we observe that changes in TOT have the dominant influence over welfare. 
Playing hub continues to be the best option for Singapore when markets are imperfectly 
competitive. However, pursuing hub status does not pay off if Japan and the US form an 
FTA; while Singapore is better off in the free trade zone compared to the benchmark, 
welfare could have been higher had the country subscribes a single bilateral instead. Welfare 
gains for hub are larger than under perfect competition, ranging from US$2144m to 
US$4242m for tariff cuts only, and US$3353m to US$5086m when services trade are 
liberalised as well. From Tables 5.5A to 5.5C, we observe that the outcomes are shaped 
mainly by TOT gains and negative variety effects, which is consistent with our predictions.  
5.2.2 Welfare Implications for Japan and the US 
Japan and the US are better off in a free trade zone created by overlapping bilaterals 
than in a HAS centred on Singapore. They always lose playing the role of spokes, except 
when services trade are liberalised in which case the US gains marginally. Ignoring the 
single super-hub cases (Scenarios 4 - 6), Japan always loses more than the US. This is 
regardless of the market structure assumed and the depth of economic integration. Overall, 
the welfare impact of a Singaporean hub on Japan and the US in percentages of their 
benchmark GDP is insignificant (0.03 percent or less). 61  This is expected in a small 
economy’s interaction with giants. 
Why does Japan lose more than the US when both are relegated to spokes status? There 
are a few plausible explanations. For starters, a reduction in tariff rate would have three 
welfare implications on the trade-liberalising country: improvement in allocative efficiency, 
deterioration in its TOT and a negative impact on domestic production (Feenstra, 2004). If 
                                                 
61 On the same note, although the present juncture of trade relations (best depicted by Scenario 8) spells welfare 
loss for Japan, and that both Japan and the US would be better off in Scenario 9, the potential gains are not likely 
to spark off negotiations for a USJFTA. 
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Japan and the US lose, then the latter two effects dominate. The US used to export directly 
to Japan and pay import duties, but now the country trades along the tariff-free route via the 
Singapore hub. As a result, Japan suffers a TOT loss on the import side. The same applies to 
the US for Japanese imports. A conjecture would then be that Japan suffers a more severe 
deterioration in its TOT. From the benchmark database, we observe that Japan imposes 
tariffs that are, on average, more than twice as high as those imposed by the US. The highest 
barriers are concentrated in agriculture, petroleum and coal products, and food, beverage 
and tobacco. Refer back to Table 4.4. A decomposition of EV indicates that adjustments in 
TOT play a major role in welfare changes for HAS scenarios and is thus a crucial factor on 
why Japan suffers more. See Tables 5.3A to 5.3C and Tables 5.5A to 5.5C. 62  With 
imperfect competition, there is a gap between the price or consumer valuation of a product, 
and the marginal costs to firms. This distortion due to monopolistic pricing creates an 
efficiency loss, and any increase in domestic output offsets this loss and raises welfare. 
Tariff elimination works in the reverse because domestic production may contract. 
However, our imperfect competition model precludes monopolistic pricing behaviour (and 
thus any related pre-existing inefficiency) because we allow for free entry and exit of firms. 
In an alternative perspective, regional welfare is a function of tariff revenue (ploughed 
back to society through the provision of public goods), company profits and consumer 
surplus. However, Japan need forgo less tariff revenue than the US following the respective 
Singapore bilateral (see Table 4.5B). Although the USSFTA and JSEPA may relocate 
production out of Japan, the US and RoW, and into Singapore (to gain preferential access to 
both the American and Japanese markets) with the contraction of industries likely to be 
more severe for Japan (because the American market is relatively larger; more production is 
attracted out of Japan than out of the US for each other’s market), our zero-profit 
assumption meant that adjustments in domestic production should not affect regional 
                                                 
62 Referring back to Table 4.5B, Japan earns less tariff revenue than the US on merchandise originating from 
Singapore. It seems that rents forgone following trade liberalisation cannot explain why Japan suffers more. 
Actually, tariff revenue is an income transfer from consumers to the government. Suppose Region A charges $10 
for a unit of export and Region B imposes a tariff of $2. If the resultant price in B’s market is $12, then the 
economy effectively pays $10 to A. When the tariff is removed and if prices stay unchanged, then B is worse off 
paying $12 to foreign producers instead of $10. We focus on the adjustment in TOT to measure welfare change. 
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welfare via changes in economic rents. Furthermore, the net change in overall domestic 
production computed as the sum of industrial output changes (in dollars) is either positive 
for Japan and negative for the US, or the contraction is more severe in the US than in Japan 
under all HAS scenarios. See Tables 5.6A - 5.7C. This refutes that industrial contraction, if 
any has landed Japan in a worse situation than the US.  
What remains is, consumers in Japan must be worse off relative to their American 
counterparts following the HAS. A loss in consumer surplus may stem from higher product 
prices and/or lower factor returns which limit purchasing power. We find that the domestic 
market prices in Japan and the US are lower in all sectors under HAS relative to the 
benchmark. However, taking Scenario 2 as an example, the ratio of primary factor returns to 
the consumer price index has declined with the gap between product and factor price 
changes being narrower in the US. This suggests that purchasing power has deteriorated 
more in Japan.63 With “large group” monopolistic competition, consumer welfare may also 
be adversely affected following the HAS shock if there is a decrease in the number of 
product varieties valued by Japanese households given the intensified cross-border 
competition and firm exit. Since firms are identical and their output is fixed (scale 
economies remain unrealised), the change in overall domestic production indicates the 
change in the number of local varieties/firms. Since production is higher in Japan with HAS, 
consumers are worse off because of fewer foreign varieties. 
Finally, as discussed in Section 5.1.2, Singapore exports to the US commodities which 
Japan also sells to the latter such as electrical products and office and data processing 
machines. With USSFTA, trade diversion makes outsider Japan worse off. Similarly, the US 
suffers as Japan imports more electrical products, chemicals, and petroleum and coal 
products from Singapore under JSEPA, because the US is also a supplier of these products 
to Japan. Our findings then indicate that the trade diversionary effect is greater under 
                                                 
63 Due to data constraints, we will furnish the data on market price changes upon request. The real returns to 
primary factors will be covered in more detail in Section 5.4. 
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USSFTA so Japan loses more than the US. Due to data limitations, we are unable to verify 
further if this last explanation holds water. 
5.2.3 Global Welfare Implications 
Under perfect competition, none of the free trade zone scenarios is superior to the HAS 
in augmenting global welfare. Referring back to Section 2.3.2, our finding echoes the 
concerns of Schott (2004) on the global impact of a USJFTA. However, if the 
manufacturing and services sectors are better explained by imperfect competition, the results 
are reversed. The HAS becomes undesirable under all circumstances, but global welfare is 
higher relative to the benchmark when a free trade zone is established (See Tables 5.2 and 
5.4). Thus the world’s predicament hinges on the type of market structure assumed. On a 
separate note, when we assume perfect competition in all markets, there is an estimated net 
welfare loss from the HAS ranging from US$110m to US$793m for the world as a whole, 
ignoring “super-hub” effects. Incorporating the latter, the world gains US$355m to 
US$1606m. Under imperfect competition, global welfare loss from the HAS is substantially 
lower in “super-hub” cases. This suggests that indirect trade via routes of least resistance 
created by Singapore-US-Japan bilaterals are crucial for enhancing world well-being. 
5.3 Sectoral Impacts: Changes in Industry Size 
Just as an all-roads-lead-to-Paris transportation system favours industrial location in 
Paris, a HAS arrangement favours industry in the hub at the expense of the industry in the 
spokes, because the former has better market access to all spokes and can get duty-free 
intermediates from them. Thus sectors receiving tariff concessions should expand 
production as overseas demand increases, while the opposite is true for their foreign 
counterparts. Filling in the gap between Japan and the US with a spoke-spoke bilateral 
removes this investment deterrent on the spokes economies (Wonnacott, 1996a; Puga and 
Venables, 1997; Baldwin, 2004). To grasp the industry-level effects of integration, Tables 
5.6A – 5.6C report the sectoral output changes that occur in Singapore, the US and Japan for 
cases under perfect competition. Output change proxies the adjustment in industry size 
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following an economic integration.64  Attention is paid on the HAS and free trade zone 
scenarios. Tables 5.7A – 5.7C present similar results for cases under monopolistic 
competition. For ease of reference, figures for the top five producing merchandise sectors 
are shaded grey. Gains exceeding 1 percent of benchmark output or market values above 
US$500m are highlighted blue. Conversely, significant losses are in red. 
5.3.1 Hub-and-spokes Configuration (Scenarios 2, 5 and 8) 
When economic sizes are highly asymmetric such as ours, the sectoral effects are acute 
in the small economy and insignificant in the hegemony. Even if economic integration is 
deep, we find that a HAS centred on Singapore has negligible impact on the industries based 
in Japan and the US. As for Singapore, we observe a shift in production toward services and 
certain types of manufactures. Summarising across Tables 5.6A – 5.6C, we obtain the 
following outcome, 
Expand Contract 
Food, Bev. & Tob. (+7.1% to +16.7%) Electronics (-0.9% to -3.8%) 
Textiles (+0.6% to +18%) Machinery & Equip. (-1.2% to -14.6%) 
Wearing Apparel (+18% to +42%) Metal Products (-0.4% to -10.8%) 
Construction (+0.5% to +6.1%) Transport Equipment (-1.4% to -15.7%)  
Trade & Transport (-0.3% to +2.7%) Chemicals (+0.3% to -16.6%) 
Other Private Services (-1.1% to 6.9%) Mining (-2% to -17.2%) 
Note: For Singapore. Perfect competition cases only; actual value of change depends on 
“super-hub” effect and the depth of integration. 
The sectors whose productions expand are: food, beverages and tobacco, textiles, wearing 
apparel, construction services, trade and transportation services, as well as, other private 
services. The wearing apparel industry experiences the biggest growth relative to the 
benchmark between 18 and 42 percent of benchmark output, while the food, beverages and 
tobacco industries gain the most in value terms. Meanwhile, the losers of integration are 
concentrated in high-end manufacturing industries such as electronics, machinery and 
equipment, transportation equipment, metal products and chemicals. 
The “super-hub” effects (Scenarios 5 and 8 compared to Scenario 2) tend to dilute the 
impact of the HAS. With shallow integration (Tables 5.6A - 5.6B), substantial output 
                                                 
64 Each table corresponds to a simulation exercise, which makes different assumptions regarding the presence of 
services trade barriers and if they are eliminated via services agreements. 
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increase is also observed in the leather products industry, while spillovers to the services 
sectors are found to be modest. Under deep integration, the contractions in manufacturing 
are more severe. This outcome results because tariff liberalisation via USSFTA and JSEPA 
leads to specialisation among the members. This is evident in the expansion of American 
and Japanese industries whose counterparts in Singapore shrank, and vice versa. If services 
trade are liberalised as well, the manufacturing industries would contract further as the 
lifting of regulations makes the trade in services more profitable and service providers in 
Singapore can entice resources away from manufacturing activities with higher returns. For 
example, the chemicals industry gains marginally when services trade is not liberalised (see 
Exercise A), but suffers a severe contraction if integration is deep (Exercise C). This is 
because chemicals consist, at a disaggregated level, items such as pharmaceuticals whose 
production is skilled labour-intensive. When these resources are diverted to services, the 
output of chemicals falls. 
Assuming “large group” monopolistic competition and restricting our observation to the 
most realistic Scenario 8, we observe that the production of food, beverages and tobacco 
expands, but contraction is rampant in the rest of the economy. Industries producing 
electronic goods, machinery and equipment, chemicals and other manufactures are some of 
the biggest losers. Regardless of whether services trade is liberalised or not, the HAS 
benefits the construction industry but adversely affects trade, transportation and other 
private services based in Singapore. 
5.3.2 Free Trade Zone (Scenarios 3, 6 and 9) 
Summarising across Tables 5.6A – 5.6C yields the following outcome, 
Expand Contract 
Food, Bev. & Tob. (+0.4% to +7.8%) Electronics (-0.6% to -2.5%) 
Textiles (+2.9% to +18.2%) Machinery & Equip. (-0.8% to -12.5%) 
Wearing Apparel (+20.9% to +43%) Metal Products (-0.4% to -9.7%) 
Construction (+0.3% to +5.2%) Transport Equipment (-1.1% to -13.9%) 
Trade & Transport (-0.2% to +2.6%) Chemicals (+0.3 to -14.2%) 
Other Private Services (-0.9% to +6%) Mining (-1.7% to -15.1%) 
Note: For Singapore. Perfect competition cases only; range depends on “super-hub” effect and 
the depth of integration. 
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The signs of sectoral output changes for the free trade zone scenario is similar to those under 
the HAS. For example, the expansion of the textiles, wearing apparel and construction 
industries found in the HAS are preserved. However, the increase in the production of food, 
beverages and tobacco is greatly reduced (roughly halved) in every situation, although the 
contraction of manufacturing sectors such as electronics, machinery and equipment, and 
transportation equipment are also comparatively milder. The former outcome may be due to 
the US and Japan trading more with each other under the USJFTA so that the advantages 
that Singapore gains under her own FTAs are partially dissipated. The latter outcome could 
be due to the income effect generated by USJFTA.  
Even if we assume monopolistic competition in all sectors except agriculture, the 
wearing apparel, food, beverages and tobacco industries still gain. Looking at the most 
realistic Scenario 9, regardless of whether services trade are liberalised or not, we observe 
that the major manufacturing industries in Singapore - chemicals, electronic goods, and 
machinery and equipment - face sizable contractions between US$0.8b and US$5.6b. 
The formation of the free trade zone expands agricultural, as well as, food, beverages 
and tobacco output in the US, but reduces similar production in Japan. Under perfect 
competition, the major manufacturing sectors in Japan (chemicals, electronics, transport 
equipment, machinery and equipment), as well as, the mining industry each stands to gain 
more than US$1b worth of increase in output at the expense of their US counterparts. 
Deeper integration benefits construction, trade and transportation services in both countries, 
harms (aid) the major manufacturing sectors in the US (Japan) and benefits (hurts) the 
American (Japanese) agricultural, private services, food, beverage and tobacco sectors. For 
example, the agricultural output in the US would expand by 2.6 percent, but the same 
economic activity in Japan contracts by more than 5 percent. The USJFTA thus causes 
further specialisation in production among the members. We summarise the findings across 




Construction (+0.1% to +0.2%) Construction (0% to +0.1%) 
Wood Products (-0.1% to -0.4%) Chemicals (+0.6% to +1.1%) 
Chemicals (-0.4% to -1.3%) Transport Equip. (+2.5% to +3.3%) 
Transport Equipment (-0.7% to -1.3%) Electronics (+0.3% to +1.1%) 
Machinery & Equip. (-0.8% to -1.9%) Machinery & Equip. (+1.2% to +2.2%) 
Agriculture (+2.6% to +2.9%) Agriculture (-5.5% to -5.7%)  
Food, Bev. & Tob. (+2.3% to +2.5%) Food, Bev. & Tob. (-2.2% to -2.4%) 
Other Private Services (0% to +0.4%) Other Private Services (0% to -0.5%) 
Note: Perfect competition cases only; range depends on “super-hub” effect and depth of integration 
 
5.3.3 Summary of Sectoral Effects 
Singapore’s FTAs with the US and Japan create significant sectoral adjustments in the 
island country where the emphasis shifts from the incumbent growth engines of 
manufacturing such as electronics to a greater emphasis on the provision of services. The 
composition of manufactures change as well; there is more output of processed food, textiles 
and wearing apparel, but less of machinery, equipment, chemicals and electronics. The 
substitution and income effects of the USJFTA are expected to moderate the contractions 
and growths of industries in Singapore caused by the USSFTA and JSEPA. Both the US and 
Japan, being economic giants, are unaffected by their bilateral agreements with Singapore. 
However, the USJFTA  is expected to cause substantial sectoral adjustments as the US and 
Japan specialise production, with the latter concentrating more on manufactures and 
construction services, while the former produces more agricultural, food, beverage and 
tobacco products, as well as, other private services. 
5.4 Impact on Primary Factors 
Tables 5.8A – 5.8C reports the percentage changes in the real returns to primary factors 
relative to the benchmark. To summarise, we have the following outcome, 
  HAS (Singapore) FTZ (Singapore) FTZ (US) FTZ (Japan) 
Land -6.9% to +0.4%   -3.9% to -11.1% +17% to +18.8% -25.4% to -26.5% 
Unskilled Labour +0.5% to +7.1% +0.4% to +6.5% 0% to +0.1% +0.5% to +0.8% 
Skilled Labour +0.4% to +7.6% +0.4% to +6.9% -0.1% to +0.1% +0.6% to +0.9% 
Capital +0.5% to +7.4% +0.4% to +6.8% 0% to +0.2% +0.5% to +0.8% 
Natural Resources -0.4% to -10.1% -3.5% to -12.5% -0.5% to -2.2% -18.5% to -19.5% 
Note: For brevity sake, we report the figures for the HAS and free trade zone scenarios, assuming perfect 
competition prevails in all the markets. FTZ refers to free trade zone. There is little adjustment in factor 
returns for the US and Japan under HAS scenarios so they are omitted. Actual change depends on “super-
hub” effects and depth of integration. 
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We observe that the labourers (both skilled and unskilled) and the capital owners in 
Singapore will always gain in both trading regimes, while the owners of natural resources 
always lose. When services trade are not liberalised (Exercises A and B), unskilled labour 
gains the most on average in the HAS (0.5 percent to 0.7 percent increase in benchmark real 
returns). When services trade is liberalised, skilled labour and capital would gain as much 
as, if not more than, unskilled labour (6.1 percent to 7.6 percent increase). The increase in 
real returns is comparatively smaller and the losses bigger in the free trade zone scenarios.  
The USSFTA and JSEPA have little impact on the primary factors employed in Japan 
and the US. However, the landowners in the US are better off (17 percent to 18.8 percent 
increase in real returns) and those in Japan are worse off (25.4 percent to 26.5 percent 
decrease) following USJFTA, while the returns on natural resources is expected to fall in 
both countries. Interestingly, we observe that, in the free trade zone, the real returns to 
skilled labour in the US decline if liberalisation is restricted to merchandise trade only, but 
they increase when liberalisation also covers services trade (figures in red and blue 
respectively). We discuss more about this finding in the following section. 
5.5 A Digression: Magnification-like Effects 
In a two-good, two-factor model, each country that liberalises trade faces a higher 
relative price in the world market for the good that uses its relatively abundant factor 
intensively, and the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theorem tells us that the country will specialise 
in and export this good (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 1933; Samuelson, 1948, 1949 and 1953). 
Meanwhile, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) showed that an increase in the relative price of a 
good increases the real return to the factor used intensively in its production, and reduces the 
real return to the other factor. This is captured by Jones’ (1965) “magnification effect”; any 
change in the product prices has a magnified effect on the factor prices. Putting the pieces 
together, one can deduce that the abundant factor would gain from free trade, while the 
scarce factor loses.  
Scenarios (3), (6) and (9) capture the change in real returns to primary factors as 
Singapore, the US and Japan move from restricted trade (the benchmark) to free trade with 
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respect to each other, while controlling for the existence of other FTAs in the background. 
The trade liberalisation among them should boost domestic production and export of goods 
that each country has a comparative advantage in, and therefore abundant factors are 
expected to gain in real returns and the converse applies for scarce factors. True to form, 
when the free trade zone is established, the real returns to land and natural resources, which 
are scarce in Singapore and Japan, decline in these countries while their abundant labour 
gain. Similarly, in the land-abundant US, landowners prove to be winners.  
However, as pointed out at the end of the previous section, when integration is shallow 
the real return to skilled labour decreases in the US. This suggests that the country is skilled 
labour-scarce which cannot be true. On liberalising services trade as well, we found skilled 
labour gains (albeit modestly). One can then infer that their employment in the US must be 
concentrated in services. This exercise demonstrates that if we want to test whether 
abundant factors gain from free trade, then it would be more appropriate to include services 
trade liberalisation as well. This is because the HO framework assumes liberalisation across 
all sectors. 65  Thus the assertion that abundant factors gain from free trade (and scarce 
factors lose) is robust in our generalised model with many factors, goods and regions. 




















65 The HO theory was also derived under the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. 
These assumptions are preserved in Simulation Exercises A - C. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SYSTEMATIC SENSTIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Results from simulation models are sometimes highly dependent on the values 
employed for exogenous variables such as endowments, substitution elasticities and policy 
distortions like taxes. In GTAP, the values of key economic parameters in the disaggregated 
database are derived from a survey of econometric work. Such estimates are most 
appropriately viewed as random. Subsequently, simulation results may be different for 
different possible sets of parameter values. We want to know the extent of this variation. In 
particular, we want to know how likely the EV for Singapore will change sign for each trade 
configuration and if hub status continues to be welfare optimal when exogenous variables 
become uncertain.66  
Many CGE studies have conducted either ad hoc or Monte Carlo sensitivity analyses to 
increase the credibility of their conclusions. The ad hoc approach involves examining 
different results from a simulation model for a relatively small, arbitrarily determined set of 
values for key exogenous variables. This method is clearly far from being systematic in 
exploring the impact of variations in the exogenous variables on simulation results. A Monte 
Carlo analysis with a sufficient number of repetitions would yield reliable and systematic 
insights. However, for large global CGE models like GTAP, the Monte Carlo approach can 
be extremely time-consuming, because it requires many solves given the multitude of 
repetitions (in the threshold of thousands) and the time taken for each solve depends on the 
complexity of the problem.  
As an alternative, we conduct formal systematic sensitivity analysis (SSA) through the 
RunGTAP platform using the multivariate Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) procedure. It is more 
efficient than a Monte Carlo approach because it requires much less information and solves 
                                                 
66 If we find the results do hinge on a few estimates (as evidenced by high variance in the distribution), then the 
next step would be to determine the reliability of the latter. Suppose they prove otherwise. Then one may suggest 
focusing research resources to reduce some of the uncertainty surrounding the exogenous variables in question. 
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of the model and is more systematic than an ad hoc analysis. DeVuyst and Preckel (1997) 
also found that SSA using GQ generates more accurate approximations of the means and 
standard deviations of simulation results than the Monte Carlo approach, while using less 
information. 67  Appendix D summarises the underlying theory of the GQ approach and 
covers the technical details of implementing SSA using RunGTAP.  
6.2 Settings of the SSA 
The SSA will be conducted for Scenarios 1 to 3, which form the basis from which we 
have departed in previous chapters to introduce a different market structure, production 
technologies, services trade liberalisation, and “super-hub” effects, all of which can also be 
considered as attempts to test the robustness of our results. The SSA involves several sets of 
GTAP supply-side parameters: elasticities of substitution between primary factors 
[ESUBVA], between domestic and imported goods or inputs [ESUBD] and between the 
valued added by primary factors and composite intermediate [ESUBT).68  Their original 
values are reported in Table 3.1. We also test our simulation results against changes in 
factor mobility across sectors, [ETRAE]. Refer back to Sections 3.1 – 3.3 for more details 
on these supply-side parameters. On the demand side, we vary two sets of GTAP parameters 
governing consumer behaviour: the own-price and income elasticities of demand, 
[SUBPAR] and [INCPAR] respectively.  
We also extend SSA to shocks caused by the FTAs of primary concern. We have 
assumed 100 percent tariff cuts on a reciprocal basis per agreement. These simplified FTA 
shocks closely approximate what was actually agreed. 69  We view the liberalisation of 
merchandise trade through USSFTA and JSEPA as “a matter of fact” and not subjected to 
                                                 
67 Estimates of the mean and standard deviation provide simple indicators of the location and dispersion of the 
distribution of results and are usually reported with confidence intervals as SSA output in the literature. 
 
68 It is vital in the GTAP model that the elasticity of substitution between imported goods from different sources 
(ESUBM) be significantly greater than ESUBD for a commodity. In fact, ESUBM is typically about twice the 
value of ESUBD in the GTAP database. A Sensitivity Information File (.SIN) in RunGTAP ensures that when 
we vary ESUBD, ESUBM varies as well to maintain a constant ratio. Thus we are conducting SSA for ESUBD 
and ESUBM at the same time. 
 
69 For merchandise trade, Singapore will lift all tariff barriers imposed on Japan and the US with immediate 
effect. The same applies for the US on Singapore by 2011. Japan will give Singapore similar concessions for 
77% of the tariff lines by 2010. Furthermore, assuming 100 percent tariff cuts is in accordance with WTO 
regulations on FTAs. 
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sensitivity analysis. However, since USJFTA is hypothetical, the extent of liberalisation is 
uncertain. This is especially so in sensitive sectors such as steel, automobiles and staples 
where concessions, if offered, are likely to be restrained. In the case of services, we have 
assumed that the FTAs would abolish trade barriers totally. However, there could be room 
for further liberalisation beyond what is achieved by each agreement. Taking these 
considerations into account, the SSA involves varying tariff cuts on merchandise for 
USJFTA and, where applicable, uncertainty is factored in on the extent of services trade 
liberalisation achieved by every agreement. 
We impose an arbitrary but plausible bound of maximum 30 percent variation from the 
original value for each element in [INCPAR], [SUBPAR], [ESUBVA], [ESUBD] and FTA 
shock per sensitivity solve. That is, each variable would vary between 0.7P and 1.3P where 
P is the original value. This bound applies both ways between partners in the case of tariff 
cuts. Since [ETRAE] and [ESUBT] have zero entries, we assume a maximum variation of 
0.5 in absolute terms. For simplicity, we let the variations of substitution elasticities be 
perfectly correlated across sectors, and for [ETRAE], across factors. The demand elasticities 
will also vary together across sectors and regions. As discussed in Appendix D, this reduces 
the number of solves dramatically. Taking into consideration that tariff cuts may differ 
between sectors, we allow them to vary independently of each other. The same applies for 
services trade liberalisation. Although this setting involves much more solves of the model 
(20 to 120 solves instead of 2 per scenario), it adds realism to the SSA. 
6.3 Outcome of the SSA 
In Table 6.1, we report estimates of the mean EVμˆ  and standard deviation EVσˆ
EV
 for EV 
when exogenous variables are uncertain. Confidence intervals (C.I.) showing the smallest 
and largest values that lie within 95% of the distribution centred on μˆ  are also 
constructed using Chebyshev’s Inequality ( YY σμ ˆˆ 5.4− , YY σμ ˆ5.4ˆ + ). This method of 
determining C.I. does not require any assumptions about the distribution of the endogenous 
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variable concerned. However, the C.I. computed this way is wider than if we knew its 
distribution. They should thus be treated as conservative estimates.70 
We find EVμˆ  positive for all random parameters and shocks in each Scenario 
suggesting that any form of trade liberalisation is good for Singapore no matter how 
discriminatory it is to others. The ranking of trade configurations is also preserved with 
Singapore still preferring hub status. However, the 95% C.I.s indicate that a HAS 
configuration made up of FTAs that liberalise both merchandise and services trade can end 
up welfare reducing for SING. This is a crucial point because many recent FTAs such as 
JSEPA are moving toward deeper integration compared to their predecessors. Keeping in 
mind that our C.I.s are conservative estimates, we find this implication reversed at the 90% 
level of confidence. Summing up, the SSA shows that our simulation results are quite robust 





















                                                 
70  According to Chebyshev’s Inequality, given an endogenous variable Y with mean EVμ  and standard 
deviation EVσ , the probability that Y does not lie within k xσ  of EVμ  is no more than . Conversely, 
we can be 93.75 percent sure that the value will lie between 
2/1 k
EVEV σμ 4−  and EVEV σμ 4+ .  Each x percent C.I. 
implies that we are x percent sure that the value for an endogenous variable (EV in this case) lies within that 
interval given the random exogenous variable(s) concerned. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A SIMPLE MODEL FOR OVERLAPPING FTAS 
 
This chapter explores the theoretical fitness of our simulation results using a product 
endowment model. We examine the various possible trade configurations, including global 
free trade which was left out in the simulation, and rank the national welfare levels across 
scenarios. We found that multilateralism is still the best option for the world community, 
although every country would prefer hub status. 
7.1 Preliminaries 
In this chapter, we extend the product endowment partial equilibrium model of Hur 
(2006) to test the theoretical fitness of our CGE findings. In particular, we analyse how 
different trading regimes affect the tariff and welfare levels of all trade partners. Past 
theoretical literature that bypass for simplicity, the process of production and simply assume 
a product endowment structure to study regional trade arrangements include Bagwell and 
Staiger (1997a), Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004) and Deltas et al (2005).71  
In our model, we assume four regions, { }DCBAi ,,,∈  and five commodities, 
 plus a numeraire, { dcbaj ,,,∈ } Z . The latter has marginal utility of one and serves to 
address any trade imbalance that may occur. The trading regimes that we analyse are: no 
trade agreement (Benchmark Scenario), single bilateral (Scenario 1; A-B FTA), a hub-and-
spokes (Scenario 2; A-B FTA and A-C FTA), an exclusive free trade zone (Scenario 3; A-B 
FTA, A-C FTA and B-C FTA) and global free trade (Scenario 4). For tractability, we 
assume the following product endowment structure, , , 
 and . This setting allows us to begin with the case 
)1  ,1  ,1  ,0(A )  ,  ,0  ,( BdBcBa eeeB








a eeD   , ce
                                                 
71 Bagwell and Stagier use a static tariff game involving a two-country endowment model and a dynamic 
alternative defined as the infinite repetition of the static game to analyse if the formation of free trade areas affect 
countries’ ability to maintain effective multilateral cooperation. They found that free trade areas can temporarily 
damage multilateral tariff cooperation during the transition to the fully implemented regional agreement. Bond et 
al used a symmetric three-country endowment model to determine how the formation of free trade areas affects 
optimal tariffs and welfare. They found that the members prefer to liberalise internal trade partially and regional 
integration is appealing to them only if their collective size is sufficiently large. For information on the work of 
Deltas et al, refer to the literature survey on hub-and-spokes in Chapter 1. 
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where all regions are symmetrical in economic size and extend the analysis later to replicate 
the asymmetric case of Singapore-US-Japan. We highlight two further assumptions in 
advance. First, external tariff rates are endogenously determined with regions choosing 
these rates independently to maximise their own welfare in a non-cooperative, single-period, 
tariff-setting game. Second, regions are exogenously chosen to form the FTAs. 
Similar to Hur (2006), each region is represented by a Consumer i  for  
who consumes  units of Good 
{ }DCBAi ,,,∈
i
jx { }dcbaj ,,,∈  and has a single-peak quadratic utility 















1     (1) 




j xp −=1  , { }dcbaj ,,,∈     (2) 
where  is the price of Good  in Region i . The regions trade in order to satisfy their 
consumers’ demand, since none of them is endowed with every type of commodity. We 
assume that the world markets are perfectly competitive. When specific tariffs are imposed, 






















































d pppp τττ +=+=+=    (6) 
We also assume that markets clear at the equilibrium. The corresponding set of international 
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Using the thirty-two equations implied by (2) to (10), we solve for sixteen sets of 
equilibrium prices and quantities. This system of equations and the solutions are 
summarised in Table 7.1.72 
Next, we assume that there is a social planner in every region who deliberates on the 
rate
   (11) 
We assume that households value their own income and the transfers from their government 
s of import tariff to maximise that region’s well-being. The regional welfare function 
iW  involved in the optimisation problem is a weighted sum of consumer surplus iCS , 
nomic rents iER  and tariff revenue iTR ,eco 73 
( ),, iii ERCSW = ∫









equally, since these resources have the same economic power when spent. For simplicity, 
we take for granted that the interests of endowment owners and consumers are of equal 
importance to the social planner. Thus 1=== TRiERiCSi wtwtwt  for all i .  
The consumer surplus for good j  is the area under the corresponding inverse demand 
function in (2) but above the prevailin  price. The total consumer surplus in Region i , iCS  
is therefore the integral of ij
i









)1( −− iij pxCS     (12) 
Economic rents can be evaluated by the market value of the total product endowments. 
People who own the products will enjoy the market values,  
∑= ijiji peER    
j  All
  (13) 
Tariff revenue of Region is the earnings fromi   duties charged by i on its imports. In the 












   (14) 
                                                 
72 Complex computations in this chapter are solved using Mathematica (Version 5.2). 
73 Tariff revenue features in the regional welfare function because the government exhausts its coffers to finance 
the provision of public goods which are valued by residents. 
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where the import of Good  from each source equals the 
endowment and its domestic consumption demand of .  is the tariff imposed by 
Region
difference of that source’s j
j AaAτ−
A  on another region A−  for Good . Substituting (12), (13), (14), and the 
equilibrium prices and quantities in Table 7.1
a
 into (11) e regional welfare at the 
equilibrium  for all 
yields th
, *iW i as a function of τ  and .  
7.2 Solving the Model 
Every social planner chooses the set of tariff rates 
e
τ  that maximises  under each 
scenario. These optimal tariff rates are then substituted back into the equilibrium welfare 
function and 
• Scenario 1 (Singular A-B FTA): The governments in Regions 
*iW
the resultant welfare level is ranked accordingly across the scenarios. In the 
process, we assume that the establishment of an FTA dismantles tariff barriers completely 
between the members. Internal tariffs are hence exogenously set equal to zero, and the now 
constrained social planner’s problem concerns with the determination of members’ external 
tariffs. Since the problem changes as we deviate from the benchmark, in what follows we 
briefly outline the treatment for each scenario. 
A  and B  maximise their 
respective welfare functions subject to the constraints  for 0=AaBτ  for A  and 0=BbAτ B . 
 and From these optimization problems, we determine the optimal external tariffs that A
B  would impose on the outsiders  and . We assu
constitute RoW, are passive and continue to impose the pre-shock optimal tariff rates. 
 for ,  for
C D me that the latter two, which 
The rationale is: RoW may be bounded by WTO rules not to act against FTA members. 
• Scenario 2 (A-B FTA; A-C FTA): The social planner’s problem is constrained by 
0;0 == AaCAaB ττ  A 0=BbAτ B  and  for  As the only outsider, 
on and continues to 
impose the benchmark “representative” tariff rates. 






Region D  represents RoW. It is passive to th
 
74 By symmetry of the problems (the endowment structures of Regions  and C  are symmetrical and they are 
in the same situation), we only solve the problem of one region and obtain the results for the other by inference. 
B
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• Scenario 3 (A-B FTA; A-C FTA, B-C FTA): Effectively, the trading area encompassing 
Regions A , B  and C  is free from tariffs. The social planners in these regions will each 
ptimisation 
dowment structure, the model yields regional and global 
s, 
where refers to a single bilateral,  is hub-and-spokes, 
determine the optimal tariff rate to impose on outsider Region D .  The latter is assumed 
passive to the integration and continues to impose the benchmark tariff rates. 
• Scenario 4 (Multilateral Tariff Elimination): Global free trade is characterised by the zero 
tariffs imposed between regions. None of the social planners face an o
problem since the tariff instrument cannot be utilised to maximise welfare; all of them are 
exogenously set equal to zero. 
7.3 Model Results, Implications and the Asymmetric Case 
With a symmetric product en
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4
is exclusive free 
is global free trade.75 Tables 7.2 – 7.trade zone, and GFT   Refer to  for the optimal tariff 
ade flow
ond, a country would prefer global 
free
                                                
rates, tr s and welfare levels at the equilibrium. 
Several interesting patterns are noteworthy. First, a country’s most preferred type of 
trading arrangement is a hub of overlapping FTAs. Sec
 trade to any pure type of RTA be it an exclusive free trade zone or single bilateral.76 
Hub status yields gains above and beyond that of global free trade. TR does not play a role 
because, in both situations, the hub-aspiring country has liberalized vis-à-vis the others. 
Instead, by having exclusive access to each of the spokes’ markets (recall that spokes 
maintain tariff barriers against each other), the hub can export at a better price. This is 
evident in the equilibrium price function in Table 7.1. Its product endowment would be 
more valuable than if global free trade prevails. Thus the hub gains from a greater ER, 
which more than offsets the loss in CS as price rises and domestic demand falls. 
 
75 For symmetric product endowment structures, . 1     ========= DcDbDaCdCbCaBdBcBa eeeeeeeee
76 Hur (2006) found that this is also true in the case of the customs union. 
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Third, the outsider(s) is better off relative to the benchmark (Scenarios 1, 2 and 3), thus 




ce their external tariffs, the extent of which is so large that they improve RoW’s terms 
of trade and hence makes outsider region(s) better off (at constant RoW tariffs). In fact, 
RoW gains more than the members of the exclusive free trade zone. This is because all three 
members lower their external tariffs upon integration but this treatment is not reciprocated 
by RoW, and each member gets tariff preference from only two other (member) regions.  
Our analysis also reveals that the formation of FTAs does not undermine multilateral 
trade liberalisation unless they overlap and create hub-and-spokes. Countries playing h
e an incentive to block the attainment of global free trade in the post-integration 
equilibrium; apart from the hub, none of the regional welfare gains arising from FTAs 
exceed those of global free trade. Thus FTAs may be welfare-improving relative to no 
cooperation at all, but the pursuit of these welfare gains may end up impeding the progress 
toward global free trade. 
Now, we let Region A  be relatively small compared to its counterparts B , C  and D  in 
terms of product endowmen
e
t in order to replicate the case of Singapore-US-Japan. The latter 
two regions (and RoW) ar  assumed symmetric in their endowment structures. With regards 
to model stability, we find that the bound, 25.100.1 ≤≤ e  applies so that endowments and 
prices at the equilibrium are non-negative. We observe that, for small deviations of e  from 
unity, hub status continues to be preferred by onomy  the smaller ec A  to other arrangements. 
Thus our conclusion that overlapping FTAs impede global free trade if they form hub-and-
spokes holds in the asymmetric case. However, for larger deviations, the small region 
becomes relatively closed to trade at the outset; both in terms of its tariffs relative to those 
imposed by the larger regions in return, as well as, according to the trade openness index, 
GDPTradeTotalI /  = . This setting does not fit the Singapore-US-Japan case and is 
excluded from the study.77 
                                                 
77 GDP is the sum of product endowments. Results for the asymmetric case will be furnished upon request. 
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7.4 Tariff Co
Our product endowment model cap
mplementarity 
tures the tariff complementarity effect of FTAs. That 
ries that integrate through a preferential agreement are 
redu
g our CGE experiment for 
sim
optimal external tariff rates on RoW (Region D) that involve the same magnitude of decline 
is, the optimal external tariffs of count
ced in the process. The pioneering work in this area of research was done by Bagwell 
and Stagier (1997b) who examined a partial equilibrium trade model with identical countries 
and linear demand functions. They found that tariff complementarity holds for both FTAs 
and CUs. In a recent paper, Bond et al (2004) not only established similar results, but also 
showed that the fall in the external tariffs of FTA members is so large, it improves RoW’s 
TOT and hence makes it better off (at constant RoW tariffs).78 
We have earlier set forth to test the theoretical fitness of our simulation results. 
However, tariff complementarity was blatantly ignored durin
plicity sake when it should have been accounted for. To redress this omission, we extend 
our simulation exercises in this section to allow for a decline in the external tariffs of 
Singapore-USA-Japan vis-à-vis outsiders whenever a bilateral is formed among the former. 
Since we only want to have a flavour of what happens when tariff complementarity is 
present, we narrow down our analysis to Scenarios 1 - 3, leaving out the super-hub effect 
and imperfect markets. We assume an arbitrary 2.5 percent drop in the external tariffs 
imposed by an FTA member. In Scenario 2 where we have a HAS, we allow for a greater 
decline in external tariffs imposed by the hub. This is in line with the theoretical model; the 
hub-aspiring country (Region A) imposes a lower external tariff rate on RoW (Regions C 
and D) following an A-B FTA, and an even lower external tariff rate on RoW (Region D) 
when an A-C FTA is also formed. We assume that the spoke countries (US and Japan) will 
reduce their tariffs on outsiders of their individual FTAs by 2.5 percent, while the reduction 
in tariffs imposed on countries outside the HAS by the hub is twice as much that of the 
spokes. For Scenario 3 where we have an exclusive free trade zone, the theoretical model 
predicts that a spoke-spoke FTA between Regions B and C will induce them to impose 
                                                 
78 However, tariff complementarity has yet to be empirically proven. 
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as those imposed by the hub-aspiring country, relative to the benchmark. Meanwhile, the 
latter would reduce its tariffs on RoW by the same extent as in Scenario 2. We suppose 
further that, regardless of whether a FTA involves shallow or deep economic integration, the 
members will reduce their external tariffs by the same extent across all the products. This 
whole exercise is then repeated with a steeper 5 percent drop in external tariffs per bilateral 
as a form of sensitivity test. The results are reported in Table 7.5. As a control, we also 
present the original outcomes, underlying which tariff complementarity was ignored. 
We made a few interesting observations from the CGE output. First, the implications 
concerning Singapore are unaffected – the country covets hub status and is always better off 





US when both countries play spokes to Singapore. Either the sign of Japan’s EV is 
reversed (becomes positive) or the magnitude of its welfare loss is reduced. Contrary to our 
earlier simulation results, the world as a whole no longer suffers the trading regimes that are 
made up of the discriminatory agreements between Singapore, the US and/or Japan. In fact, 
the larger is the exclusive free trade area, the higher is the global welfare gain. We found 
that, the bigger the external tariff cuts, the larger would be the improvement in Japanese and 
world welfare. Some of the trading partners of Singapore-US-Japan may even stand to 
benefit, although they were excluded from the economic integration. In conclusion, after 
accounting for the tariff complementarity effect of preferential agreements, our simulation 















8.1.1 Are FTAs Desirable? 
Our study reveals that Singapore is better off at the aggregate by signing FTAs, and it is 
terests to play hub to the US and Japan. However, pursuing hub 
m ich are not factored into our CGE and theoretical analyses. 
Adm
 features of 
FTA
in sectoral output that there could be significant 
m tries contract while others expand. 
We have assumed in our experiment that labour is perfectly mobile between sectors. In 
reality, changes in industrial composition can lead to temporary spells of frictional 
 
8
in the country’s best in
status ay entail high costs wh
inistering several sets of preferential tariff rates for different FTA partners can be 
tedious, although the appropriate utilisation of information technology may be able to keep 
this downside of FTAs in check. There are also substantial costs involved when countries 
negotiate new FTAs. Complicated local content rules may also put off firms from utilising 
the preferences. Although the “super-hub” effect or the presence of other Singapore FTAs 
do not alter our conclusion that the hub status is best, it tends to dilute the gains from having 
new spokes. In other words, there seems to be diminishing returns to the hub from the 
increase in its spoke population, even if we disregard the aforementioned costs. 
We also observe that deep integration such as services trade facilitation can 
substantially boost national welfare compared to FTAs that involve only tariff cuts. Unlike 
many other nations, Singapore is relatively unperturbed by the trade-diverting
s and still benefit from the improved access to foreign markets. We recommend that 
Singapore should strive to establish agreements that integrate deeply in order to realise as 
much of the potential gains as possible.  
8.1.2 Industrial Shift and its Impact on Employment 
Although national welfare might have increased for Singapore following USSFTA and 
JSEPA, we observe from the changes 




 the presence of a national competition policy.  
petition Act 
cam
the CCS should conduct outreach and advocacy programmes for the business and legal 
                                                
mployment. While FTAs can boost a country’s export competitiveness, the country will 
need complementary policies such as re-training programs, job matching services and social 
safety nets to cushion the local workforce from the potential adverse effects that may arise. 
8.1.3 Competition Policy 
Our analysis assumes that a high degree of competition exists in the markets. Even 
under “large-group” monopolistic competition, free entry is incorporated to control pricing 
behaviour. As a result, welfare gains hinge to some degree on pro-competitive effects. One 
can regard this treatment as either recognising the inherent competitiveness prevailing in
some sectors like agriculture or
The majority of WTO member countries already have competition laws in place, such 
as antitrust or anti-monopoly laws that regulate or prohibit such things as price fixing, 
mergers, and vertical agreements. However, recent efforts to implement a body to oversee 
competition standards internationally have faltered (WTO, 2006c).79 In Singapore, the bill 
on competition law was passed in parliament on 19 October 2004 and the Com
e into being in November the same year. The Competition Commission of Singapore 
(CCS) was set up under the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 1 January 2005 to administer 
and enforce the Competition Act. Sections 34 and 47 of the Act, which came into force on 1 
January 2006, prohibit anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance. The 
prohibition of mergers and acquisitions which result in a substantial lessening of 
competition is expected to come into force in 2007 under Section 54 (CSS, 2006). 
As the CCS and the regulations that it is mandated to uphold are both relatively new, 
compliance can be best achieved only if there is public awareness, understanding and 
support. Not only should businesses be allowed sufficient time to transit to the new regime, 
 
79 At the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, a working group was set up to look at how trade 
relates to competition policies. This relationship has long been recognised; the GATT and GATS contain rules 
on monopolies and exclusive service suppliers. However, at the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, no 
consensus could be reached on modalities for negotiations to form a “multilateral framework to enhance the 
contribution of competition policy to international trade and development”. On 1 August 2004, the members 
agreed to proceed with negotiations on trade facilitation only and drop competition policy from the Doha agenda. 
The working group has since become inactive. 
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communities in order to resolve any misconception that can put off investments. 
Furthermore, overseas attachments for CCS officers to other competition authorities can 
help
air-wise 
 m f an USJFTA in the future. Already, Japan and the US are 
 i edicament as spoke trading partners is likely 
to re
 them to anticipate possible challenges and improve on operational procedures. 
8.2 United States and Japan 
8.2.1 The Disincentive Effect of Spoke Status 
Although Japan suffers more than the US in a HAS centred on Singapore, this is not 
sufficient to kick-start negotiations for a spoke-spoke FTA because their welfare losses are 
insignificant when expressed in percentages of their respective benchmark GDPs. While this 
may be expected of a small country-large country FTA per se, being spokes to multiple p
HAS ay tip the balance in favour o
spokes n another HAS centred on Mexico. Their pr
cur and their welfare losses to cumulate as both countries continue on the FTA path. 
8.2.2 Which Party Should Take the Initiative to Negotiate for an USJFTA? 
As pointed out in Section 2.3, the US administration is bounded by the fast-track 
authority, which requires trading partners to initiate negotiations for an FTA. Furthermore, 
in the US-Singapore-Japan HAS, we found Japan loses more than the US when both are 
spokes (although this result cannot be generalised). Coupled with the rise of China as an 




in a tariff-free world? Busse (2000) 
thought otherwise, because this process is likely to stop prematurely once countries run out 
the US as other countries sign FTAs with the latter, we have strong reasons to 
Japanese government should take the first step and negotiate for an EPA. 
8.3 Overlapping FTAs: A Second-Best Remedy? 
From our analysis, we observe that, in a world of overlapping FTAs, a small economy 
can maximise its interests by being a trade hub to other economies. Meanwhile, the spoke 
countries have economic incentives to form FTAs among themselves to neutralize the 
detrimental effects arising from the HAS. One question that arises would be: if every 
country pursues hub status via FTAs industriously (or stand to lose from the 
of other hub-aspiring nations), will we end up living 
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of “meaningful FTA partners”. Furthermore, larger economies like the US are less reliant on 
foreign trade and can sign or refuse an FTA on non-economic grounds. 
Even if this persistent race for FTAs does lead to global free trade (in the sense of zero 
tariffs), it must be a patchwork of HAS systems or overlapping FTAs. Is this arrangement 
which is independent of WTO efforts desirable? We doubt so. Section 8.1.1 highlights some 
hidden costs of playing hub so we do not paint too rosy a picture for hub-aspiring countries. 
As for the spokes, the value of the preferences previously enjoyed decreases with the entry 
of additional spokes (which now gain equal access to the hub) and when these new spokes 
secure better preferences. If this is so, where would the pursuit of FTAs lead the world to? 
From our point of view, multilateralism is still the best option for the world community. 
This is brought out by our theoretical model in Chapter 7. However, acquiring a portfolio of 
FTAs may be a second-best short-run remedy to boost trade and economic growth given the 
impasse of recent WTO talks for freer international trade. This is especially true for small 
economies like Singapore, Chile and Mexico, which have limited political influence over 

















.1 A Summary of Our Research 
The proliferation of FTAs in the recent years has led to overlapping free trade zones. 
vid subscribers of such agreements have become hubs to their trading partners which are 
 turn relegated to spokes status. We ask whether hub status is welfare optimal for a small 
open economy when it can choose A, an exclusive tariff-free zone or 
support global free trade instead. xamine the welfare impact of a 
iangular trade relationship between the US, Singapore and Japan facilitated by the JSEPA, 
free trade pact. We draw three conclusions that prove 
robu
mbers, domestic 





to join a single FT
 Using GTAP, we e
tr
USSFTA and a hypothetical US-Japan 
st to sensitivity analyses, including on the market structure, production technologies, 
“super-hub” effects, the depth of integration and variations in key behavioural parameters. 
First, Singapore is always better off relative to the benchmark. Second, national welfare gain 
is highest when Singapore plays hub. Third, when relegated to spoke status, Japan loses 
more than the US. Next, we introduce a partial equilibrium model to analyse the issue of 
overlapping FTAs further. We conclude that hub status is preferred over other trading 
arrangements when countries are symmetric in their product endowment structures. On 
replicating the asymmetric case of US-Singapore-Japan, we found that hub preference 
continues to hold when the small region starts out relatively open to trade. 
Both the GTAP analysis and theoretical model provide important input for informed 
policy-making. There are a few lessons from our study: first, there is a high chance that 
small and open economies will not stop at one FTA, but will actively establish such 
agreements to achieve and maintain hub status. Meanwhile, economic incentives build up 
for those relegated to spoke status to ink trade pacts with each other. However, a global free 
trade outcome is unlikely to arise from these interactions, and even if it does, the returns will 
be diluted by costs such as those incurred from wooing prospective me
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repe
ulwark of our research. We try to make it as robust as 
pos
mputational analysis does not take into 
unt  which do not lend themselves readily to 
qua
rtoire of ROOs. What the international race for FTAs does is to drive national resources 
away from multilateral efforts, which is the best option for the world at large (this is 
supported by our theoretical model). 
However, we also assert that acquiring a portfolio of FTAs is a second-best remedy for 
countries that depend heavily on free trade to survive given the stalemate in recent 
multilateral talks. Even so, these nations must come to grips with potentially large sectoral 
shifts that accompany the discriminatory trade pacts. They should harness technological 
innovations, encourage competition and implement complementary labour policies to reduce 
the downside of FTAs and maximise the returns. 
9.2 Weaknesses and Future Research 
The CGE experiment forms the b
sible by tweaking the underlying assumptions of the model as well as the database. 
However, some issues remain unresolved. Although the capital accumulation effect is 
captured in the GTAP 6 model, we have not accounted for many other important dynamic 
factors that can possibly alter our conclusions. For example, changes in trade policy can 
affect the pace of technological innovation, and this is a powerful source of economic 
growth. We should also emphasise that our co
acco  of the other features of FTAs,
ntification. These include the facilitation of e-commerce, IP protection, labour and 
environmental standards, government procurement, dispute settlement procedures, and the 
development of new institutional and cooperative measures.80 The GTAP model used in the 
thesis assumes that production is not mobile. Thus, it is assumed that a firm cannot relocate 
its production facility to another region. In other words, there is no possibility for FDI. In 
reality, FDIs are prevalent among those countries under study. The formation of a free trade 
agreement may stimulate more FDIs and brings added benefits to the countries involved. 
                                                 
80
commerce through shocks to the parameter, ams(i,r,s). Based on the iceberg trade cost assumption, when ams is 
shocked by 20%, the rate of decay on imports of commodity or service i from region r imported by region s falls 
and 20% more of the product becomes available to domestic consumers. The parameter can also facilitate the 
simulation of efficiency-enhancing bilateral services liberalisation (Itakura and Hertel, 2001). 
 GTAP does allow for the simulation of efficiency improvements such as customs automisation and e-
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Furthermore, the establishment of an FTA could be driven by political motives and not 
economic incentives. Sometimes, FTAs with small economies are also viewed by trading 
partners as one of those “low-costs-low-benefits-so-why-not-do-it type of policies” 
(Baldwin, 2004). Such perceptions may apply to economic giants because they do not rely 
primarily on international trade for survival but may want to establish their presence 
ove







rseas. Along the same line of thought, the motivation for large economies like the US to 
play hub is less clear-cut and beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our simple product endowment model suggests that when countries come in all 
economic sizes and trade preferentially with each other, smaller economies will covet hub 
status. However, the asymmetry in product endowments cannot be too large - otherwise, the 
smaller economy would start out relatively closed to trade. Furthermore, we have assumed 
that RoW does not exercise its market power when a trading
irically supported. Countries are also arbitrarily chosen to form FTAs when the decision 
to form one could be determined by, for example, the pre-integration bilateral trade volume 
and hence the significance of the trading partner concerned. We intend to address these 
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TABLE 1.1 SHARES IN GLOBAL GDP: SINGAPORE, THE US AND JAPAN 
 SING US JAP ROW 
Share of Global GDP 0.27 32.23 13.36 54.14 
Composition of Final Demand 
Consumption 60.08 68.89 55.87 61.80 
Investment 35.88 19.71 25.37 21.56 
Government 14.66 15.14 17.19 16.65 
Exports 142.05 9.00 11.45 22.78 
Imports (152.68) (12.74) (9.89) (22.78) 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: 2001 figures from the GTAP 6 database, computed using the expenditure approach. Figures in 
parentheses are negative values. 
 
 
TABLE 1.2 SINGAPORE’S SHARE IN US/JAPAN TRADE 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Avg 
Singapore’s Share in US’ Trade 
% Total US imports 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.7 
% Total US exports 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 
     % US total trade 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.9 
Singapore’s Share in Japan’s Trade 
% Total Japanese imports 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 
% Total Japanese exports 5.1 4.8 3.8 3.9 4.3 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.9 
     % Japan's total trade 3.7 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.9 
J ' Sh i US’ T d% Total US imports 13.7 13.0 12.6 12.1 11.3 10.2 9.9 8.9 8.3 11.1
% Total US exports 12.7 11.0 9.9 9.7 9.2 8.6 8.3 8.2 7.6 9.5 
     % US' total trade 30.7 28.0 27.3 28.2 27.5 25.2 25.5 24.2 23.2 26.6
US' Share in Japan’s Trade 
% Total Japanese imports 22.7 22.3 23.9 21.7 19.0 18.1 17.1 15.4 13.7 19.3
% Total Japanese exports 27.2 27.8 30.5 30.7 29.7 30.0 28.5 24.6 22.4 27.9
     % Japan's total trade 25.2 25.4 27.8 26.9 25.0 24.5 23.4 20.5 18.6 24.1











TABLE 2.1 JAPAN’S BILATERAL TRADE FLOWS WITH THE US 
Time Period 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 AVG
Imp. from US, % Total Imp 22.9 22.4 22.7 22.3 23.9 21.7 19.0 18.1 17.1 15.4 13.7 19.9
Exp. to US, % Total Exp 32.6 29.7 27.2 27.8 30.5 30.7 29.7 30.0 28.5 24.6 22.4 28.5
% Total Imp. from US 
Agriculture 18.5 17.4 17.3 15.8 15.0 15.5 14.8 16.0 16.3 17.9 16.0 16.4
Raw Materials 15.8 15.5 14.3 13.1 11.3 10.7 10.4 9.9 9.4 9.4 11.0 11.9
Transport & Defence Equip. 9.8 8.4 7.4 8.1 10.5 10.5 6.4 5.8 8.7 9.6 8.8 8.5 
Mech. App. & Elect. Equip. 24.8 27.9 31.0 32.5 32.2 31.1 34.7 32.9 30.3 28.3 28.6 30.4
Others 31.1 30.7 30.0 30.5 31.0 32.2 33.7 35.4 35.3 34.9 35.7 32.8
% Total Exp. to US 
Electronics 19.5 21.6 21.6 19.8 18.9 20.7 21.9 17.7 16.1 16.2 16.8 19.2
Automobiles 27.4 24.2 26.3 26.2 27.7 30.2 30.3 33.6 38.7 38.0 36.4 30.8
Machinery, Mech. App. 23.7 24.1 26.6 26.7 25.0 21.8 21.5 21.5 20.7 20.4 21.2 23.0
Others 29.5 30.1 25.5 27.3 28.4 27.3 26.3 27.2 24.5 25.5 25.6 27.0
Source: SourceOECD (2006).  
 
TABLE 3.1 GTAP SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITIES 
SECTORAL AGGREGATE ESUBVA ESUBD ESUBM ESUBT 
AGRICULTURE 0.235 2.411 4.929 0 
MINING 0.628 4.166 10.122 0 
FOOD_BEV_TOB 1.120 2.489 5.042 0 
TEXTILES 1.260 3.750 7.500 0 
WEAR_APP 1.260 3.700 7.400 0 
LEATH_PROD 1.260 4.050 8.100 0 
WOOD_PROD 1.150 3.061 6.271 0 
PETROL_COAL 1.260 2.100 4.200 0 
CHEM 1.260 3.300 6.600 0 
NM_MIN_PROD 1.260 2.900 5.800 0 
METAL_PROD 1.260 3.750 7.500 0 
TRANSPORT 1.260 3.148 6.426 0 
ELECTRONICS 1.260 4.400 8.800 0 
MACH_EQUIP 1.260 4.050 8.100 0 
OTHER_MNFCS 1.260 3.750 7.500 0 
UTILITIES 1.260 2.800 5.600 0 
CONSTRUCTN 1.333 1.900 3.800 0 
TRADE_TRANS 1.680 1.900 3.800 0 
OTH_PTE_SVCS 1.260 1.900 3.800 0 
GOVT_SVCS 1.260 1.900 3.800 0 
CGDS 1.000 - - - 
Source: GTAP 6 Beta database. Note the interpretation of ESUBVA, ESUBT, ESUBM and ESUBD values in 
the GTAP database. For ESUBVA and ESUBT, agriculture = 0.235 and 0.00 respectively mean that to produce 
agriculture output, primary factors can substitute for each other at ESUBVA = 0.235, and the value-added 
composite and the intermediate composite are not substitutable for each other at all (ESUBT = 0). In the case of 
ESUBD and ESUBM, firms are perceived as consumers, except that they buy tradables as inputs for production. 
Then for agriculture = 2.41 or 4.92 respectively, it means the firm can substitute foreign agriculture composite 
input for domestic input at ESUBD = 2.41, and among foreign agriculture inputs at ESUBM = 4.92. Since 
capital goods [CGDS] are primary factors and not intermediate goods, there is no need to have substitution 





TABLE 4.1 FTAS OF SINGAPORE, THE US AND JAPAN (2001 – 2006) 
Bilateral FTAs Date of Entry 
Into Force 
Bilateral FTAs Date of Entry 
Into Force 
FTAs of Primary Interest Other Singapore FTAs 
Japan-Singapore* Nov 2002 Singapore-New Zealand* Jan 2001 
US-Singapore* Jan 2004 EFTA-Singapore* Jan 2003 
US-Japan N.A. Singapore-Australia* Jul 2003 
Other US FTAs Singapore-India* Jun 2005 
US-Chile*  Jan 2004 Korea-Singapore* Mar 2006 
US-Jordan* Dec 2001   
US-Australia* Jan 2005 Other Japan FTAs 
US-Morocco* Jan 2006 Japan-Mexico* Apr 2005 
    
Source: WTO, 2006. Note: (1) The EFTA consists of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. (2) 
Only FTAs that entered into force since 2001 and are reported to the WTO are listed above. (3) Members in 
FTAs with asterisk (*) have also established among themselves services agreements sanctioned under GATS 













































TABLE 4.2 LIST OF SECTORAL AGGREGATES AND THE GOODS OR SERVICES INVOLVED 




























































Cereal grains nec 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
Oil seeds 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 
Plant-based fibers 
Crops nec 
Bovine cattle, sheep and 
goats, horses 
Raw milk 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 











Bovine meat products 
Meat products nec 




Food products nec 









































































Paper products, publishing 
Forestry 
 
Petroleum, coal products 
 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
 





Motor vehicles and parts 




































































Financial services nec 
Insurance 
Business services nec 









TABLE 4.3A SINGAPORE’S BILATERAL IMPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2001, WORLD (CIF) PRICES, US$ MILLIONS 
US$ million US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW GLOBAL
Agriculture 90 52 127 7 9 19 1 10 2 6 7 1344 1672 
Mining 178 148 833 49 834 5 0 50 11 3 224 9476 11811 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 212 44 268 33 214 73 1 19 9 24 18 2210 3126 
Textiles 67 83 10 8 65 1 0 5 3 0 75 1328 1646 
Wearing Apparel 26 35 4 5 11 1 5 2 2 0 9 883
0 1 0 4 365
  983 
Leather Products 18 7 3 4 3 0 0 405 
Wood & Wood Products 203 7 34 12 116 12 0 17 2 10 57 1445 1913 
Petroleum & Coal 1592 3 205 62 65 2 16 12 51 0 11 3355 5374 
Chemicals 1865 107 126 286 1208 24 1 33 22 0 162 4726 8560 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 170 9 13 17 265 0 0 2 1 0 16 809 1302 
Metal Products 195 25 25 31 255 5 0 4 1 0 64 1302 1907 
Transportation Equipment 3881 17 60 34 1122 11 0 30 4 0 340 1731 7228 
Electronic Equipment 5952 252 128 95 6754 12 148 55 273 0 2474 29906 46048 
Machinery & Equipment 4572 130 215 722 4094 21 1 91 27 0 426 9808 20106 
Other Manufactures 187 146 40 58 162 4 0 2 17 0 60 1183 1859 
Electricity, Gas & Water 12 0 1 2 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 88
2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 27
  108 
Constru  ction    
Trade & Transport 771 94 49 161 386 21 14 153 65 24 99 5219 7055 
Other Private Services 1496 147 54 193 210 14 7 236 51 13 122 5072 7616 
Government Services 409 3 14 23 7 3 8 6 3 0 16 316 808 
In Percentage (%) US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW GLOBAL
Agriculture 5.4 3.1 7.6 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.4 80.4 100.0 
Mining 1.5 1.2 7.1 0.4 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.9 80.2 100.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 6.8 1.4 8.6 1.1 6.9 2.3 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.6 70.7 100.0 
Textiles 4.1 5.0 0.6 0.5 4.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 4.6 80.7 100.0 
Wearing Apparel 2.6 3.5 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 89.8 100.0 
Leather Products 4.3 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9 89.9 100.0 
Wood & Wood Products 10.6 0.3 1.8 0.6 6.0 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.5 3.0 75.5 100.0 
Petroleum & Coal 29.6 0.1 3.8 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.2 62.4 100.0 
Chemicals 21.8 1.3 1.5 3.3 14.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.9 55.2 100.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 13.1 0.7 1.0 1.3 20.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.2 62.1 100.0 
Metal Products 10.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 13.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 3.4 68.3 100.0 
Transportation Equipment 53.7 0.2 0.8 0.5 15.5 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.7 23.9 100.0 
Electronic Equipment 12.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 14.7 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.0 5.4 64.9 100.0 
Machinery & Equipment 22.7 0.6 1.1 3.6 20.4 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 2.1 48.8 100.0 
Other Manufactures 10.1 7.9 2.1 3.1 8.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 3.2 63.6 100.0 
Electricity, Gas & Water 10.9 0.0 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 3.6 1.6 0.0 0.3 81.2 100.3 
Construction 5.6 0.7 0.4 2.2 2.6 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.0 1.1 84.8 100.0 
Trade & Transport 10.9 1.3 0.7 2.3 5.5 0.3 0.2 2.2 0.9 0.3 1.4 74.0 100.0 
Other Private Services 19.6 1.9 0.7 2.5 2.8 0.2 0.1 3.1 0.7 0.2 1.6 66.6 100.0 
Government Services 50.6 0.4 1.7 2.8 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 2.0 39.1 100.0 
 VI 
TABLE 4.3B SINGAPORE’S BILATERAL EXPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2001, WORLD (CIF) PRICES, US$ MILLIONS 
US$ millions US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 29 28 7 2 72 2 1 5 3 1 9 479 636 
Mining 32 182 141 41 120 5 0 2 41 2 46 1103 1715 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 54 26 63 3 293 12 0 11 4 1 29 1722 2217 
Textiles 148 18 6 1 10 2 0 9 2 1 23 758 978 
Wearing Apparel 205 0 2 2 3 0 0 10 1 0 1 257 482 
Leather Products 8 2 2 4 21 0 0 0 5 0 4 198 243 
Wood & Wood Products 176 108 59 6 92 14 0 11 3 2 35 1037 1542 
Petroleum & Coal 140 39 12 2 359 63 0 2 32 0 40 6742 7429 
Chemicals 1025 329 256 11 556 46 6 59 97 4 374 7728 10491 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 3 11 12 0 23 3 0 0 4 0 27 724 808 
Metal Products 41 16 26 3 22 3 0 12 3 1 12 682 821 
Transportation Equipment 178 25 26 111 87 7 0 15 2 4 33 1566 2054 
Electronic Equipment 11685 691 785 110 3561 132 6 461 427 12 2374 29708 49951 
Machinery & Equipment 1404 311 328 60 673 48 5 77 119 8 362 9082 12475 
Other Manufactures 65 19 13 34 12 3 0 4 2 3 7 1018 1179 
Electricity, Gas & Water 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 11
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 17
   
Constru  ction    
Trade & Transport 791 129 58 165 707 17 3 119 106 37 167 5682 7982 
Other Private Services 1761 226 103 225 718 31 9 409 192 17 378 8911 12981 
Government Services 196 5 12 22 54 3 1 24 12 2 15 565 910 
In Percentage (%) US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 4.6 4.3 1.1 0.3 11.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.3 75.3 100.0 
Mining 1.9 10.6 8.2 2.4 7.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.4 0.1 2.7 64.3 100.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 2.4 1.2 2.8 0.1 13.2 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 1.3 77.7 100.0 
Textiles 15.1 1.9 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 2.4 77.5 100.0 
Wearing Apparel 42.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 53.4 100.0 
Leather Products 3.2 0.7 0.7 1.6 8.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.9 0.0 1.6 81.2 100.0 
Wood & Wood Products 11.4 7.0 3.8 0.4 5.9 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 2.2 67.2 100.0 
Petroleum & Coal 1.9 0.5 0.2 0.0 4.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 90.7 100.0 
Chemicals 9.8 3.1 2.4 0.1 5.3 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.0 3.6 73.7 100.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.4 1.3 1.5 0.0 2.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 3.4 89.7 100.0 
Metal Products 4.9 1.9 3.2 0.4 2.7 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.4 0.1 1.5 83.0 100.0 
Transportation Equipment 8.7 1.2 1.2 5.4 4.2 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.6 76.2 100.0 
Electronic Equipment 23.4 1.4 1.6 0.2 7.1 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.0 4.8 59.5 100.0 
Machinery & Equipment 11.3 2.5 2.6 0.5 5.4 0.4 0.0 0.6 1.0 0.1 2.9 72.8 100.0 
Other Manufactures 5.5 1.6 1.1 2.9 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6 86.4 100.0 
Electricity, Gas & Water 18.8 0.9 1.8 2.7 6.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.8 0.0 1.8 63.4 100.0 
Construction 10.2 1.8 0.6 1.8 7.2 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.2 0.0 2.4 72.3 100.0 
Trade & Transport 9.9 1.6 0.7 2.1 8.9 0.2 0.0 1.5 1.3 0.5 2.1 71.2 100.0 
Other Private Services 13.6 1.7 0.8 1.7 5.5 0.2 0.1 3.2 1.5 0.1 2.9 68.6 100.0 
Government Services 21.5 0.5 1.3 2.5 5.9 0.3 0.2 2.6 1.3 0.2 1.7 62.1 100.0 
 VII 
TABLE 4.3C U.S.’ BILATERAL IMPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2001, WORLD (CIF) PRICES, US$ MILLIONS 
US$ millions SING IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 35 602 204 26 67 158 32 4348 3743 885 52 10148 20302 
Mining 34 297 1371 2738 2146 51 84 28138 10619 1117 1074 62568 110236 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 58 417 1771 348 401 1004 29 7860 2841 828 245 18988 34790 
Textiles 154 1535 66 100 521 24 5 2376 3932 6 1607 20635 30961 
Wearing Apparel 213 1714 44 67 64 24 104 1438 6122 17 1805 39177 50788 
Leather Products 8 213 27 40 13 10 7 169 526 2 211 21254 22480 
Wood & Wood Products 186 194 106 362 783 283 7 30954 4520 700 517 25094 63705 
Petroleum & Coal 151 23 11 136 66 2 2 2017 260 5 177 5661 8511
Chemicals 1041 953 412 3151 9644 360 34 18024 3459 312 1849 60829 100067 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 3 215 65 136 1427 11 3 2860 2012 22 191 13108 20054 
Metal Products 42 499 58 322 2014 41 2 4889 2507 29 1066 12865 24334 
Transportation Equipment 183 158 709 376 47513 74 2 53987 23094 17 7403 58142 191656 
Electronic Equipment 11898 95 139 588 24593 33 89 10568 28710 4 13398 82826 172940 
Machinery & Equipment 1438 659 793 4533 32290 199 6 29301 36988 24 4306 89724 200261 
Other Manufactures 67 3217 182 799 2717 52 5 1633 1802 9 972 45833 57287 
Electricity, Gas & Water 2 1 13 18 2 0 1 1563 17 1 5 483 2104
Construction 2 1 2 10 50 1 3 5 4 0 3 683 764
Trade & Transport 791 461 1758 3532 1467 368 365 2221 1086 261 1333 69344 82987 
Other Private Services 1761 913 762 2439 1961 195 102 2394 602 137 1304 57304 69873 
Government Services 196 290 426 1300 538 70 256 582 120 45 739 16175 20736 
In Percentage (%) SING IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 0.2 3.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.2 21.4 18.4 4.4 0.3 50.0 100.0 
Mining 0.0 0.3 1.2 2.5 1.9 0.0 0.1 25.5 9.6 1.0 1.0 56.8 100.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.2 1.2 5.1 1.0 1.2 2.9 0.1 22.6 8.2 2.4 0.7 54.6 100.0 
Textiles 0.5 5.0 0.2 0.3 1.7 0.1 0.0 7.7 12.7 0.0 5.2 66.6 100.0 
Wearing Apparel 0.4 3.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 2.8 12.1 0.0 3.6 77.1 100.0 
Leather Products 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.3 0.0 0.9 94.5 100.0 
Wood & Wood Products 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.0 48.6 7.1 1.1 0.8 39.4 100.0 
Petroleum & Coal 1.8 0.3 0.1 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 23.7 3.1 0.1 2.1 66.5 100.0 
Chemicals 1.0 1.0 0.4 3.1 9.6 0.4 0.0 18.0 3.5 0.3 1.8 60.8 100.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.0 1.1 0.3 0.7 7.1 0.1 0.0 14.3 10.0 0.1 1.0 65.4 100.0 
Metal Products 0.2 2.1 0.2 1.3 8.3 0.2 0.0 20.1 10.3 0.1 4.4 52.9 100.0 
Transportation Equipment 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 24.8 0.0 0.0 28.2 12.0 0.0 3.9 30.3 100.0 
Electronic Equipment 6.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 14.2 0.0 0.1 6.1 16.6 0.0 7.7 47.9 100.0 
Machinery & Equipment 0.7 0.3 0.4 2.3 16.1 0.1 0.0 14.6 18.5 0.0 2.2 44.8 100.0 
Other Manufactures 0.1 5.6 0.3 1.4 4.7 0.1 0.0 2.9 3.1 0.0 1.7 80.0 100.0 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 74.3 0.8 0.0 0.2 22.9 100.0 
Construction 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.3 6.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.4 89.4 100.0 
Trade & Transport 1.0 0.6 2.1 4.3 1.8 0.4 0.4 2.7 1.3 0.3 1.6 83.6 100.0 
Other Private Services 2.5 1.3 1.1 3.5 2.8 0.3 0.1 3.4 0.9 0.2 1.9 82.0 100.0 
Government Services 0.9 1.4 2.1 6.3 2.6 0.3 1.2 2.8 0.6 0.2 3.6 78.0 100.0 
 VIII 
TABLE 4.3D U.S.’ BILATERAL EXPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2001, WORLD (CIF) PRICES, US$ MILLIONS 
US$ millions SING IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 78 286 83 137 4479 31 103 3150 4024 23 1822 16010 30226 
Mining 167 217 102 333 1450 19 24 6824 3277 31 1012 11472 24928 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 200 117 266 240 6877 89 43 4624 3518 95 1150 11890 29107 
Textiles 64 28 94 40 427 23 18 2529 3724 45 165 5468 12625 
Wearing Apparel 25 6 27 49 244 6 4 389 1290 12 34 3030 5116 
Leather Products 16 12 14 12 146 2 0 148 342 6 96 1138 1930 
Wood & Wood Products 189 156 459 161 2910 78 17 9151 4373 93 622 11128 29337 
Petroleum & Coal 1464 202 71 26 154 16 2 710 1379 53 195 2112 6383 
Chemicals 1783 678 2039 1524 6679 260 28 19155 13228 433 2576 48148 96529 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 157 77 322 117 1284 59 16 3269 1349 78 461 6702 13890 
Metal Products 185 26 152 90 588 19 3 5150 3243 48 247 5246 14997 
Transportation Equipment 3858 433 1888 1404 5259 783 31 35001 12154 372 3029 45861 110075 
Electronic Equipment 5872 545 1436 717 10940 165 26 11242 14586 490 6795 59069 111884 
Machinery & Equipment 4438 972 3192 1768 13354 395 53 33865 20042 918 5336 83092 167425 
Other Manufactures 182 179 236 935 1715 50 2 1770 1028 59 245 8310 14710 
Electricity, Gas & Water 12 3 6 14 30 1 0 245 16 1 16 387 732 
Construction 2 1 2 8 461 1 0 14 2 0 4 2245 2739 
Trade & Transport 771 584 1145 3100 5008 266 59 1783 756 350 2057 46324 62203 
Other Private Services 1496 1090 1063 2482 7524 285 90 4170 1147 188 2793 87305 109632 
Government Services 409 277 571 955 2502 124 255 1094 715 141 780 36429 44252 
In Percentage (%) SING IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.5 14.8 0.1 0.3 10.4 13.3 0.1 6.0 53.0 100.0 
Mining 0.7 0.9 0.4 1.3 5.8 0.1 0.1 27.4 13.1 0.1 4.1 46.0 100.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.8 23.6 0.3 0.1 15.9 12.1 0.3 4.0 40.8 100.0 
Textiles 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.3 3.4 0.2 0.1 20.0 29.5 0.4 1.3 43.3 100.0 
Wearing Apparel 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.9 4.8 0.1 0.1 7.6 25.2 0.2 0.7 59.2 100.0 
Leather Products 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 7.5 0.1 0.0 7.7 17.7 0.3 4.9 58.9 100.0 
Wood & Wood Products 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.5 9.9 0.3 0.1 31.2 14.9 0.3 2.1 37.9 100.0 
Petroleum & Coal 22.9 3.2 1.1 0.4 2.4 0.2 0.0 11.1 21.6 0.8 3.1 33.1 100.0 
Chemicals 1.8 0.7 2.1 1.6 6.9 0.3 0.0 19.8 13.7 0.4 2.7 49.9 100.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 1.1 0.6 2.3 0.8 9.2 0.4 0.1 23.5 9.7 0.6 3.3 48.2 100.0 
Metal Products 1.2 0.2 1.0 0.6 3.9 0.1 0.0 34.3 21.6 0.3 1.6 35.0 100.0 
Transportation Equipment 3.5 0.4 1.7 1.3 4.8 0.7 0.0 31.8 11.0 0.3 2.8 41.7 100.0 
Electronic Equipment 5.2 0.5 1.3 0.6 9.8 0.1 0.0 10.0 13.0 0.4 6.1 52.8 100.0 
Machinery & Equipment 2.7 0.6 1.9 1.1 8.0 0.2 0.0 20.2 12.0 0.5 3.2 49.6 100.0 
Other Manufactures 1.2 1.2 1.6 6.4 11.7 0.3 0.0 12.0 7.0 0.4 1.7 56.5 100.0 
Electricity, Gas & Water 1.6 0.4 0.8 1.9 4.1 0.2 0.1 33.4 2.2 0.1 2.2 52.9 100.0 
Construction 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 16.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 82.0 100.0 
Trade & Transport 1.2 0.9 1.8 5.0 8.1 0.4 0.1 2.9 1.2 0.6 3.3 74.5 100.0 
Other Private Services 1.4 1.0 1.0 2.3 6.9 0.3 0.1 3.8 1.0 0.2 2.5 79.6 100.0 
Government Services 0.9 0.6 1.3 2.2 5.7 0.3 0.6 2.5 1.6 0.3 1.8 82.3 100.0 
 IX 
TABLE 4.3E JAPAN’S BILATERAL IMPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2001, WORLD (CIF) PRICES, US$ MILLIONS 
US$ millions SING US IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 91 4943 139 1198 143 336 14 1019 171 108 535 6323 15019 
Mining 126 1585 261 8176 209 444 12 1491 293 1130 1177 46911 61815 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 307 7328 556 2288 485 571 189 1088 279 717 1014 15021 29842 
Textiles 10 448 230 9 34 3 1 11 23 1 569 8069 9406 
Wearing Apparel 4 252 104 5 23 4 8 13 12 1 504 14520 15451 
Leather Products 23 156 24 10 30 9 4 5 5 0 250 5515 6029 
Wood & Wood Products 97 3178 10 679 72 491 2 2060 8 497 276 11540 18911 
Petroleum & Coal 388 165 43 102 4 13 0 15 22 1 1809 5737 8298 
Chemicals 581 6966 124 183 1333 252 5 219 155 43 1530 17123 28514 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 25 1389 36 97 37 3 1 12 13 3 296 3411 5323 
Metal Products 24 623 16 23 52 7 1 105 7 3 610 3147 4615 
Transportation Equipment 89 5396 9 86 141 6 0 209 60 0 258 8461 14716 
Electronic Equipment 3621 11135 5 25 96 2 5 208 267 0 5129 35895 56389 
Machinery & Equipment 692 13667 104 148 1516 28 0 266 153 3 2038 24442 43056 
Other Manufactures 12 1790 457 93 167 36 3 32 13 1 380 7571 10555 
Electricity, Gas & Water 1 30 0 4 6 0 0 26 6 0 2 366 441 
Construction 1 461 1 8 17 2 1 35 72 0 14 3857 4469 
Trade & Transport 707 5008 399 545 1093 128 115 925 364 163 552 28773 38772 
Other Private Services 718 7524 369 305 930 75 32 1141 278 50 489 24249 36161 
Government Services 54 2502 21 78 137 14 47 42 19 2 94 2179 5189 
In Percentage (%) SING US IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 0.6 32.9 0.9 8.0 1.0 2.2 0.1 6.8 1.1 0.7 3.6 42.1 100.0 
Mining 0.2 2.6 0.4 13.2 0.3 0.7 0.0 2.4 0.5 1.8 1.9 75.9 100.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.0 24.6 1.9 7.7 1.6 1.9 0.6 3.6 0.9 2.4 3.4 50.3 100.0 
Textiles 0.1 4.8 2.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 6.0 85.8 100.0 
Wearing Apparel 0.0 1.6 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 3.3 94.0 100.0 
Leather Products 0.4 2.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 4.2 91.5 100.0 
Wood & Wood Products 0.5 16.8 0.1 3.6 0.4 2.6 0.0 10.9 0.0 2.6 1.5 61.0 100.0 
Petroleum & Coal 4.7 2.0 0.5 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 21.8 69.1 100.0 
Chemicals 2.0 24.4 0.4 0.6 4.7 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.2 5.4 60.1 100.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.5 26.1 0.7 1.8 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 5.6 64.1 100.0 
Metal Products 0.5 13.5 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.0 2.3 0.1 0.1 13.2 68.2 100.0 
Transportation Equipment 0.6 36.7 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.4 0.0 1.8 57.5 100.0 
Electronic Equipment 6.4 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 9.1 63.7 100.0 
Machinery & Equipment 1.6 31.7 0.2 0.3 3.5 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 4.7 56.8 100.0 
Other Manufactures 0.1 17.0 4.3 0.9 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 3.6 71.7 100.0 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.2 6.8 0.0 1.0 1.4 0.0 0.1 5.9 1.4 0.0 0.4 82.9 100.0 
Construction 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.8 1.6 0.0 0.3 86.3 100.0 
Trade & Transport 1.8 12.9 1.0 1.4 2.8 0.3 0.3 2.4 0.9 0.4 1.4 74.2 100.0 
Other Private Services 2.0 20.8 1.0 0.8 2.6 0.2 0.1 3.2 0.8 0.1 1.4 67.1 100.0 
Government Services 1.0 48.2 0.4 1.5 2.6 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.8 42.0 100.0 
 X 
TABLE 4.3F JAPAN’S BILATERAL EXPORTS BY ORIGIN, 2001, WORLD (CIF) PRICES, US$ MILLIONS 
US$ millions SING US IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agricu  lture 8 61 4 4 1 3 0 8 1 0 97  1223 1410
Mining 792 2001 206 246 221 40 0 234 336 14 3289 13811 21192 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 202 370 3 49 6 25 0 24 4 1 216 1361 2260
Textiles 62 493 41 44 15 13 3 45 20 3 452 7942 9131
Wearing Apparel 11 61 1 2 3 0 0 5 2 0 47 358 489
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 27 245 292
  
Leather Products 3 12  
Wood & Wood Products 106 732 17 77 9 16 0 52 35 4 208 1902 3158
Petroleum & Coal 61 60 87 92 3 3 0 6 2 0 385 503 1201
Chemicals 1153 9288 438 600 404 105 18 422 322 77 4402 24547 41774 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 229 1310 50 160 23 14 1 67 87 3 1068 4209 7221
Metal Products 240 1915 67 98 41 6 5 156 132 4 353 3440 6457
Transportation Equipment 1090 46326 313 3314 1038 572 39 3608 652 197 942 39655 97746 
Electronic Equipment 6634 24037 104 1018 330 90 14 1618 1785 29 6394 52454 94507 
Machinery & Equipment 3975 31414 686 1937 634 296 64 2049 1470 192 8256 67071 118044 
Other Manufactures 155 2623 34 101 109 23 1 335 49 14 303 4888 8632
Electricity, Gas & Water 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 14  
Construction 1 50 1 0 10 2 0 20 0 0 3 4053 4138
Trade & Transport 386 1467 357 144 592 50 5 219 250 134 679 14224 18505 
Other Private Services 210 1961 172 110 246 34 9 444 45 20 366 11904 15521 
Government Services 7 538 7 9 13 2 7 17 13 3 15 983 1613
In Percentage (%) SING US IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total
Agriculture 0.5 4.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 6.9 86.7 100.0 
Mining 3.7 9.4 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.1 15.5 65.2 100.0 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 8.9 16.4 0.1 2.2 0.3 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 9.5 60.2 100.0 
Textiles 0.7 5.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 4.9 87.0 100.0 
Wearing Apparel 2.2 12.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 9.7 73.1 100.0 
Leather Products 1.1 4.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 9.1 83.8 100.0 
Wood & Wood Products 3.4 23.2 0.5 2.4 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.6 1.1 0.1 6.6 60.2 100.0 
Petroleum & Coal 5.0 5.0 7.2 7.7 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 32.0 41.8 100.0 
Chemicals 2.8 22.2 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.2 10.5 58.8 100.0 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 3.2 18.1 0.7 2.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.2 0.0 14.8 58.3 100.0 
Metal Products 3.7 29.7 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 2.4 2.0 0.1 5.5 53.3 100.0 
Transportation Equipment 1.1 47.4 0.3 3.4 1.1 0.6 0.0 3.7 0.7 0.2 1.0 40.6 100.0 
Electronic Equipment 7.0 25.4 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.7 1.9 0.0 6.8 55.5 100.0 
Machinery & Equipment 3.4 26.6 0.6 1.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.7 1.2 0.2 7.0 56.8 100.0 
Other Manufactures 1.8 30.4 0.4 1.2 1.3 0.3 0.0 3.9 0.6 0.2 3.5 56.6 100.0 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.7 14.1 0.7 0.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.7 0.0 1.5 75.6 100.0 
Construction 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 97.9 100.0 
Trade & Transport 2.1 7.9 1.9 0.8 3.2 0.3 0.0 1.2 1.4 0.7 3.7 76.9 100.0 
Other Private Services 1.4 12.6 1.1 0.7 1.6 0.2 0.1 2.9 0.3 0.1 2.4 76.7 100.0 
Government Services 0.4 33.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.9 60.9 100.0 
 XI 
TABLE 4.4 AD VALOREM EQUIVALENTS OF BILATERAL TARIFF BARRIERS BY SECTOR, 2001 
Country Sectoral Aggregate SING US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW 
Singapore Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 15.3 0.0 1.9 0.5 
               
US Agriculture 0.4 0.0 0.7 1.8 1.8 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.9 
 Mining 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.2 1.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.4 0.3 
 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 2.2 0.0 1.5 5.4 7.1 3.7 5.3 3.2 1.7 0.4 2.0 4.7 4.0 
 Textiles 12.7 0.0 6.9 10.2 6.5 8.0 5.5 10.5 0.0 0.1 11.4 11.0 10.1 
 Wearing Apparel 13.8 0.0 11.6 10.8 12.5 11.3 2.3 10.7 0.0 0.1 14.6 15.1 11.5 
 Leather Products 5.7 0.0 6.1 4.6 5.8 9.5 6.3 7.2 0.0 0.5 6.7 11.1 12.7 
 Wood & Wood Products 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.5 
 Petroleum & Coal 2.1 0.0 0.8 2.1 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 2.2 2.1 1.2 
 Chemicals 4.0 0.0 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 2.1 
 Non-metallic Mineral Products 6.5 0.0 0.6 3.3 4.5 3.6 4.8 1.1 0.0 0.9 5.3 2.1 4.7 
 Metal Products 2.4 0.0 0.3 2.4 2.9 2.9 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.4 2.7 
 Transportation Equipment 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.6 2.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.3 1.4 
 Electronic Equipment 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 
 Machinery & Equipment 1.2 0.0 0.2 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.5 1.4 
 Other Manufactures 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.1 1.3 
               
Japan Agriculture 2.9 39.4 3.9 52.2 3.5 0.0 5.1 0.7 63.4 3.1 4.8 5.0 7.9 
 Mining 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.1 0.2 1.0 0.1 
 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 27.3 39.2 5.1 66.6 8.1 0.0 29.8 8.3 39.8 53.7 10.3 15.4 25.4 
 Textiles 8.6 7.1 3.7 0.9 7.6 0.0 0.9 10.7 8.2 6.1 2.1 8.2 7.1 
 Wearing Apparel 10.2 10.8 9.0 12.0 11.6 0.0 12.7 11.0 11.9 10.2 11.9 10.9 10.2 
 Leather Products 16.2 12.9 10.2 9.8 13.8 0.0 11.5 13.7 10.8 15.6 10.7 11.8 12.7 
 Wood & Wood Products 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.2 
 Petroleum & Coal 3.8 1.4 3.1 0.2 1.4 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.1 3.8 3.8 3.7 1.0 
 Chemicals 1.3 1.3 0.3 1.4 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.8 
 Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.8 1.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.5 
 Metal Products 0.5 0.9 0.0 1.6 1.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 
 Transportation Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Electronic Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Machinery & Equipment 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
 Other Manufactures 2.0 1.7 0.1 0.4 3.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.3 0.6 0.0 2.3 1.0 
Source: GTAP database. Note: For Singapore, the AVE for all sectors (except Food, Beverages and Tobacco) across all regions equal zero. The AVE for services sectors, Electricity, Gas & 
Water, Construction, Trade & Transport, Other Private Services and Government Services are zero for Singapore, the U.S. and Japan. 
 XII 
TABLE 4.5A TARIFF REVENUE BY SECTOR FOR ALL REGIONS, 2001, US$ MILLIONS  
 SING US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total 
Agriculture 0 220 602 2 813 3783 0 261 63 570 28 6791 11301 24436 
Mining 0 299 2505 205 9 83 5 139 11 300 139 1217 6949 11861 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 17 1119 1702 84 1568 9359 24 205 1133 669 59 1407 20998 38344 
Textiles 0 2445 263 240 41 666 15 581 249 272 42 365 11136 16314 
Wearing Apparel 0 5030 22 332 45 1579 29 165 477 218 33 211 7682 15822 
Leather Products 0 2741 61 80 8 762 9 60 167 138 19 84 2570 6698 
Wood & Wood Products 0 135 294 119 13 193 8 164 42 162 46 153 4434 5762 
Petroleum & Coal 0 75 549 0 1 143 1 20 8 61 29 197 2278 3361 
Chemicals 0 1715 2145 279 22 285 25 242 157 701 160 947 16214 22891 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0 693 280 70 4 33 7 79 25 163 28 238 3535 5154 
Metal Products 0 446 158 83 7 23 6 74 54 195 24 101 3110 4281 
Transportation Equipment 0 2098 555 1127 17 0 75 141 359 999 88 255 19803 25517 
Electronic Equipment 0 397 492 63 3 0 13 12 13 854 80 298 10975 13199 
Machinery & Equipment 0 1913 1669 461 14 41 49 201 171 1222 232 1370 21250 28592 
Other Manufactures 0 688 1589 58 1923 124 9 23 56 228 25 150 3060 7932 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 67 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade & Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Private Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 17 20013 12887 3204 4485 17074 274 2366 2984 6751 1031 13784 145361 230230 









TABLE 4.5B TARIFF REVENUE BY REGION, 2001, US$ MILLIONS  
Importer 
Exporter SING US IND AUST EFTA JAP NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW Total 
SING 0 126 414 27 153 116 4 3 5 69 3 78 3230 4227 
US 0 0 1000 337 1581 5078 31 87 694 1032 192 3889 18354 32275 
IND 0 357 0 33 16 57 3 20 71 53 7 132 2645 3394 
AUST 0 156 318 0 34 2162 7 22 46 45 7 305 1746 4847 
EFTA 0 190 159 14 44 72 2 28 49 107 11 69 1959 2703 
JAP 3 2170 629 726 43 0 61 26 258 613 39 1464 17536 23569 
NZ 0 73 17 118 20 202 0 5 100 91 2 66 782 1475 
MOR 0 13 99 1 30 17 0 0 1 6 0 2 191 361 
CAN 0 134 145 14 41 1109 0 50 0 57 25 91 1524 3190 
MEX 1 53 99 11 76 166 2 2 6 0 0 21 1103 1540 
CHILE 0 57 12 1 20 82 0 3 1 27 0 31 649 883 
KOR 0 896 382 165 9 454 13 21 114 365 40 0 9331 11790 
ROW 11 15789 9613 1758 2418 7560 149 2100 1640 4285 705 7637 86313 139977 
Total 17 20013 12887 3204 4485 17074 273 2366 2984 6751 1031 13783 145361 230230 




TABLE 4.6 RE-AGGREGATION OF ISIC SECTORS TO MATCH THE GTAP 
SECTORAL AGGREGATES 
ISIC 
No. 2-Digit ISIC Sector j  
2-Digit 




kjj ww |/ ) 
GTAP Sectoral 
Aggregate k  
5 Construction 1.0 1.00 Construction 
61 Motor vehicle repair 1.0 0.13 
62 Wholesale 1.0 0.13 
63 Retail 1.0 0.13 
64 Hotel/Restaurant 1.0 0.13 
71 Land transport 1.0 0.13 
72A Maritime/ Waterway trans. 0.7 0.09 
72B Maritime Carbotage 0.3 0.04 
73A Supporting air trans. 0.2 0.03 
73B Air tans. proper 0.8 0.10 




75A Post (incl. courier) 0.1 0.02 
75B Basic telecommunications 0.8 0.13 
75C Voice telecom 0.2 0.03 
81+82 Fin. svcs (excl. life insurance) 0.9 0.15 
81+82 Life insurance 0.2 0.03 
83 Real Estate 1.0 0.16 
84 Rental 1.0 0.16 
89 Business 1.0 0.16 




92 Sewage 1.0 0.33 
93 Education 1.0 0.33 
94 Health/Social 1.0 0.33 
Government 
Services 
     
Source: Computations based on Hoekman (1995, Annex 2). Weights may not add up to value of one due to 






















TABLE 4.7 AD VALOREM EQUIVALENTS OF BILATERAL SERVICES TRADE BARRIERS, BY SECTOR 
 SING US JAP IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW 
SINGAPORE              
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Trade & Transport 0.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Other Private Services 0.0 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 
Government Services 0.0 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 45.5 
UNITED STATES              
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Trade & Transport 43.8 0.0 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 0.0 0.0 43.8 43.8 43.8 
Other Private Services 41.0 0.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 0.0 0.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 
Government Services 
PAN
28.0 0.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 0.0 0.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 
JA               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Trade & Transport 42.4 42.4 0.0 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 42.4 
Other Private Services 33.7 33.7 0.0 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7 
Government Services 
DIA
24.5 24.5 0.0 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
IN               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 34.0 34.0 34.0 0.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 
Trade & Transport 61.9 61.9 61.9 0.0 61.9 61.9 61.9 61.9 61.9 61.9 61.9 61.9 61.9 
Other Private Services 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 
Government Services 
LIA
48.6 48.6 48.6 0.0 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 
AUSTRA               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
Trade & Transport 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 0.0 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 
Other Private Services 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 




TABLE 4.7 AD VALOREM EQUIVALENTS OF BILATERAL SERVICES TRADE BARRIERS, BY SECTOR (CONT’D)  
 SING US JAP IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW 
E  FTA              
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Trade & Transport 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 0.0 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 45.6 
Other Private Services 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 0.0 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 
Government Services 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 0.0 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 
NEW ZEALAND              
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Trade & Transport 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 0.0 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 
Other Private Services 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 
Government Services 
CCO
38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8 0.0 38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8 38.8 
MORO               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 0.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Trade & Transport 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 0.0 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 59.9 
Other Private Services 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 0.0 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 
Government Services 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 0.0 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 43.8 
CANADA              
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 6.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 
Trade & Transport 41.3 0.0 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.3 41.3 
Other Private Services 44.6 0.0 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.6 44.6 
Government Services 
ICO
35.4 0.0 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.4 35.4 
MEX               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 24.0 0.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0 24.0 
Trade & Transport 52.2 0.0 52.2 52.2 52.2 52.2 52.2 52.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.2 52.2 
Other Private Services 60.8 0.0 60.8 60.8 60.8 60.8 60.8 60.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.8 60.8 




TABLE 4.7 AD VALOREM EQUIVALENTS OF BILATERAL SERVICES TRADE BARRIERS, BY SECTOR (CONT’D)  
 SING US JAP IND AUST EFTA NZ MOR CAN MEX CHILE KOR ROW 
CH  ILE              
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 40.0 
Trade & Transport 60.7 60.7 60.7 60.7 60.7 60.7 60.7 60.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.7 60.7 
Other Private Services 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.4 61.4 
Government Services 
REA
50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 
KO               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 0.0 16.0 
Trade & Transport 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1 0.0 54.1 
Other Private Services 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 0.0 58.3 
Government Services 
OW
42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 42.2 0.0 42.2 
R               
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 
Trade & Transport 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 
Other Private Services 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 
Government Services 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 
Note: (1) Trade & Transport AVE is a weighed average of the AVE for motor vehicle repair, wholesale, retail, hotels and restaurants, land transport, maritime/waterway transport, maritime 
carbotage, supporting air transport, air transport proper, and auxiliary transport. (2) Figures for EFTA are the unweighted average of Norway and Switzerland. (3) Figures for RoW are the 












TABLE 4.8 PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION MODELLING 








Agriculture 1.00 0 2.41 - 0 
Mining 1.16 0.139 4.17 7.20 0.161 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.11 0.102 2.49 9.80 0.114 
Textiles 1.14 0.121 3.75 8.28 0.137 
Wearing Apparel 1.12 0.109 3.70 9.15 0.123 
Leather Products 1.15 0.129 4.05 7.74 0.148 
Wood & Wood Products 1.18 0.154 3.06 6.49 0.182 
Petroleum and Coal Prod. 1.14 0.120 2.10 8.32 0.137 
Chemicals 1.22 0.180 3.30 5.57 0.219 
Non-metallic Mineral Prod. 1.24 0.195 2.90 5.14 0.242 
Metal Products 1.15 0.134 3.75 7.47 0.155 
Transportation Equipment 1.17 0.143 3.15 7.01 0.166 
Electronic Equipment 1.26 0.209 4.40 4.78 0.265 
Machinery and Equipment 1.19 0.160 4.05 6.25 0.190 
Other Manufactures 1.24 0.196 3.75 5.10 0.244 
Elec., Gas & water 1.27 0.213 2.80 4.70 0.270 
Construction 1.27 0.213 1.90 4.70 0.270 
Trade and Transport 1.27 0.213 1.90 4.70 0.270 
Other Private Services 1.27 0.213 1.90 4.70 0.270 
Government Services 1.27 0.213 1.90 4.70 0.270 
Sources: Column 4 is from GTAP 6.0 database and the rest are constructed based on estimates from Martins et al (1996), Francois (2000) and Francois et al (2005). Note: The Armington 
substitution elasticities continue to hold in the perfectly competitive agricultural sector. However, we assume non-nested Armington structure. That is, ESUBD = ESUBM. The "large 




TABLE 4.9    LIST OF EXPERIMENTS & UNDERLYING MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Services Trade Barriers Market Structure Exercise 
 Built In? Eliminated  
with FTA(s)? 




A No - Perfect Comp. 
Constant Returns 
All Armington 
B Yes No Perfect Comp. 
Constant Returns 
All Armington 
C Yes Yes Perfect Comp. 
Constant Returns 
All Armington 
D No - Monopolistic Comp. 
Increasing Returns 





E Yes No Monopolistic Comp. 
Increasing Returns 




F Yes Yes Monopolistic Comp. 
Increasing Returns 























TABLE 5.1 STEP-BY-STEP ANALYSES OF THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF SCENARIOS 1 TO 3 
WEvent Effect on A Δ  Effect on Hub-Aspiring C WΔ  





RoW (B) is the more efficient producer than C: 
 
(A1) Suppose B charges x and C charges z for their exports 
where z < y. With MFN tariff t, A imports from B at x + t 
initially. As A extends preferential treatment to C, it switches 
some of its import purchases from the more efficient B to a 
higher-cost C at a price, z +δ  > x, thus leading to a terms-of-
trade loss. 
 
(A2) Gain from improved allocative efficiency: Had there been 
no tariffs in the first place imposed on the imports from B and C, 
A would have imported from the more efficient B at x. With 
MFN tariffs, A imports from B at x + t. The zero tariff treatment 
given to C that previously charges z + t and now z +δ , where 
δ  < t lowers A’s domestic prices. Imports will increase toward 
the (zero-tariff) efficient level in A and its domestic resources are 
re-allocated to more productive uses. Fewer distortions mean less 
deadweight loss. 
 
C is the more efficient producer than RoW (B): 
 
(A3) A imports from C initially at z + t. After the tariff cut by A 
on C, C will simply increase its price to z + t, as it is already 
competitive at this price. Thus imports will not change and there 
is no improved allocative efficiency. 
 
(A4) By removing its tariff on imports from C, A suffers from a 
terms-of-trade loss since it is now importing from C at price, z 






































(H1) C gains access to the duty-free inputs in A that will allow 
its export sectors to better compete against those from B in 
markets worldwide. 
 
RoW (B) is more efficient producer than A: 
 
(H2) For imports in which B is the least cost source, let B charge 
x and A charge y for their exports to C where x < y. With equal 
MFN tariff t, C imports from B at x + t initially. As C extends 
preferential treatment to A, it switches some of its import 
purchases from the more efficient B to a higher-cost source A at 
price y +δ  higher than what it pays B at x. This leads to a 
terms-of-trade loss for the hub.  
 
(H3) Gain from improved allocative efficiency: Had there been 
zero tariffs in the first place on A and B, C would have imported 
from the more efficient B at x. With MFN tariffs, the Hub still 
imports from Spoke B but at x + t and overall purchases from 
abroad fall below the efficient level. Following A-C FTA, Hub 
buys more from A at y +δ < x + t and domestic prices are 
lowered. There is an increase in imports toward the efficient 
level in C and therefore a reduction in its deadweight loss. 
 
A is the more efficient producer than RoW (B): 
 
(H4) For imports in which A is the least-cost source (y < x), C 
imports from A at y + t under MFN tariffs. Since A is already 
more competitive than B, tariff cuts by C on imports from A 
should not lower the import price.  







































Event Effect on A WΔ  Effect on Hub-Aspiring C WΔ  
  EXPORT SIDE 
 
(A5) A receives preferential treatment from C following the 
FTA. It can export at higher prices to C and enjoy terms-of-trade 
gains. There is also an increase in the volume exported by A to 
C. 
 
(A6) A gains access to the duty-free inputs in C that will allow its 
export sectors to better compete against those from B in markets 












A charges price equals to y + t post A-C FTA. Thus prices in C 
are unchanged; no improved allocative efficiency. 
 
(H5) Hub already trades with the more efficient Spoke A. By 
removing its tariff on the imports from Spoke A, the Hub may 




(H6) C receives preferential tariff treatment from A following 
the FTA. It can export to A at higher prices and enjoy terms-of-
trade gains. There is also an increase in the volume exported by 


















Spoke B is the more efficient producer than Hub C: 
 
(A7) The Spoke A-C FTA would have caused Spoke A to trade 
more with Hub C, diverting trade away from Spoke B (A1 and 
A2). With the Spoke B-C FTA, goods from Spoke B, which 
previously sell at x + t in Spoke A, now enter into Spoke A 
through C and sell at z +δ  < x + t. This means even greater 
reliance on import purchases by A from a higher-cost source (i.e. 
Hub C) and thus aggravates the terms-of-trade loss suffered by 
Spoke A. 
 
(A8) There may be allocative efficiency gains if Spoke A still 
buys from Spoke B after Spoke A-C FTA at x + t. Now, goods 
from B sent via Hub C to A cost consumers less at z + δ . 
Imports will increase and domestic resources can be re-allocated 
























(H7) Similar to (H1), but for Spoke B-C FTA. 
 
RoW (A) is more efficient producer than B: 
(H8) Similar to (H2), but for Spoke B-Hub FTA. 
(H9) Similar to (H3), but for Spoke B-Hub FTA. 
B is the more efficient producer than RoW (A): 
 
(H10) Similar to (H4), but for Spoke B-Hub FTA. 
(H11) Similar to (H5), but for Spoke B-Hub FTA. 
EXPORT SIDE 
 
















Bilateral FTA Effect on A WΔ  Effect on Hub-Aspiring C WΔ  
  Hub C is the more efficient producer than Spoke B: 
 
(A9) A continues to import from Hub C just like when there is 
only A-C FTA. No further tariff concessions means A is 
unaffected by B-C FTA as long as Hub C can continue to supply 




(A10) A becomes outsider to this FTA. If the FTA is a 
complement, then it increases imports by the FTA members (C 
and B) from Outsider A. For example, if A produces resources 
not available within this FTA and if the increase in trade and 
income between B and Hub C (due to the Spoke B-Hub FTA) 
increases their demand for such products from A, then A will be 
better off.  
 
However, if the FTA is a substitute, then A produces goods that 
are substitutes for those produced within the FTA. If the income 
effect (increase in income generated by the FTA formation 
leading to increased demand by C and B for outsider A’s goods) 
more than offset the substitution effect, then A gains. Otherwise, 














Spoke i (i = A, B for i ≠  j) is the more efficient producer than 
Hub C: 
 
(H13) Suppose Spoke i sells a commodity at x and Hub C sells at 
z > x to Spoke j. Without FTAs, Spoke j buys from Spoke i at x 
+ t < z + t, where t is the MFN tariff. With Spoke j-C FTA, 
Spoke j buys from Hub C at z +δ < x + t. Suppose that there is 
still excess demand in Spoke j. Without Spoke i-Hub FTA, Hub 
will not import from Spoke i at x + t and re-export to Spoke A at 
lower price z +δ . With Spoke i-Hub FTA, Hub imports from 
Spoke i at x and re-sells to Spoke j at a higher price, z +δ .  
 
Even when Rules of Origin (ROOs) apply, the Hub can import 
from Spoke i for own consumption at x, and export the same 
produce to Spoke j at y +δ . Riskless profits equal y +δ  – x > 0 
per unit. There is two-way indirect arbitrage as the spokes trade 







A – B FTA 
(FREE TRADE 




RoW (C) is the more efficient producer than B: 
 
(A11) A will still trade with the more efficient source (i.e. C) just 
like when there is only a A-C FTA among the three countries. 
This is because the less efficient B continues to charge more than 

















 j is the more efficient producer than i (i = A, B; i ≠  j): 
 
(H14) The two i-C FTAs (i = A, B) would have caused C to 
trade more with the more efficient partner just like in the 
benchmark case of MFN tariffs. Even with the Spoke-Spoke 
FTA, C continues to import from the more efficient and 














Bilateral FTA Effect on A WΔ  Effect on Hub-Aspiring C WΔ  
  B is more efficient producer than RoW (c) : 
 
(A12) A will restore its imports from B that were switched earlier 
to the high-cost C due to the A-C FTA. Recall from (A1) that A 
imports from C at z +δ  < x + t after the A-C FTA. Now, A 
imports from Spoke B at x where x < z. This yields a terms-of-
trade benefit that offsets (A1). 
 
(A13) A buys more from B. The domestic prices in A fall 
because B charges less than C and C has to price lower at z 
instead of z + δ  to stay competitive (still x < z). Thus A’s 
imports increase toward the efficient level. Domestic resources 
are re-allocated to more productive uses reducing deadweight 
loss. Gains accrue from an improvement in allocative efficiency.  
 
(A14) A’s tariff elimination on B may cause A to suffer a terms-
of-trade loss for the existing quantities purchased from B. This is 
because B can raise its price to x + γ  < z + δ  and still remain 
competitive. A pays x to B previously where the prevailing price 




(A15) A receives preferential treatment from B, which may lead 
to higher export prices and therefore terms-of-trade gains. There 
is also an increase in the volume exported by A to the B. This is 
similar to Effect (A5). 
 
(A16) A gains access to the duty-free inputs in B that will allow 
its export sectors to better compete against those from C in 
markets worldwide (which also gets this preferential access 





































(H15) Effects (5), (6), (11) and (12) are eroded because each 
spoke i = A, B now receives the same treatment as C from the 
other spoke. C no longer has any advantage over A and B.  
 
i (i = A, B; i ≠  j) is the more efficient producer than C: 
 
(H16) Suppose that i sells at x + t and C at z + t to j for x < z 
where t is the MFN tariff. With a Spoke j-C FTA, Spoke j buys 
more from Hub C at z +δ < x + t. When Spoke i-C FTA is 
formed, i “sells to” Spoke j at z +δ through Hub C, which buys 
from the former at x. C earns a riskless profit equal to z + δ - x 
> 0. However, with the Spoke-Spoke FTA, Spoke i receives 
preferential treatment from and sells directly to Spoke j at x. 
Less efficient C loses the two-way indirect arbitrage trade, 
cancelling out Effect (H13). 
 
(H17) In addition, by assuming that the Spoke-Spoke FTA is a 
substitute, Outsider C produces goods that compete with those 
produced within the FTA (e.g. goods produced by Spokes i). If 
the income effect (i.e. the income increase generated by the FTA 
leading to increase in demand by members for outsiders’ goods) 
more than offsets this substitution effect, then C gains. 
Otherwise, purchases of C’s goods by the FTA members (i.e. 
Spoke j) are reduced. If the Spoke-Spoke FTA is a complement, 
then it strictly increases imports by members from Outsider C. 
For example, if C produces resources not available within the 
FTA and if the increase in trade between the spokes raises their 
income level and their demand for such products from C, then C 



























TABLE 5.2   CHANGE IN REGIONAL UTILITY (EQUIVALENT VARIATION), US$ MILLIONS AND % OF BENCHMARK GDP 
EXERCISE A EXERCISE B EXERCISE C US$ 
Million S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
SING 216 464 347 189 385 277 184 380 276 265 546 409 223 432 311 217 426 309 1396 2672 2154 918 1625 1218 912 1603 1205 
US -29 -102 4055 -24 -70 4104 -22 -68 4105 -38 -121 4621 -29 -75 4687 -27 -73 4677 -203 241 9923 -142 722 10470 -137 748 10496 
JAP -117 -126 570 -81 -87 584 -72 -78 800 -131 -144 451 -82 -89 472 -73 -80 706 -248 -415 -39 -31 -188 62 -13 -166 423 
IND -5 -13 -80 1 1 -68 1 1 -67 -7 -16 -91 1 2 -76 1 2 -74 -40 -89 -218 1 -36 -179 1 -36 -176 
AUST -6 -9 -313 -4 -5 -311 -4 -5 -294 -8 -12 -362 -5 -6 -359 -4 -6 -338 -35 -72 -497 -21 -63 -493 -22 -70 -466 
EFTA -4 -6 -91 203 377 194 194 367 196 -5 -8 -105 252 457 244 242 445 246 -30 -72 -308 1218 1697 976 1202 1654 956 
NZ -1 -2 -66 -1 -1 -66 -1 -1 -64 -1 -2 -74 -1 -1 -74 -1 -1 -71 -6 -12 -98 -4 -14 -100 -4 -14 -99 
MOR -1 -1 -17 -1 -1 -17 0 -1 -12 -1 -1 -19 -1 -1 -19 -1 -1 -14 -2 -5 -32 -2 -4 -32 -2 -5 -26 
CAN -4 -14 -675 -3 -9 -671 -3 -9 -657 -6 -19 -710 -4 -11 -704 -4 -11 -690 -31 -128 -1219 -19 -119 -1219 -19 -117 -1194 
MEX -1 -14 -399 -1 -8 -394 -3 -10 -487 -2 -16 -415 -1 -8 -408 -4 -10 -513 -13 -56 -578 -5 -41 -566 -12 -48 -723 
CHILE -2 -2 -46 -1 -1 -46 -1 -1 -43 -2 -2 -53 -1 -2 -53 -1 -1 -49 -5 -9 -76 -3 -7 -74 -3 -8 -71 
KOR -8 -14 -439 -5 -9 -435 -5 -9 -426 -10 -18 -478 -6 -10 -472 -6 -10 -462 -43 -90 -638 -25 -90 -648 -25 -89 -639 
ROW -115 -270 -3256 -101 -213 -3208 -98 -210 -3148 -174 -380 -3834 -136 -266 -3742 -132 -262 -3669 -1225 -2759 -9308 -810 -1874 -8548 -805 -1847 -8390 
WLD -76 -110 -410 172 357 -58 170 355 178 -120 -194 -659 211 421 -191 208 417 58 -485 -793 -932 1074 1609 868 1074 1606 1297 
% GDP S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
SING 0.25 0.55 0.41 0.19 0.38 0.27 0.18 0.37 0.27 0.31 0.63 0.47 0.21 0.40 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.29 1.62 3.10 2.50 0.83 1.48 1.11 0.83 1.46 1.10 
US 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.11 
JAP 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
IND 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
AUST 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 
EFTA 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.28 0.40 0.23 0.28 0.39 0.22 
NZ 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 -0.03 -0.19 -0.01 -0.03 -0.19 
MOR 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 
CAN 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.17 0.00 -0.02 -0.17 0.00 -0.02 -0.17 
MEX 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 
CHILE 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 
KOR 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 
ROW 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
WLD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
 XXV
TABLE 5.3A DECOMPOSITION OF EV, IN % (SIMULATION EXERCISE A) 
S1 S2 S3 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 5 89 6 100 6 87 6 100 6 88 6 100 
US -1 53 47 100 3 60 37 100 -7 93 14 100 
JAP 54 49 -3 100 49 55 -4 100 158 -27 -31 100 
IND 25 70 5 100 34 65 1 100 10 71 19 100 
AUST 11 85 4 100 9 88 3 100 8 88 4 100 
EFTA 48 57 -4 100 53 55 -8 100 39 56 5 100 
NZ 10 98 -7 101 10 96 -6 100 9 96 -6 100 
MOR 22 73 5 100 25 70 5 100 18 73 8 100 
CAN 2 107 -9 100 17 100 -17 100 9 91 0 100 
MEX 16 88 -4 100 27 85 -12 100 3 95 2 100 
CHILE 9 102 -11 100 10 105 -15 100 10 93 -3 100 
KOR 46 57 -4 100 32 75 -7 100 57 42 2 100 
ROW 14 82 4 100 20 79 1 100 20 69 11 100 
Total 100 0 0 100 99 1 0 100 98 2 0 100 
             
S4 S5 S6 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 6 86 8 100 7 85 8 100 6 86 8 100 
US -1 42 59 100 -92 144 47 100 -5 91 14 100 
JAP -12 115 -3 100 -12 115 -3 100 161 -30 -31 100 
IND 415 -277 -38 100 517 -375 -44 99 -1 78 23 100 
AUST 9 86 5 100 7 88 5 100 8 88 4 100 
EFTA 89 13 -2 100 88 14 -2 100 112 -6 -5 100 
NZ 8 101 -9 100 9 101 -9 101 9 96 -6 100 
MOR 24 71 6 100 27 66 6 99 19 73 8 100 
CAN 2 110 -12 100 16 103 -18 100 9 91 0 100 
MEX 18 90 -9 99 27 86 -13 100 3 95 3 100 
CHILE 8 104 -13 100 9 107 -17 100 10 93 -3 100 
KOR 43 62 -6 100 30 79 -9 100 57 41 2 100 
ROW 12 85 3 100 17 83 0 100 20 69 11 100 
Total 110 -9 -1 100 110 -10 -1 100 31 65 4 100 
             
S7 S8 S9 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 6 86 8 100 7 85 8 100 6 86 8 100 
US -1 38 63 100 -94 146 48 100 -5 91 13 100 
JAP -21 124 -3 100 -20 124 -3 100 140 -17 -23 100 
IND 396 -259 -37 100 503 -360 -43 100 0 77 23 100 
AUST 9 85 5 100 8 87 5 100 7 89 4 100 
EFTA 89 13 -2 100 88 14 -2 100 111 -6 -5 100 
NZ 8 101 -9 100 9 101 -10 100 9 96 -6 100 
MOR 23 71 6 100 30 64 6 100 -14 103 11 100 
CAN 2 111 -13 100 16 103 -19 100 8 92 0 100 
MEX 2 108 -10 100 20 93 -12 100 -1 101 0 100 
CHILE 9 103 -12 100 11 106 -17 100 5 97 -2 100 
KOR 42 64 -6 100 29 80 -9 100 56 42 2 100 
ROW 12 85 3 100 17 83 0 100 20 69 11 100 
Total 110 -9 -1 100 110 -9 -1 100 124 -22 -2 100 
Note: Simulation A: Services trade barriers are non-existent, markets are perfectly competitive and production 
technologies display constant returns. Refer to Table 4.9 for a description of each simulation exercise. Figures 
indicate the magnitude, not the signs. For example, total EV can be negative in dollars, but is taken to be 100 
percent here. Then if TOT effect is -20 percent, it will be positive in dollars. 
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TABLE 5.3B DECOMPOSITION OF EV, IN % (SIMULATION EXERCISE B) 
S1 S2 S3 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total Alloc tot IS Total 
SING 15 79 6 100 15 78 6 100 15 78 6 100 
US 17 43 40 100 16 51 34 100 2 85 14 100 
JAP 57 46 -3 100 53 51 -3 100 206 -64 -42 100 
IND 37 59 5 100 42 56 2 100 18 63 19 100 
AUST 23 74 3 100 21 76 3 100 19 78 4 100 
EFTA 60 44 -3 100 64 42 -6 100 48 47 5 100 
NZ 22 83 -6 99 23 82 -5 100 18 88 -6 100 
MOR 28 66 6 100 33 63 5 101 24 68 8 100 
CAN 30 76 -6 100 37 76 -13 100 11 89 1 100 
MEX 54 47 -1 100 41 69 -10 100 3 94 3 100 
CHILE 22 88 -10 100 26 87 -13 100 19 84 -3 100 
KOR 54 49 -3 100 44 61 -5 100 59 39 2 100 
ROW 35 62 4 100 38 61 1 100 31 58 11 100 
Total 100 0 0 100 99 1 0 100 98 1 0 100 
             
S4 S5 S6 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 15 75 9 100 16 75 9 100 16 76 9 100 
US 13 32 55 100 -89 143 47 100 3 83 14 100 
JAP -26 128 -2 100 -23 125 -2 100 207 -67 -40 100 
IND 297 -162 -37 99 261 -125 -37 99 9 68 24 100 
AUST 21 74 5 100 19 75 6 100 18 78 4 100 
EFTA 89 13 -2 100 89 13 -2 100 107 -1 -5 100 
NZ 19 88 -8 99 20 87 -9 99 18 88 -6 100 
MOR 29 64 5 98 32 62 6 100 24 68 8 100 
CAN 27 82 -9 100 33 81 -14 100 10 89 1 100 
MEX 56 47 -2 100 41 70 -11 100 2 95 3 100 
CHILE 20 91 -11 99 23 92 -14 101 19 84 -3 100 
KOR 50 54 -4 100 41 66 -7 100 59 38 2 100 
ROW 29 68 3 100 31 68 2 100 30 58 11 100 
Total 111 -10 -1 100 111 -10 -1 100 74 24 2 100 
             
S7 S8 S9 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 15 76 9 100 16 75 9 100 16 76 9 100 
US 15 28 57 100 -92 144 47 100 3 83 13 100 
JAP -37 139 -2 100 -33 134 -2 100 166 -39 -27 100 
IND 286 -150 -36 100 252 -116 -36 100 9 67 23 100 
AUST 21 73 6 100 20 74 6 100 17 79 4 100 
EFTA 89 13 -2 100 88 13 -2 100 106 -1 -5 100 
NZ 20 88 -8 100 21 88 -8 100 18 88 -6 100 
MOR 28 65 7 100 33 60 7 100 -5 95 10 100 
CAN 27 82 -9 100 33 81 -14 100 9 90 1 100 
MEX 21 86 -7 100 32 78 -10 100 0 99 0 100 
CHILE 21 91 -11 100 24 91 -15 100 14 88 -2 100 
KOR 49 55 -4 100 40 67 -7 100 59 39 2 100 
ROW 29 68 3 100 31 68 2 100 30 59 11 100 
Total 111 -10 -1 100 111 -10 -1 100 193 -85 -8 100 
Note: Simulation B: Services trade barriers are built in and held unchanged by shocks, markets are perfectly 
competitive and production technologies display constant returns. Refer to Table 4.9 for a description of each 
simulation exercise. 
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TABLE 5.3C DECOMPOSITION OF EV, IN % (SIMULATION EXERCISE C) 
S1 S2 S3 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 13 79 7 100 14 77 9 100 13 77 10 100 
US 17 45 38 100 31 85 -16 100 7 77 16 100 
JAP 48 49 3 100 27 62 10 100 -4259 3374 985 100 
IND 37 59 4 100 35 57 8 100 21 56 23 100 
AUST 22 74 4 100 21 72 7 100 20 73 7 100 
EFTA 58 51 -9 100 52 52 -4 100 48 49 3 100 
NZ 26 78 -3 100 25 74 1 100 20 82 -2 100 
MOR 23 68 9 100 20 67 14 100 21 67 12 100 
CAN 36 70 -6 100 22 75 2 100 10 85 5 100 
MEX 54 46 0 100 7 84 9 100 -15 104 10 100 
CHILE 29 82 -11 100 27 72 1 100 19 75 5 100 
KOR 35 66 -1 100 30 65 5 100 50 42 8 100 
ROW 35 63 2 100 34 61 5 100 31 57 12 100 
Total 98 2 0 100 96 4 0 100 93 6 1 100 
             
S4 S5 S6 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 1 86 13 100 -7 90 18 100 -14 95 20 100 
US 11 36 53 100 96 0 4 100 13 71 16 100 
JAP -1184 1201 83 100 -182 237 45 100 3159 -2368 -692 100 
IND 1983 -1641 -240 102 -8 85 23 100 12 59 29 100 
AUST 24 71 6 100 28 61 11 100 20 72 7 100 
EFTA 89 12 -1 100 91 10 -1 100 104 -1 -3 100 
NZ 23 87 -10 100 29 76 -5 100 21 82 -3 100 
MOR 23 67 10 100 19 62 19 100 21 66 13 100 
CAN 32 78 -10 100 13 79 8 100 9 86 5 100 
MEX 61 41 -2 100 -32 109 23 100 -18 107 11 100 
CHILE 24 92 -16 100 19 70 12 100 18 75 6 100 
KOR 24 81 -5 100 32 65 3 100 50 42 7 100 
ROW 30 68 2 100 29 60 11 100 30 56 14 100 
Total 111 -10 -1 100 116 -14 -2 100 130 -26 -4 100 
             
S7 S8 S9 
Regions 
alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total alloc tot IS Total 
SING 2 86 13 100 -7 90 18 100 -14 95 20 100 
US 12 34 54 100 94 2 4 100 13 71 16 100 
JAP -2864 2770 195 100 -213 262 50 100 537 -335 -102 100 
IND 1758 -1446 -211 102 -7 84 23 100 12 59 29 100 
AUST 26 68 7 100 22 67 11 100 13 79 8 100 
EFTA 89 12 -1 100 91 10 -1 100 104 -1 -3 100 
NZ 23 87 -10 100 30 76 -5 100 21 82 -2 100 
MOR 22 65 13 101 1 82 18 100 -12 96 16 100 
CAN 32 78 -10 100 12 80 8 100 8 87 5 100 
MEX 18 87 -5 100 -27 109 18 100 -13 107 6 100 
CHILE 25 91 -16 100 3 87 10 100 3 88 8 100 
KOR 24 82 -5 100 32 65 3 100 50 43 7 100 
ROW 30 68 2 100 29 60 11 100 30 56 14 100 
Total 111 -10 -1 100 116 -14 -2 100 120 -18 -3 100 
Note: Simulation C: Services trade barriers are built in and eliminated with shocks, markets are perfectly 




TABLE 5.4   CHANGE IN REGIONAL UTILITY (EQUIVALENT VARIATION), US$ MILLIONS AND % OF BENCHMARK GDP 
EXERCISE D EXERCISE E EXERCISE F US$ 
Millio S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
SING 2589 2648 1555 2930 2974 1996 2121 2144 1316 4177 4242 2349 3368 3416 1961 3120 3158 1902 4550 5086 3708 3108 3519 2594 2911 3353 2577 
US -1175 -1162 2286 -3026 -3180 50 -280 -220 3296 -1230 -1251 3530 491 -533 4081 -287 -371 4639 -1061 131 11920 -467 928 12264 -435 997 12603 
JAP -1304 -1307 2890 1253 1314 5138 -829 -844 3599 -1686 -1674 2511 -1000 -1186 2443 -894 -889 3464 -1061 -925 9332 -596 -549 9129 -325 -281 10124 
IND -97 -98 -80 -456 -490 -471 51 43 29 -156 -159 -129 42 -37 -26 18 -3 7 -156 -170 -164 76 -31 -210 82 -31 -204 
AUST -161 -172 -70 1919 1993 2059 -57 -90 53 -269 -267 -204 -202 -64 -64 -91 -75 -66 -297 -229 -79 -80 -101 -41 -70 -96 65 
EFTA -149 -146 -232 -1929 -1947 -1676 -750 -735 -520 -181 -181 -301 -769 -825 -583 -764 -764 -546 -171 -179 -379 -754 -734 -594 -710 -685 -572 
NZ -22 -23 -10 276 285 294 -4 -9 9 -36 -36 -27 -22 -6 -5 -9 -7 -8 -40 -31 -11 -7 -15 -6 -6 -15 -5 
MOR -105 -107 -107 462 467 453 -4 -7 -11 -131 -131 -133 -19 -9 -26 -6 -5 -17 -131 -121 -83 -12 -11 -29 -43 -36 3 
CAN -8 5 -211 -2246 -2318 -2533 -30 4 -260 -13 -15 -149 159 -88 -214 -32 -55 -164 40 -33 -169 -54 -58 -193 -61 -48 -196 
MEX 3 5 -282 -1075 -1112 -1382 -82 -62 -590 15 10 -205 107 -62 -250 -77 -91 -566 41 -10 -226 -41 -35 -200 -89 -72 -569 
CHIL -15 -15 -41 62 63 32 -8 -9 -30 -22 -22 -53 -5 -15 -52 -10 -11 -38 -18 -19 -55 -13 -13 -56 -11 -10 -36 
KOR 141 -45 -737 40709 42024 41265 257 -380 29 -415 -364 -968 -4573 593 -218 -352 77 -1295 -1311 -106 -734 -18 -22 -707 269 -75 -687 
ROW -4587 -4441 -1449 -45178 -46519 -44427 -2930 -2285 -1705 -7525 -7592 -4822 -150 -4003 -3059 -3166 -3477 -2296 -6851 -6668 -2649 -3631 -3202 -2025 -3749 -3009 -2065 
WLD -4891 -4857 3512 -6298 -6447 799 -2545 -2449 5214 -7471 -7438 1398 -2575 -2819 3987 -2551 -2513 5015 -6463 -3274 20412 -2490 -324 19927 -2235 -8 21038 
% S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
SING 3.05 3.12 1.83 3.18 3.22 2.16 2.26 2.29 1.40 0.048 0.049 0.03 0.034 0.035 0.02 0.031 0.032 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.030 0.034 0.026 
US -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
JAP -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IND -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AUST -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.53 0.55 0.57 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EFTA -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.46 -0.46 -0.40 -0.18 -0.17 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NZ -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.55 0.57 0.59 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MOR -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 1.26 1.27 1.23 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CAN 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.31 -0.32 -0.35 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MEX 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.17 -0.18 -0.22 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CHIL -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
KOR 0.03 -0.01 -0.17 10.08 10.41 10.22 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROW -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.33 -0.34 -0.32 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




TABLE 5.5A DECOMPOSITION OF EV, IN % (SIMULATION EXERCISE D) 
S1 S2 S3 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING -21 -576 697 100 -20 -556 676 100 -20 -633 753 100 
US -2 -122 224 100 -27 -137 264 100 15 -699 784 100 
JAP 115 -198 184 100 116 -195 179 100 25 426 -351 100 
IND -48 -165 313 100 -46 -160 306 100 -202 -306 609 100 
AUST -43 -89 232 100 -37 -79 215 100 -323 -409 832 100 
EFTA 88 -45 57 100 88 -43 55 100 98 -36 38 100 
NZ -21 -119 240 100 -17 -108 225 100 -116 -275 491 100 
MOR -102 224 -22 100 -103 226 -22 100 -88 201 -13 100 
CAN -42 -341 483 100 -97 -556 752 100 -243 -96 439 100 
MEX 218 2671 -2789 100 237 2586 -2722 100 -139 -118 357 100 
CHILE 5 -37 133 100 4 -37 133 100 9 -25 117 100 
KOR -32108 146318 -114111 100 179 -622 543 100 45 2 53 100 
ROW -65 -44 210 100 -67 -50 217 100 -879 -509 1488 100 
Total -11 105 6 100 -15 109 6 100 146 -41 -4 100 
 
S4 S5 S6 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING -15 15 108 109 -24 21 103 100 -34 103 31 100 
US 4820 4677 -9397 100 3942 3854 -7696 100 -723 -1369 2192 100 
JAP -75 -123 299 100 -74 -124 298 100 12 154 -67 100 
IND 15 23 62 100 33 26 42 100 71 26 3 100 
AUST 34 38 28 100 34 38 28 100 37 40 24 100 
EFTA 56 -52 96 100 55 -53 98 100 52 -69 117 100 
NZ 35 35 30 100 35 35 30 100 37 37 25 100 
MOR -150 280 -31 100 -151 281 -30 100 -154 287 -33 100 
CAN 50 87 -37 100 50 87 -37 100 39 82 -21 100 
MEX 119 203 -222 100 119 202 -221 100 85 176 -161 100 
CHILE 25 -39 113 100 26 -39 114 100 21 -32 111 100 
KOR -35 340 -204 100 -35 339 -204 100 -36 343 -207 100 
ROW 49 134 -83 100 49 134 -84 100 47 143 -91 100 
Total 586 -491 6 100 592 -498 6 100 8967 -8942 75 100 
 
S7 S8 S9 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING -15 15 108 109 -24 21 103 100 -34 103 31 100 
US 4820 4677 -9397 100 3942 3854 -7696 100 -723 -1369 2192 100 
JAP -75 -123 299 100 -74 -124 298 100 12 154 -67 100 
IND 15 23 62 100 33 26 42 100 71 26 3 100 
AUST 34 38 28 100 34 38 28 100 37 40 24 100 
EFTA 56 -52 96 100 55 -53 98 100 52 -69 117 100 
NZ 35 35 30 100 35 35 30 100 37 37 25 100 
MOR -150 280 -31 100 -151 281 -30 100 -154 287 -33 100 
CAN 50 87 -37 100 50 87 -37 100 39 82 -21 100 
MEX 119 203 -222 100 119 202 -221 100 85 176 -161 100 
CHILE 25 -39 113 100 26 -39 114 100 21 -32 111 100 
KOR -35 340 -204 100 -35 339 -204 100 -36 343 -207 100 
ROW 49 134 -83 100 49 134 -84 100 47 143 -91 100 
Total 586 -491 6 100 592 -498 6 100 8967 -8942 75 100 
Note: Simulation D: Services trade barriers are non-existent, markets are imperfectly competitive and 
production displays increasing returns. The figures for Korea (KOR) seem unusually high in S1 because the 




 TABLE 5.5B DECOMPOSITION OF EV, IN % (SIMULATION EXERCISE E) 
S1 S2 S3 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING 26 -336 410 100 26 -327 402 100 20 -403 483 100 
US -4 -124 228 100 -15 -127 242 100 53 -377 424 100 
JAP 100 -149 149 100 102 -147 145 100 19 506 -424 100 
IND 14 -100 186 100 16 -96 181 100 -33 -144 277 100 
AUST 7 -45 139 100 7 -45 139 100 -12 -102 215 100 
EFTA 92 -33 41 100 92 -33 42 100 100 -28 28 100 
NZ 16 -68 153 100 16 -68 152 100 9 -109 200 100 
MOR -91 207 -16 100 -90 206 -16 100 -78 186 -8 100 
CAN 42 -341 399 100 44 -300 355 100 -1444 -618 2162 100 
MEX 138 1362 -1401 100 167 2009 -2076 100 -413 -254 767 100 
CHILE 32 -24 92 100 32 -24 92 100 28 -19 91 100 
KOR 58 -52 94 100 64 -76 112 100 49 14 36 100 
ROW 4 -36 132 100 5 -35 129 100 -21 -74 195 100 
Total 9 87 4 100 21 75 4 100 210 -99 -11 100 
 
S4 S5 S6 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING 36 -102 166 100 34 -92 158 100 32 -93 161 100 
US 186 151 -236 100 90 -34 44 100 39 -350 411 100 
JAP 72 -128 156 100 83 -102 119 100 21 485 -406 100 
IND 1953 138 -1991 100 -2339 -116 2555 100 2614 239 -2754 100 
AUST 31 15 54 100 26 -40 114 100 -50 -308 458 100 
EFTA 84 4 12 100 80 -3 23 100 89 -8 18 100 
NZ 31 3 66 100 0 -88 188 100 -29 -323 452 100 
MOR -73 161 11 100 -21 79 43 100 -14 51 63 100 
CAN 65 83 -48 100 51 16 33 100 -418 -70 588 100 
MEX 120 172 -192 100 67 -27 61 100 -237 -27 364 100 
CHILE -123 -60 283 100 40 -15 75 100 30 -16 85 100 
KOR -18 185 -66 100 4 284 -188 100 117 -377 359 100 
ROW 3 -533 630 100 37 17 46 100 18 -2 84 100 
Total -78 168 10 100 60 31 10 100 55 50 -5 100 
 
S7 S8 S9 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING 35 -106 171 100 34 -101 167 100 32 -108 176 100 
US 520 -2280 1859 100 -4353 -249 254 -4347 32 -266 333 100 
JAP 76 -121 144 100 83 -118 136 100 47 310 -257 100 
IND 2875 274 -3049 100 14483 1195 -15578 100 1232 143 -1274 100 
AUST 25 -11 86 100 25 -20 96 100 -86 -194 381 100 
EFTA 84 -2 18 100 83 -3 19 100 92 -5 13 100 
NZ 15 -36 120 100 10 -53 143 100 -3 -154 257 100 
MOR 20 33 47 100 32 1 67 100 -26 38 88 100 
CAN 45 -9 63 100 51 15 35 100 -637 -148 885 100 
MEX -6 -226 332 100 10 -178 268 100 -80 -222 402 100 
CHILE 33 -16 82 100 39 -16 77 100 8 -22 114 100 
KOR 4 107 -11 100 18 1346 -1264 100 25 107 -32 100 
ROW 32 -7 74 100 34 6 60 100 -2 -70 172 100 
Total 32 59 9 100 42 48 10 100 77 27 -4 100 
Note: Simulation E: Services trade barriers are built in and stay unchanged with FTA shocks, markets are 





TABLE 5.5C DECOMPOSITION OF EV, IN % (SIMULATION EXERCISE F) 
S1 S2 S3 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING 23 -297 374 100 29 -224 295 100 36 -101 166 100 
US -43 -169 312 100 208 113 -221 100 44 -104 160 100 
JAP 75 -218 242 100 84 -234 249 100 103 164 -167 100 
IND 11 -97 186 100 26 -80 155 100 0 -73 173 100 
AUST 9 -34 126 100 6 -47 141 100 -150 -347 597 100 
EFTA 92 -27 35 100 87 -30 44 100 92 -18 27 100 
NZ 17 -55 138 100 12 -66 154 100 -44 -200 344 100 
MOR -94 211 -17 100 -90 207 -17 100 -57 159 -2 100 
CAN 152 1312 -1364 100 19 -235 316 100 751 213 -864 100 
MEX 129 668 -697 100 -2026 -16692 18818 100 -1280 -267 1647 100 
CHILE 22 -25 103 100 30 -22 92 100 25 -19 94 100 
KOR 24 115 -39 100 111 -350 339 100 46 13 41 100 
ROW 1 -50 149 100 5 -36 130 100 -113 -177 390 100 
Total 2 94 4 100 -30 124 6 100 82 18 -1 100 
 
S4 S5 S6 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING 26 -115 190 100 29 -79 150 100 33 -17 84 100 
US 69 -116 147 100 104 0 -4 100 45 -106 161 100 
IND 812 141 -853 100 -2349 -319 2768 100 -161 60 201 100 
AUST 27 -26 99 100 31 -14 82 100 -6439 -14309 20848 100 
EFTA 81 -2 21 100 67 -4 36 100 69 -8 40 100 
JAP 28 -174 247 100 36 -201 264 100 103 163 -165 100 
NZ 26 -76 150 100 24 -20 96 100 -39 -197 336 100 
MOR -54 125 29 100 -50 115 35 100 10 27 63 100 
CAN 45 -23 78 100 16 -71 155 100 824 241 -964 100 
MEX 49 -116 167 100 -27 -155 282 100 -12493 -1597 14190 100 
CHILE 33 -15 82 100 30 -14 84 100 27 -18 91 100 
KOR 142 -362 320 100 100 -480 480 100 37 27 35 100 
ROW 33 -2 69 100 35 -5 69 100 -68 -114 283 100 
Total 33 58 9 100 -243 268 75 100 78 23 -1 100 
 
S7 S8 S9 
Regions 
eff tech tot total eff tech tot total eff tech tot total 
SING 25 -124 199 100 30 -81 151 100 33 -22 88 100 
US 156 -123 67 100 98 1 1 100 40 -97 157 100 
JAP -11 -257 368 100 -10 -326 436 100 103 135 -138 100 
IND 755 146 -801 100 -2225 -314 2639 100 -158 58 200 100 
AUST 35 -33 99 100 31 -10 79 100 108 82 -90 100 
EFTA 82 -3 20 100 68 -4 35 100 68 -8 40 100 
NZ 22 -97 175 100 24 -17 93 100 -186 -378 664 100 
MOR -92 203 -11 100 -94 203 -9 100 -346 565 -118 100 
CAN 51 2 47 100 16 -67 151 100 1577 339 -1816 100 
MEX 13 -175 261 100 -29 -232 361 100 -124 -255 479 100 
CHILE 39 -16 77 100 25 -15 90 100 -20 -47 167 100 
KOR -38 412 -274 100 50 -141 191 100 36 32 32 100 
ROW 33 4 63 100 35 -8 73 100 -62 -58 220 100 
Total 32 59 9 100 14710 -11838 -2771 100 79 22 -1 100 
Note: Simulation E: Services trade barriers are built in and eliminated with FTA shocks, markets are 
monopolistically competitive, technologies display increasing returns. The figures for Australia (AUST), 
Mexico (MEX) and India (IND) seem unusually high in some cases, because the base (total EV) is very small, 
while each effect is huge in dollar value but they cancel each other out. 
 XXXII 
TABLE 5.6A CHANGES IN SECTORAL OUTPUT BY REGION (EXERCISE A) 
 Scenario S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9
% Change SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 2.8 -5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 2.8 -5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 2.7 -5.6 
MINING -2.3 0.0 0.0 -1.9 -0.7 0.7 -2.1 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -0.6 0.7 -2.0 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -0.6 0.7 
FOOD BEV TOB 16.6 0.0 -0.1 7.8 2.3 -2.4 13.1 0.0 -0.1 6.0 2.3 -2.4 12.6 0.0 -0.1 6.0 2.3 -2.3 
TEXTILES 18.0 -0.1 0.0 18.2 -0.6 1.3 15.2 0.0 0.0 15.5 -0.6 1.3 15.3 0.0 0.0 15.5 -0.6 1.3 
WEAR APP 42.0 -0.1 0.0 43.0 -0.2 0.0 32.4 0.0 0.0 33.3 -0.2 0.0 32.5 0.0 0.0 33.3 -0.2 0.0 
LEATH PROD 13.8 0.0 -0.1 13.9 0.5 0.7 10.5 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.5 0.8 10.5 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.5 0.8 
WOOD PROD -1.1 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2 
PETROL COAL 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 
CHEM 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 -0.4 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.4 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.4 0.6 
NM MIN PROD -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.4 
METAL PROD -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.4 
TRANSPORT -2.1 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -0.7 2.6 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.7 2.6 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.7 2.6 
ELECTRONICS -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.1 0.3 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 0.3 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 0.3 
MACH EQUIP -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.8 1.3 -1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 1.3 -1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 1.2 
OTHER MNFCS -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.7 0.5 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 0.5 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 0.5 
UTILITIES 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 
CONSTRUCTN 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 
TRADE TRANS -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
OTH PTE SVCS -1.1 0.0 0.0 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
GOVT SVCS 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Value, Market Prices SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE 0 -11 -30 -6 5668 -5181 0 -9 -21 -6 5679 -5178 0 -9 21 6- - 5531 -5110 
MINING -46 25 55 -37 -2449 1579 -45 16 37 -37 -2462 1569 -44 16 35 -37 -2414 1476 
FOOD BEV TOB 703 -86 -255 332 17224 -7644 445 -61 -176 204 17293 -7603 428 -56 -168 204 16906 -7275 
TEXTILES 192 -102 9 194 -860 509 107 -61 5 108 -823 506 107 -62 4 108 -835 488 
WEAR APP 337 -72 4 346 -247 19 146 -36 2 150 -212 18 146 -36 2 150 -215 14 
LEATH PROD 49 2 -8 49 86 58 18 1 -2 18 85 63 18 1 -3 18 87 59 
WOOD PROD -41 12 2 -38 -505 -323 -28 5 -1 -25 -521 -327 -28 5 -1 -25 -523 -324 
PETROL COAL 64 -9 -23 68 3 -82 60 -9 -22 64 5 -82 61 -9 -22 64 5 -82 
CHEM 40 -56 71 95 -3084 1938 14 -32 56 48 -3075 1931 17 -33 54 49 -3022 1866 
NM MIN PROD -11 6 6 -15 -413 310 -6 4 5 -8 -417 308 -6 4 4 -8 -415 299 
METAL PROD -12 10 6 -15 -933 522 -10 8 4 11-  -938 520 -10 8 4 -10 -931 507 
TRANSPORT -83 61 73 -70 -4744 9080 -34 45 47 -26 -4774 9061 -33 45 43 -26 -4702 8880 
ELECTRONICS -510 99 116 -372 -3676 1204 -371 73 79 -257 -3731 1199 -365 72 74 -263 -3634 1048 
MACH EQUIP -217 54 93 -155 -6141 3740 -108 51 66 -69 -6172 3728 -105 49 61 -68 -6080 3561 
OTHER MNFCS -29 10 7 -24 -427 364 -173 -45 -1 -139 -407 358 -170 -44 -1 -138 -396 347 
UTILITIES 29 -2 4 25 260 186 13 -10 2 11 265 185 13 -10 2 11 256 180 
CONSTRUCTN 93 -32 -42 62 1589 -138 71 -19 -22 44 1606 -127 70 -18 -20 44 1608 -73 
TRADE TRANS -144 18 0 -96 -69 193 -73 17 0 -37 -74 191 -73 17 1 -37 -62 210 
OTH PTE SVCS -449 52 7 -350 -1357 -201 -189 32 2 -139 -1389 -206 -187 31 2 -139 -1333 -193 
GOVT SVCS 56 -18 -33 42 498 -712 52 -9 -23 38 508 -707 52 -9 -21 38 512 -650 
 XXXIII 
TABLE 5.6B CHANGES IN SECTORAL OUTPUT BY REGION (EXERCISE B)  
Scenario S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9
% Change SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.8 2.9 -5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 2.9 -5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 2.8 -5.6 
MINING -2.8 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -0.7 0.8 -2.4 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -0.7 0.8 -2.4 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -0.7 0.7 
FOOD BEV TOB 16.7 0.0 -0.1 7.8 2.5 -2.4 12.6 0.0 -0.1 5.7 2.5 -2.4 12.1 0.0 0.0 5.7 2.4 -2.3 
TEXTILES 16.6 -0.1 0.0 17.0 -0.7 1.3 14.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 -0.6 1.3 14.1 0.0 0.0 14.4 -0.6 1.3 
WEAR APP 40.5 -0.1 0.0 41.8 -0.3 0.0 28.3 0.0 0.0 29.2 -0.2 0.0 28.4 0.0 0.0 29.3 -0.2 0.0 
LEATH PROD 13.2 0.0 -0.1 13.4 0.5 0.8 9.2 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.5 0.8 9.3 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.5 0.8 
WOOD PROD -1.4 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2 
PETROL COAL 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 
CHEM -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.5 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.5 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.5 0.6 
NM MIN PROD -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.4 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.4 
METAL PROD -0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.4 
TRANSPORT -2.6 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -0.8 2.6 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.8 2.6 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.8 2.5 
ELECTRONICS -1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -1.2 0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.2 0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.2 0.3 
MACH EQUIP -2.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -0.9 1.3 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 1.3 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.9 1.2 
OTHER MNFCS -1.9 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -0.8 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.8 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 0.5 
UTILITIES 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
CONSTRUCTN 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 
TRADE TRANS -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OTH PTE SVCS -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 
GOVT SVCS 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Value, Market Prices SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE -1 -12 -31 -6 5782 -5371 0 -8 -20 -7 5796 -5367 0 -9 20 7- - 5645 -5297 
MINING -57 27 59 -46 -2686 1680 -45 16 36 -37 -2704 1668 -45 16 33 -37 -2650 1570 
FOOD BEV TOB 716 -89 -265 336 17818 -7942 401 -58 -165 181 17904 -7890 385 -53 -158 181 17502 -7549 
TEXTILES 180 -98 9 185 -927 519 85 -51 4 87 -884 515 86 -52 4 87 -896 497 
WEAR APP 322 -70 4 333 -275 21 107 -28 2 110 -236 19 107 -28 2 110 -239 14 
LEATH PROD 48 2 -8 49 81 62 12 1 -1 12 80 68 12 1 -2 12 81 63 
WOOD PROD -53 12 2 -48 -593 -316 -29 3 -1 -24 -611 -320 -28 3 -1 -24 -612 -318 
PETROL COAL 61 -8 -23 67 -4 -86 58 -8 -23 63 -1 -85 59 -8 -23 63 -1 -86 
CHEM -41 -44 77 31 -3422 1995 -16 -21 57 21 -3418 1986 -12 -21 55 22 -3355 1916 
NM MIN PROD -17 6 7 -20 -454 315 -7 4 5 -9 -458 313 -7 4 4 -8 -456 303 
METAL PROD -22 12 6 -23 -1019 530 -13 9 5 -13 -1027 527 -13 9 4 13- -1017 514 
TRANSPORT -102 69 81 -84 -4979 9148 -31 48 45 -22 -5019 9123 -30 47 41 -22 -4942 8934 
ELECTRONICS -639 115 131 -464 -4163 1461 -428 80 81 -293 -4236 1450 -422 78 77 -299 -4125 1286 
MACH EQUIP -300 65 103 -219 -6740 3939 -115 57 66 -74 -6786 3922 -112 55 62 -73 -6681 3745 
OTHER MNFCS -40 11 8 -32 -483 372 -208 -54 -2 -162 -460 364 -204 -53 -2 -162 -448 352 
UTILITIES 25 -2 4 22 245 194 9 -11 2 8 250 192 9 -11 2 8 242 186 
CONSTRUCTN 114 -38 -50 78 1778 -208 81 -21 -22 50 1800 -193 80 -20 -20 50 1799 -133 
TRADE TRANS -113 12 -6 -67 100 191 -51 11 -3 -16 96 191 -50 12 -2 -17 105 214 
OTH PTE SVCS -333 33 4 -259 -805 -164 -106 16 -1 -75 -829 -169 -104 16 0 -75 -788 -154 
GOVT SVCS 72 -23 -35 54 672 -750 60 -10 -22 44 687 -744 59 -10 -20 43 686 -684 
 XXXIV 
TABLE 5.6C CHANGES IN SECTORAL OUTPUT BY REGION (EXERCISE C) 
Scenario S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9
% Change SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE -1.7 0.0 0.0 -2.2 2.6 -5.6 -1.3 0.0 0.0 -1.9 2.6 -5.6 -1.3 0.0 0.0 -1.9 2.6 -5.5 
MINING -17.2 -0.1 0.0 -15.1 -1.6 1.4 -11.5 -0.1 0.0 -9.7 -1.7 1.3 -11.3 -0.1 0.0 -9.6 -1.6 1.2 
FOOD BEV TOB 7.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 2.4 -2.4 7.6 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.4 -2.3 7.2 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.3 -2.2 
TEXTILES 0.6 -0.2 0.0 2.9 -1.5 1.6 5.9 -0.2 -0.1 7.7 -1.5 1.5 6.1 -0.2 -0.1 7.8 -1.5 1.5 
WEAR APP 18.0 -0.1 0.0 21.8 -0.8 0.1 18.3 -0.1 0.0 20.9 -0.8 0.1 18.6 -0.1 0.0 21.1 -0.8 0.1 
LEATH PROD -11.4 -0.1 -0.1 -9.0 -0.7 0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 1.3 -0.8 0.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 1.4 -0.8 0.8 
WOOD PROD -11.5 0.0 0.0 -10.4 -0.4 -0.1 -6.0 0.0 0.0 -5.3 -0.4 -0.2 -6.0 0.0 0.0 -5.2 -0.4 -0.2 
PETROL COAL -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
CHEM -16.6 -0.1 0.1 -14.2 -1.2 1.1 -9.1 -0.1 0.0 -7.2 -1.3 1.0 -9.0 -0.1 0.0 -7.1 -1.2 1.0 
NM MIN PROD -9.4 -0.1 0.0 -8.6 -0.9 0.7 -4.5 -0.1 0.0 -4.1 -0.9 0.6 -4.5 -0.1 0.0 -4.0 -0.9 0.6 
METAL PROD -10.8 0.0 0.0 -9.7 -0.9 0.8 -6.1 -0.1 0.0 -5.3 -0.9 0.7 -6.0 -0.1 0.0 -5.2 -0.9 0.7 
TRANSPORT -15.7 0.0 0.1 -13.9 -1.3 3.3 -7.5 -0.1 0.0 -6.1 -1.3 3.2 -7.4 -0.1 0.0 -6.0 -1.3 3.1 
ELECTRONICS -3.8 -0.1 0.1 -2.5 -2.8 1.1 -2.2 -0.2 0.0 -1.0 -2.9 1.0 -2.1 -0.2 0.0 -1.0 -2.9 1.0 
MACH EQUIP -14.6 -0.1 0.1 -12.5 -1.8 2.2 -7.9 -0.1 0.0 -6.0 -1.9 2.1 -7.8 -0.1 0.0 -5.9 -1.9 2.1 
OTHER MNFCS -8.8 -0.1 0.0 -7.1 -2.0 0.7 -2.2 -0.6 -0.1 -1.7 -2.2 0.6 -2.2 -0.6 -0.1 -1.7 -2.2 0.6 
UTILITIES -2.8 0.0 0.0 -2.5 -0.1 0.2 -1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -0.1 0.2 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -0.1 0.2 
CONSTRUCTN 6.1 0.0 0.0 5.2 0.2 0.1 3.1 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 3.1 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 
TRADE TRANS 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 
OTH PTE SVCS 6.9 0.0 -0.1 6.0 0.3 -0.5 3.2 0.1 0.0 2.5 0.4 -0.5 3.2 0.1 0.0 2.6 0.3 -0.5 
GOVT SVCS 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 
Value, Market Prices SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE -14 -74 -24 -18 5293 -5295 -10 -98 -22 -15 5274 -5297 -10 -98 -22 -15 5131 -5229 
MINING -352 -315 94 -309 -5960 2986 -198 -531 -84 -167 -6215 2840 -197 -531 -88 -167 -6119 2742 
FOOD BEV TOB 306 -157 -223 16 17108 -7744 232 -151 -144 63 17155 -7706 222 -151 -138 65 16734 -7368 
TEXTILES 7 -214 4 32 -2082 644 34 -260 -32 44 -2142 612 35 -261 -32 45 -2154 592 
WEAR APP 143 -125 -2 174 -877 68 65 -138 -19 74 -897 53 66 -139 -19 75 -901 48 
LEATH PROD -41 -20 -6 -33 -111 72 0 -34 -6 2 -127 72 0 -34 -6 2 -124 67 
WOOD PROD -437 -173 5 -396 -2215 -286 -177 -295 -26 -154 -2370 -312 -176 -295 -26 -154 -2356 -309 
PETROL COAL -54 -3 -14 -32 -87 -28 -5 -20 -20 12 -98 -33 -4 -21 -20 12 -97 -33 
CHEM -2086 -408 231 -1794 -8434 3399 -581 -835 14 -459 -8939 3222 -576 -834 11 -456 -8810 3142 
NM MIN PROD -200 -61 23 -185 -1115 519 -70 -104 -3 -62 -1169 497 -69 -105 -3 -62 -1162 486 
METAL PROD -329 -120 35 -296 -2480 905 -131 -218 -4 -114 -2602 870 -131 -218 -4 -113 -2579 858 
TRANSPORT -614 -64 317 -543 -8360 11529 -144 -354 49 -117 -8715 11316 -144 -354 43 -117 -8603 11104 
ELECTRONICS -1986 -382 362 -1311 -9814 4175 -880 -795 0 -412 -10332 3912 -861 -790 -8 -415 -10121 3701 
MACH EQUIP -2136 -616 377 -1820 -14313 6716 -563 -1099 41 -430 -14934 6441 -557 -1099 35 -427 -14751 6249 
OTHER MNFCS -179 -82 9 -145 -1290 519 -803 -338 -43 -603 -1340 474 -785 -333 -43 -594 -1314 462 
UTILITIES -80 -56 7 -73 -226 348 -46 -118 -22 -40 -257 322 -45 -116 -23 -40 -258 318 
CONSTRUCTN 812 -54 -185 696 3033 806 485 147 -102 397 3247 866 481 151 -98 396 3249 937 
TRADE TRANS 1059 724 377 1027 5117 861 364 1081 622 348 5502 1086 348 1074 620 333 5425 1058 
OTH PTE SVCS 2300 1282 -595 1992 14201 -6624 919 2301 -170 736 15354 -6268 920 2291 -167 740 15209 -6192 
GOVT SVCS 99 38 -185 23 1881 -2021 -95 138 -141 -151 1984 -2005 -97 141 -136 -152 1996 -1922 
 XXXV 
TABLE 5.7A CHANGES IN SECTORAL OUTPUT BY REGION (EXERCISE D) 
Scenario S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9 
Value, Market Prices SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE 21 -611 -2646 12 9099 -13631 -2 -240 -777 -4 9403 -12460 -1 -242 -1346 -3 8693 -12292 
MINING -1601 -834 2185 -1226 -7091 11652 -4207 -16981 -27860 -3534 -23543 -17682 -1797 35 1725 -1224 -6780 9969 
FOOD_BEV_TOB 57473 -2162 -25716 36235 96561 -102293 19520 8072 -10639 12313 106993 -94201 17802 -517 -12884 11225 97072 -88503 
TEXTILES -924 247 589 -317 -6177 1124 10 58645 17108 75 52830 17732 -5 -477 176 58 -4824 1105 
WEAR_APP 380 -199 323 3609 -5121 -175 -973 44586 11385 -801 41163 10912 160 -390 77 315 -2589 -149 
LEATH_PROD -259 -219 223 1498 -198 278 -58 -899 2694 -49 -1034 3013 -5 37 103 3 -53 426 
WOOD_PROD 464 -191 -385 430 191 -3099 -658 5402 3087 -416 5702 261 -526 -67 -212 -318 259 -2821 
PETROL_COAL -2087 -230 23 -764 -591 -221 8673 2045 4221 9515 1621 4002 -596 -83 -100 395 -434 -194 
CHEM -11295 0 2253 -9120 -10333 5216 -498 44770 46967 19 34282 50377 -1659 -385 405 -1148 -9453 4753 
NM_MIN_PROD 1511 -115 149 1100 -702 700 -11 1047 534 -41 405 1129 109 -14 113 76 -612 647 
METAL_PROD 831 -319 47 479 -2873 758 -124 -8401 -4293 -119 -11133 -3561 34 -1 133 30 -2940 656 
TRANSPORT -3595 -2916 10225 -3228 -37648 73446 -3134 -7296 4186 -3090 -43313 70123 -175 -983 4973 -136 -36173 67898 
ELECTRONICS -39974 9031 7015 -26714 -8328 16454 6318 -128232 -44685 9363 -143800 -33413 -8677 2957 3445 -5690 -16289 11860 
MACH_EQUIP -12006 -1340 4852 -9485 -20017 18727 -1591 -9347 451 -1003 -28797 15753 -1880 -566 2979 -1333 -20930 16033 
OTHER_MNFCS -1519 -289 222 -1336 -2102 635 -4628 7766 2327 -3395 5887 2794 -3133 -136 94 -2053 -1622 542 
UTILITIES 174 -146 19 153 73 346 -17 2423 -37 -23 2603 285 25 -52 25 19 173 324 
CONSTRUCTN 628 -422 857 282 -1266 4712 770 -8552 -7332 559 -9444 -3230 447 -190 487 265 -1005 3936 
TRADE_TRANS -1763 -315 -946 -524 -946 -4863 -3112 2239 -100 -2200 1318 -4320 -1658 104 -466 -860 -467 -4340 
OTH_PTE_SVCS -9458 0 595 -5993 -2268 -357 -4270 17137 3730 -2880 14710 2981 -3460 295 192 -2212 -1134 -565 













TABLE 5.7B CHANGES IN SECTORAL OUTPUT BY REGION (EXERCISE E) 
Scenario S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9 
Value, Market Prices SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE 18 -567 -2435 11 9404 -14024 -3 -163 -1246 -5 9767 -13498 -2 -203 -1117 -4 8978 -12601 
MINING -1649 -721 2166 -1279 -7515 12157 -1825 -291 1127 -1175 -7442 11862 -1723 -123 1164 -1138 -6778 11080 
FOOD_BEV_TOB 52178 -2084 -23751 33949 100348 -105355 14960 -456 -12481 8910 102577 -100914 14506 -347 -10757 9200 100899 -90696 
TEXTILES -960 -73 472 -434 -6457 1210 -9 786 548 46 -5208 1352 -5 175 329 47 -6649 746 
WEAR_APP 280 -415 250 3310 -5196 -133 122 579 320 279 -2948 -56 141 104 184 284 -3960 -406 
LEATH_PROD -284 -215 197 1089 -279 359 -5 15 157 2 -185 539 -4 22 115 2 -90 391 
WOOD_PROD 283 -191 -352 343 238 -3094 -602 67 -123 -351 416 -2971 -552 -5 -135 -338 176 -2892 
PETROL_COAL -2275 -230 0 -867 -630 -226 -482 -31 -9 414 -488 -221 -464 -49 -55 209 -509 -305 
CHEM -11571 -381 1902 -9496 -11155 5351 -1430 483 1340 -978 -10652 5175 -1434 87 820 -1029 -11230 3702 
NM_MIN_PROD 1279 -123 150 978 -763 745 20 14 128 15 -692 770 37 3 107 29 -688 668 
METAL_PROD 562 -234 83 329 -3030 815 -66 -148 57 -33 -3102 827 -47 -66 78 -21 -2872 811 
TRANSPORT -3639 -2470 9416 -3283 -38289 73212 -159 -1153 4736 -119 -38323 71192 -155 -780 4116 -119 -36519 67402 
ELECTRONICS -41514 9640 7113 -27831 -9891 17546 -7590 485 2509 -4716 -16989 14983 -8006 1401 2518 -5505 -15117 13688 
MACH_EQUIP -12416 -1309 4546 -9871 -21569 20040 -1721 -418 2954 -1183 -21526 19841 -1683 -543 2519 -1207 -22153 17141 
OTHER_MNFCS -1584 -349 196 -1401 -2317 683 -3275 24 144 -2042 -2038 681 -3094 -39 104 -2019 -1980 527 
UTILITIES 101 -147 26 99 49 345 5 2 25 5 167 353 6 -21 22 6 101 329 
CONSTRUCTN 742 -357 766 347 -1061 4811 538 -386 310 300 -1219 4617 500 -252 308 292 -687 4232 
TRADE_TRANS -997 -325 -1011 -66 -713 -5088 -1342 58 -526 -586 -530 -4896 -1240 83 -435 -570 -230 -4414 
OTH_PTE_SVCS -5799 22 417 -3576 -1409 -273 -2391 390 227 -1426 -1120 -363 -2269 315 176 -1430 -845 -545 













TABLE 5.7C CHANGES IN SECTORAL OUTPUT BY REGION (EXERCISE F) 
Scenario S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9 
Value, Market Prices SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP SING US JAP 
AGRICULTURE 14 -492 -2069 1 9460 -13204 -3 -179 -1051 -8 9550 -13008 -2 -201 -905 -8 8765 -12076 
MINING -1651 -873 2042 -1277 -10668 17895 -1746 -527 1302 -1223 -10891 17690 -1676 -477 1111 -1220 -10471 16323 
FOOD_BEV_TOB 44357 -1779 -20294 16202 100888 -98694 13511 -580 -10535 2871 100999 -96964 12298 -388 -8746 2822 99367 -86492 
TEXTILES -955 -7 495 -449 -8590 1728 -2 -209 277 52 -8313 1601 4 -299 222 54 -8622 1304 
WEAR_APP 121 -290 273 2765 -6347 153 103 -194 146 244 -5074 47 121 -265 122 250 -5217 -101 
LEATH_PROD -314 -224 186 -256 -734 568 -5 -69 104 -2 -711 551 -4 -62 84 -2 -613 449 
WOOD_PROD -144 -252 -290 -342 -1078 -3230 -732 -170 -145 -632 -1157 -3207 -703 -181 -128 -627 -1288 -3078 
PETROL_COAL -2220 -197 27 -765 -791 16 -366 -77 -50 581 -746 -34 -275 -74 -60 540 -722 -37 
CHEM -11724 -578 2041 -9913 -17653 9466 -1284 -899 786 -970 -18482 8730 -1260 -901 638 -975 -18113 8131 
NM_MIN_PROD 909 -141 176 175 -1357 1397 -48 -79 125 -257 -1398 1379 -61 -76 108 -255 -1360 1278 
METAL_PROD 184 -356 137 -482 -5185 2203 -136 -302 115 -345 -5392 2164 -154 -280 105 -348 -5294 2061 
TRANSPORT -3663 -2561 9137 -3296 -51359 97350 -147 -1909 4562 -114 -52518 95721 -144 -1687 3960 -115 -50927 92438 
ELECTRONICS -33266 6574 6217 -8299 -23153 24011 -6677 227 2604 -267 -25982 22691 -6835 288 2269 -800 -26077 20458 
MACH_EQUIP -12092 -1830 4527 -8998 -30954 29460 -1547 -1478 2724 -1008 -31656 28732 -1496 -1593 2258 -1017 -32226 25801 
OTHER_MNFCS -1475 -348 191 -1141 -3212 953 -2705 -245 97 -1492 -3189 911 -2524 -236 76 -1479 -2943 787 
UTILITIES 3 -146 61 -86 -292 1214 -30 -90 30 -77 -295 1171 -38 -90 28 -79 -306 1148 
CONSTRUCTN 1021 -419 672 656 -1021 8443 708 -301 277 502 -1044 8280 676 -229 220 498 -648 7705 
TRADE_TRANS -577 977 -530 1104 5431 -9078 -2045 1990 405 -885 6282 -8331 -1855 1950 468 -849 6356 -7848 
OTH_PTE_SVCS -1905 792 -1428 4715 23817 -29190 -976 2074 -1050 2110 25974 -28045 -496 1934 -1136 2223 26263 -28268 













TABLE 5.8A % CHANGE IN THE REAL RETURNS TO PRIMARY FACTOR (EXERCISE A) 
S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9 
Region 
T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR 
SING 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 -0.4 -5.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 -4.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.6 -4.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 -3.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.6 -4.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 -3.6 
US 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 
JAP -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -26.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 -19.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -26.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 -19.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -25.9 0.5 0.6 0.5 -19.1 
IND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
AUST 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 
EFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
NZ -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5 
MOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
CAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 
MEX 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 
CHILE -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
KOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 
ROW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 













TABLE 5.8B % CHANGE IN REAL RETURN TO PRIMARY FACTOR (EXERCISE B) 
S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9 
Region 
T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR 
SING 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 -0.9 -5.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 -4.9 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 -0.7 -3.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 -3.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0.7 -3.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 -3.5 
US 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.6 
JAP -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -26.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 -19.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -26.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 -19.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -25.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 -19.0 
IND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
AUST 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.2 
EFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
NZ -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 
MOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
CAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 
MEX 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 
CHILE -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
KOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 
ROW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 













TABLE 5.8C % CHANGE IN REAL RETURN TO PRIMARY FACTOR (EXERCISE C) 
S2 S3 S5 S6 S8 S9 
Region 
T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR T UL SL K NR 
SING -6.9 7.1 7.6 7.4 -10.1 -11.1 6.5 6.9 6.8 -12.5 -2.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 -4.1 -5.2 5.6 5.6 5.6 -5.9 -2.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 -4.1 -5.1 5.6 5.5 5.6 -5.8 
US -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 17.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 -2.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 17.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -2.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 17.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -2.1 
JAP -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -25.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 -18.8 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -25.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 -18.8 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -25.4 0.8 0.9 0.8 -18.5 
IND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 
AUST 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -4.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -4.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 1.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -4.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 1.6 
EFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -2.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.6 -2.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.5 -2.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
NZ 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -4.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -4.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -4.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 
MOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 
CAN 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 
MEX 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 
CHILE -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 
KOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 
ROW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 









TABLE 6.1   SYSTEMATIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: EQUIVALENT VARIATION (SINGAPORE) 




EVμˆ  EVσˆ  95% C.I.  EVμˆ  EVσˆ  95% C.I.  EVμˆ  EVσˆ  95% C.I. 90% C.I. 
S1 - - -  - - -  1403 384 (-323, 3130) (190, 2617) 
S2 - - -  - - -  2647 599 (-47, 5341) (754, 4540) 
FTA Shock 
S3 347 12 (295, 399)  408 14 (344, 473)  2492 551 (13, 4970) (750, 4233) 
S1 216 0 (215, 218)  265 0 (264, 267)  1396 0 (1395, 1396) (1395, 1396) 
S2 464 0 (464, 464)  546 0 (545, 546)  2672 1 (2668, 2677) (2670, 2675) 
ESUBVA 
S3 347 1 (345, 349)  408 1 (405, 412)  2155 1 (2152, 2157) (2153, 2156) 
S1 218 8 (181, 255)  267 12 (213, 321)  1403 57 (1149, 1658) (1224, 1582) 
S2 467 8 (431, 502)  549 13 (491, 608)  2698 96 (2265.9, 3129) (2394, 3001) 
ESUBD 
S3 348 1 (344, 353)  410 1 (406, 415)  2172 21 (2078, 2266) (2106, 2238) 
S1 217 15 (148, 287)  267 19 (183, 350)  1404 100 (953, 1856) (1087, 1722) 
S2 467 32 (322, 612)  549 38 (380, 714)  2691 222 (1691, 3691) (1988, 3394) 
ESUBT 
S3 349 23 (246, 452)  411 27 (290, 532)  2172 194 (1299, 3044) (1559, 2784) 
S1 216 0 (216, 216)  265 0 (265, 265)  1396 0 (1395, 1396) 1395, 1396) 
S2 464 0 (464, 464)  546 0 (545, 546)  2672 0 (2672, 2673) (2672, 2673) 
ETRAE 
S3 347 0 (345, 349)  409 0 (407, 411)  2155 0 (2153, 2156) (2153, 2156) 
S1 216 0 (216, 216)  265 0 (265, 265)  1396 0 (1395.6, 1395.6) (1396, 1396) 
S2 464 0 (464, 464)  546 0 (546, 546)  2672 0 (2672.4, 2672.4) (2672, 2672) 
INCPAR 
S3 347 0 (347, 347)  409 0 (409, 409)  2154 0 (2154.4, 2154.4) (2154, 2154) 
S1 216 1 (213, 219)  265 1 (261, 270)  1396 5 (1375.1, 1416.1) (1381, 1410) 
S2 464 1 (458, 471)  546 2 (536, 555)  2672 8 (2636.5, 2708.3) (2647, 2698) 
SUBPAR 
S3 347 1 (343, 352)  409 1 (402, 415)  2154 6 (2125.4, 2183.5) (2134, 2175) 
Note: 
EVμˆ  and EVσˆ  are estimates of the mean and s.d. respectively of the distribution of simulation result, EV under each Scenario. Variations of FTA shocks involve tariff cuts (USJFTA only) 
and where applicable, services trade liberalisation (for all three FTAs). ESUBVA, ESUBD and ESUBT are the substitution elasticities among primary factors, between domestic and foreign 
consumption goods or intermediates, and between the value-added by primary factors and the intermediate composite respectively. ETRAE indicates how mobile a primary factor is across 
sectors. INCPAR and SUBPAR are the income and own-price elasticities of demand respectively. We assume all exogenous variables have a symmetric triangular distribution. The order-three 
Gaussian Quadratures used in the SSA are based on Stroud (1957). We allow for maximum 30% variation from the original value for ESUBD, ESUBVA, INCPAR, SUBPAR and FTA shock 
per sensitivity solve. ESUBT and ETRAE vary from the defaults by a maximum absolute value of 0.5. The 95% confidence intervals (C.I.) for EV are constructed using Chebyshev’s 
Inequality, because its distribution is not known. They are conservative estimates, i.e. the C.I. is wider than if the distribution is known. 
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TABLE 7.1 EQUILIBRIUM PRICES AND QUANTITIES 
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TABLE 7.2 TARIFF RATES AT THE EQUILIBRIUM 
 i
jAτ  ijBτ  ijCτ  ijDτ  
     
Scenario 0 (No FTAs) 
Region A  for  a - 0.200 0.200 0.200 
Region  for  B b 0.200 - 0.200 0.200 
Region  for  C c 0.200 0.200 - 0.200 
Region  for  D d 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 
     
Scenario 1 (Singular FTA) 
Region A  for  a - 0* 0.071 0.071 
Region  for  B b 0* - 0.071 0.071 
Region  for  C c 0.200 0.200 - 0.200 
Region  for  D d 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 
     
Scenario 2 (HAS System) 
Region A  for  a - 0* 0* 0.043 
Region  for  B b 0* - 0.071 0.071 
Region  for  C c 0* 0.071 - 0.071 
Region  for  D d 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 
     
Scenario 3 (Exclusive Free Trade Zone) 
Region A  for  a - 0* 0* 0.043 
Region  for  B b 0* - 0* 0.043 
Region  for  C c 0* 0* - 0.043 
Region  for  D d 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 
     
Scenario 4 (Global Free Trade) 
Region A  for  a - 0* 0* 0* 
Region  for  B b 0* - 0* 0* 
Region  for  C c 0* 0* - 0* 
Region  for  D d 0* 0* 0* - 
Note: Equilibrium tariff rates are optimal in the sense that they maximise regional welfare. However, figures 











TABLE 7.3 TRADE FLOWS AT THE EQUILIBRIUM 
i
jE  Region A  Region  B Region C  Region  D Total Imports 
Scenario 0 (No FTAs) 
Region A  - 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.600 
Region  B 0.200 - 0.200 0.200 0.600 
Region C  0.200 0.200 - 0.200 0.600 
Region  D 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 0.600 
Total Exports 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 2.400 
      
Scenario 1 (Singular FTA) 
Region A  - 0.286 0.214 0.214 0.714 
Region  B 0.286 - 0.214 0.214 0.714 
Region C  0.200 0.200 - 0.200 0.600 
Region  D 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 0.600 
Total Exports 0.686 0.686 0.629 0.629 2.629 
      
Scenario 2 (HAS System) 
Region A  - 0.261 0.261 0.217 0.739 
Region  B 0.286 - 0.214 0.214 0.714 
Region C  0.286 0.214 - 0.214 0.714 
Region  D 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 0.600 
Total Exports 0.771 0.675 0.675 0.646 2.768 
      
Scenario 3 (Exclusive Free Trade Zone) 
Region A  - 0.261 0.261 0.217 0.739 
Region  B 0.261 - 0.261 0.217 0.739 
Region C  0.261 0.261 - 0.217 0.739 
Region  D 0.200 0.200 0.200 - 0.600 
Total Exports 0.722 0.722 0.722 0.652 2.817 
      
Scenario 4 (Global Free Trade) 
Region A  - 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.750 
Region  B 0.250 - 0.250 0.250 0.750 
Region C  0.250 0.250 - 0.250 0.750 
Region  D 0.250 0.250 0.250 - 0.750 
Total Exports 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 3.000 
Note: Column denotes exporter Region and row, the importer Region. Total trade in the world is twice the 








TABLE 7.4 WELFARE LEVELS AT THE EQUILIBRIUM 
iW  Region A Region B Region C Region  D Total 
Scenario 0 (No FTAs) 1.8600 1.8600 1.8600 1.8600 7.4400 
Scenario 1 (Singular FTA) 1.8665 1.8665 1.8659 1.8659 7.4649 
Scenario 2 (HAS System) 1.8842 1.8627 1.8627 1.8695 7.4792 
Scenario 3 (Exclusive FTZ) 1.8707 1.8707 1.8707 1.8709 7.4829 

































TABLE 7.5 SIMULATION RESULTS: WITH AND WITHOUT TARIFF COMPLEMENTARITY 
Exercise A: Shallow Integration Exercise B: Shallow Integration Exercise C: Deep Integration EV 
NSvcs_PC_S1 NSvcs_PC_S2 NSvcs_PC_S3 SvcsH_PC_S1 SvcsH_PC_S2 SvcsH_PC_S3 SvcsNH_PC_S1 SvcsNH_PC_S2 SvcsNH_PC_S3 
Without External Tariff Downward Adjustment following Integration
SING 216 464 347 265 546 409 1396 2672 2154
US -29 -102 4055 -38 -121 4621 -203 241 9923 
IND -5 -13 -80 -7 -16 -91 -40 -89 -218 
AUST -6 -9 -313 -8 -12 -362 -35 -72 -497 
EFTA -4 -6 -91 -5 -8 -105 -30 -72 -308 
JAP -117 -126 570 -131 -144 451 -248 -415 -39 
NZ -1 -2 -66 -1 -2 -74 -6 -12 -98 
MOR -1 -1 -17 -1 -1 -19 -2 -5 -32 
CAN -4 -14 -675 -6 -19 -710 -31 -128 -1219 
MEX -1 -14 -399 -2 -16 -415 -13 -56 -578 
CHILE -2 -2 -46 -2 -2 -53 -5 -9 -76 
KOR -8 -14 -439 -10 -18 -478 -43 -90 -638 
ROW -115 -270 -3256 -174 -380 -3834 -1225 -2759 -9308 
WORLD -76 -110 -410 -120 -194 -659 -485 -793 -932 
With External Tariff Downward Adjustment following Integration (-5% per FTA)
SING 206 448 332 257 520 345 1382 2760 2158
US 38 -247 3461 78 1 4771 -84 353 10037 
IND -9 -9 -64 -7 7 -45 -40 -66 -171 
AUST 36 40 -216 48 87 -192 22 26 -326 
EFTA -8 -3 -76 -3 44 -3 -28 -21 -205 
JAP 104 171 938 653 513 1713 558 259 1492 
NZ 0 2 -53 2 11 -48 -3 1 -72 
MOR -2 -1 -16 -1 3 -9 -2 0 -22 
CAN 11 -38 -683 18 -10 -689 -7 -116 -1188 
MEX -5 -84 -508 -9 -85 -537 -20 -124 -696 
CHILE -3 -2 -41 -3 4 -39 -6 -3 -61 
KOR -6 20 -333 5 71 -289 -28 -2 -449 
ROW -44 228 -2020 230 1463 -193 -804 -935 -5646 
WORLD 319 524 721 1268 2629 4785 940 2132 4850 
With External Tariff Downward Adjustment following Integration (-2.5% per FTA)
SING 211 456 340 262 536 379 1389 2718 2158
US 5 -174 3765 19 -54 4725 -144 304 10010 
IND -7 -11 -72 -7 -5 -68 -40 -78 -195 
AUST 15 16 -266 20 37 -280 -7 -24 -414 
EFTA -6 -4 -84 -4 17 -55 -29 -46 -257 
JAP -5 23 755 264 187 1090 158 -75 732 
NZ -1 0 -60 0 4 -61 -4 -6 -85 
MOR -1 -1 -17 -1 1 -14 -2 -3 -27 
CAN 4 -26 -680 6 -15 -702 -19 -123 -1206 
MEX -3 -49 -454 -6 -51 -476 -17 -90 -637 
CHILE -3 -2 -43 -3 1 -46 -5 -6 -69 
KOR -7 2 -386 -2 26 -384 -36 -46 -544 
ROW -80 -22 -2641 27 534 -2039 -1016 -1855 -7504 
WORLD 122 208 157 575 1219 2069 228 671 1962 
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FIGURE 2.1 VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM SINGAPORE TO THE US 





















Off. & Data Pro. Mach. Only Agriculture & Food, except Beverages
Beverages & Tobacco
Mining, Petroleum & Coal Prod.
Textiles
Wearing Apparel
Leather & Leather Prod.
Wood & Wood Prod.
Chemicals & Related Prod.




Industrial Machinery & Equip.
Telecomm. & Sound Recording Apparatus
Electrical Prod.
Prof. & Sci. Instruments
Office & Data Processing Machines
Photo Apparatus, Optical Gds, Watches, Clocks
Other Manufactures
Source: Constructed based on data from SourceOECD ITCS International Trade by Commodities Statistics, Standard International Trade Classification (Revision 3), 
Vol. 2005, Release 1. 
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FIGURE 2.2 VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM SINGAPORE TO JAPAN
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FIGURE 2.3 VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM JAPAN TO THE US
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FIGURE 2.4 VALUE OF EXPORTS FROM THE US TO JAPAN 
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FIGURE 4.1 NETWORK OF FTAS INVOLVING SINGAPORE, THE US AND JAPAN LEGEND 
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APPENDIX A STANDARD CLOSURE OF THE GTAP MODEL 
(1) “pop” - Regional population,  
(2) “pfactwld” - World price index of primary factors, 
(3) “psaveslack” - Slack variable in the savings price 
equation. This is exogenous as long as savings is 
endogenous, 
(4) “profitslack” – Slack variable in the zero profits 
equation and is exogenous as long as output is 
endogenous,  
(5) “incomeslack” – Slack variable in the regional income 
equation and is exogenous as long as regional household 
income is endogenous, 
(6) “endwslack” - Slack variable in the endowment 
market clearing condition and is exogenous as long as 
primary factor rental rates are endogenous, 
(7) “cgdslack” - Slack variable for output of capital goods 
and is exogenous as long as the latter is endogenous, 
(8) “tradslack” – Slack variable in the tradables market 
clearing condition and is exogenous as long as the price 
of tradable is endogenous, 
(9) “ams” - import i from region r augmenting tech. 
change in region s,  
(10) “atm” – tech. change in transport mode m, 
worldwide,  
(11) “atf” – tech. change shipping of i, worldwide,  
(12) “ats”- tech. change shipping from region r,  
(13) “atd” – tech. change shipping to s,  
(14) “aosec” - output tech change of sector j, 
worldwide,  
(15) “aoreg” - output tech. change in region r,  
(16) ”avasec” - value added tech. change of sector j, 
worldwide,  
(17) “avareg” – value-added tech. change in region r,  
(18) “aoall” - output augmenting technical change in 
sector j of r,  
(19) “afall” - intermediate input i augmenting tech. 
change by j in r,  
(20) “afeall” - primary factor i augmenting tech. 
change sector j in r, 
(21) “au” - input-neutral shift in utility function, 
(22) “dppriv” - private consumption distribution 
parameter,  
(23) “dpgov” - government consumption distribution 
parameter,  
(24) “dpsave” - saving distribution parameter,  
(25) “to” – power of the tax on output (or income) of 
non-savings commodity I in region r,  
(26) “tp” - comm.-, source-generic (i.e. non-specific) 
shift in tax on private consumption81, 
(27) “tm” – source-generic change in tax on imports 
of i into s ,  
(28) “tms” – source-specific change in tax on 
imports of i from r into s,  
(29) “tx” - destination-generic change in subsidy on 
exports of i from r,  
(30) “txs” – destination-specific change in subsidy 
on exports of i from r to s, and  
(31)  “qo(ENDW_COMM,REG)” – quantity of 
endowment commodity i output/supplied in r. 
                                                 
81 The variable “tp” is a uniform consumption tax instrument introduced to the underlying theory of the GTAP model in GTAP.TAB Version 6.2. 
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APPENDIX B TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION FOR MODELLING SERVICES 
TRADE BARRIERS INTO THE GTAP MODEL 
 
We assume that there is a complete pass-through of the barriers to services trade arising 
from regulations and other policy measures to the domestic prices, raising them over the 
respective world prices, so that the implied (ad valorem) tariff equivalent rate of such a 




VIWSVIMS =− 100  
 
Where VIMS is the value of imports at the importer country’s market prices, VIWS is the 
value of imports at world prices.  
 
Our data adjustment to incorporate services trade barriers follows Malcolm (1998). This 
procedure is, in general, used for changing taxes in the initial, pre-simulation database when 
the user has better information than that used to construct the original GTAP database.  
 
When a tax rate is adjusted, in this case to reflect services trade barriers, it is not desirable to 
leave the rest of the database unchanged, because doing this destroys its internal 
consistency. By way of example, consider how the pre-tax and post-tax value flows of 
imports are affected when a tariff is imposed. Holding the post-tax quantity the same as the 
pre-tax quantity, the price and therefore at least one of the two value flows must change. In 
order to maintain the overall balance of the database, it is therefore necessary to change the 
tax in question, and allow the other flows in the database to adjust. However, there are so 
many flows to edit in the model and important adding-up conditions cannot be violated.  
 
 LVIII
The alternative approach taken by Malcolm (1998) utilises a variant of the standard GTAP 
model, whose structure and parameter settings have been designed to “maintain the internal 
consistency of the data base while minimizing the impacts of tax change on the value flows 
in the data base”, Tariff equivalents of tax rates (or in this case, services trade barriers) are 
shocked to their desired values and the updated post-simulation database is then used for 
subsequent policy experiments. 
 
It should be noted that the aim of Malcolm (1998) is to improve the quality of the base year 
data, once improved information becomes available. The procedure is not appropriate for 
incorporating information, which post-dates the base year. This does not pose a problem 
since we are trying to estimate the services trade barriers in 2001 using information from the 
1995 GATS and incorporating the services agreements among the members of NAFTA, 
between Canada and Chile, and between Chile and Mexico, which were all established prior 
to 2001. We assume that the services trade barriers are reduced to zero by the reference year 
due to these Agreements. 
  
The vehicle utilized in our paper to alter services trade barriers is the RunGTAP program. 
The Tools..AlterTax command loads the computer version of the modified GTAP model 
(ALTERTAX.tab) and the special closure necessary to carry out this procedure.82 Then, the 
new target tax equivalent rates are set in the Shocks page through the exogenous variable 
[tms], which is the change in tax on imports of good i from region r into region s. Next, 
solve the model and use the View..Updated Data..Tax Rates to check that the target rates 
have been reached. If all is well, then create a new version based on the post-simulation 
database. Go to Version/New and duplicate the current version using the Updated Database 
from Recent Simulation. Our aggregation of regions and sectors is preserved in the process. 
 
                                                 
82 The original files for changing tax rates by Malcolm (1998) may be downloaded from the GTAP website at 
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr. 
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Subsequent simulations (Scenarios 1 to 9) under the assumptions of nonzero services trade 
barriers will be based on this newly created version. This will involve Exercises A, B, D and 
E in Table 4.6. The introduction of services trade barriers leads to a different benchmark 
dataset, although the reference year remains the same at 2001. As a result, any comparison 
of the welfare effects arising from a particular scenario across different assumptions about 
initial services trade barriers must be treated with caution. 
 
We assume that the services agreements under GATS Article V will completely liberalise 
all the services sectors. That is, under each Agreement, we set the variable [tms] to a target 
rate of zero for all the services sectors in each partner country as a shock, and solve the 





















APPENDIX C TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION FOR MODELLING SCALE 
ECONOMIES AND “LARGE GROUP” MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION INTO THE GTAP MODEL 
 
The relevant GEMPACK programming codes for our alternative market structure and 
production technologies are obtained (in TABLO file format) from Francois (1998) and 
Francois et al (2005) and built into the standard GTAP model.83 Simulations are conducted 
via the Windows Version of GEMPACK (WinGEM). Refer to Diagram A for the add-on 
module to the computer version of the standard GTAP model.  
 
Diagram A GEMPACK Programming Codes (ADD-ON MODULE) 
 
!-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------! 
!                      Imperfect competition variables                            ! 
!-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------! 
 
VARIABLE (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,r,REG)                           qo_lrge(i,r) 
       # real industry output in large group variety-scaled models # ; 
EQUATION QO_LARGE  (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
qo_lrge(i,r)  =  qo(i,r) - ao(i,r); 
! Computes physical output for large group monopolistic competition sectors! 
 
COEFFICIENT (all,i,trad_COMM)(all, r, REG)                   SCALE(i,r) 
! SCALE is a CDR-based parameter for sectors to be modelled as being characterized by 
various specifications of output scaling.  The actual specification is controlled through 
values entered in the parameter file.  The CDR is the inverse elasticity of scale, or (AC-
MC)/AC! ; 
READ SCALE    FROM FILE GTAPPARM header "SCAL"; 
 
VARIABLE (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,r,REG)                           OSCALE(i,r) 
       # Switch for output scaling # ; 
EQUATION O_SCALE  (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
                                                 
83 TABLO is a program in the GEMPACK software suite that converts the formulas in .TAB files (such as the 
GTAP model) to a computer version called GEMSIM Auxiliary Files. Another program, GEMSIM can be 
activated to calculate the formulas in the auxiliary files and export the results to a SL4 file, which can be 
accessed using the ViewSOL or GEMPIE programs. The formulas and which data GEMSIM should use for its 
computation are stated in the .TAB file. Data needed in the process are stored in .HAR files and can be viewed 
and altered using ViewHAR. All programs aforementioned are part of the GEMPACK suite of software. 
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OSCALE(i,r)  =  [SCALE(i,r)] *  qva(i,r) - aoall(i,r); 
! Computes output scaling effect for various specifications of increasing returns for value 
added in sector i of region r. OSCALE is controlled through closure switches.! 
The command file, from which the WinGEM program gets its instructions, groups all the 
manufacturing and services sectors into a subset called NOTAGRI, apart from the 
agricultural sector that remains perfectly competitive and whose firms continue to face 
constant returns in production. The closure has to be altered with a CLOSURE SWAP 
command to set the variable OSCALE exogenous for sectors in NOTAGRI. 
 
The solution method and shocks that occur in each scenario are also specified within the 
command file. Our equilibrium solution is obtained using the Eular 1000-step, 1-solution 
method.84 Shocks involve the elimination of bilateral tariff barriers and tariff equivalents of 




Diagram B Command File for Scenario 1 Simulation using WinGEM 
 
! MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITHOUT SERVICES BARRIERS 
! SCENARIO 1: JSEPA ONLY 
 
!----------------------------------------------------------! 
! STUFF GEMPACK NEEDS TO KNOW       ! 
!----------------------------------------------------------! 
 
start with MMNZ = 1700000;  
! Sets initial memory allocation for nonzeros in GEMSIM or Fortran 90 TABLO-generated 
programs. 
 
XSET NOTAGRI (MINING, FOOD_BEV_TOB, TEXTILES, WEAR_APP, LEATH_PROD, 
WOOD_PROD, PETROL_COAL, CHEM, NM_MIN_PROD, METAL_PROD, TRANSPORT, 
                                                 
84 The choice of solution method was advised by Joseph Francois in a recent correspondence. We do not 
extrapolate with GEMPACK to prevent getting nonsensical results like negative quantities and prices due to the 
non-convexity of increasing returns specifications. Corner solutions may arise because sectors can shift between 
regions in monopolistic competition models. Such solutions can cause problems for GEMPACK and the Euler 
method (at least 500 steps) is adopted to address this issue.  
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ELECTRONICS, MACH_EQUIP, OTHER_MNFCS, UTILITIES, CONSTRUCTN, 
TRADE_TRANS, OTH_PTE_SVCS, GOVT_SVCS); 
 
XSUBSET NOTAGRI is SUBSET of TRAD_COMM; 
 
iz1 = no ;  
! Use 'IZ1 = no ;' to keep coefficients which are zero at step 1 
 
NDS = yes; 
! yes means do no displays 
 
Extrapolation accuracy file = YES ; 
! Use 'yes' to get an XAC file 
 
CPU = yes; 
! yes means report CPU times 
 
aux files = gtap; 
! always required for GEMSIM. Shows name of model and location of model files. 
! Will lead GEMSIM to the .TAB and .STI files. 
 
file gtapSETS = sets.har; 
file gtapDATA = basedata.har; 
! Files are either OLD (for input) like in this case or NEW (for output). 
 
Updated file gtapDATA = Updates\S1_gtapDATA.har; 
Solution file = SAVESIMS\S1_NSvcs_MP; 
! if omitted, SL4 name will follow CMF 
 
file gtapPARM = parm.prm; 
updated file gtapPARM = updates\S1_gtapPARM.prm; 
 
Log File = SAVESIMS\S1_NSvcs_MP.LOG; 
! log to screen and to file S1_NSvcs_MP.log 
! A record of the simulation work are kept in files suffixed LOG and INF.  
! TABmate reads the INF file to get error messages and deduce details of the model.  
! Occasionally you will need to view the INF or LOG file yourself to identify an error  
! – search for %% to find them. 
 
Verbal Description = 
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S1 NSvcs_MP version 6.2; 
! Commands: model, version, identifier are not needed; obsolete. 
 
Method = EULER; 
Steps = 1000; 
automatic accuracy = no; 
subintervals = 1; 
! The solution method is Euler 1000-step 1-solution. 
 
!------------------------------------! 
!            CLOSURE              ! 
!------------------------------------! 
Exogenous 
          pop 
          psaveslack pfactwld 
          profitslack incomeslack endwslack 
          cgdslack tradslack 
          ams atm atf ats atd 
          aosec aoreg avasec avareg 
          afcom afsec afreg afecom afesec afereg 
          aoall afall afeall 
          au dppriv dpgov dpsave 
          to tp tm tms tx txs tf tfd tfm 
          qo(ENDW_COMM,REG); 
Rest Endogenous ; 
 
!-------------------------------! 
! CLOSURE SWAPS     ! 
!-------------------------------! 
! Scale economies 
Swap oscale(NOTAGRI,REG) = aoall(NOTAGRI,REG); 
 
!------------------------------------------------! 
!         SHOCK: JSEPA ONLY            ! 
!------------------------------------------------! 
 
! SCENARIO 1: JSEPA ONLY. Complete Tariff Elimination on Merchandise Trade.  
! NO Services Trade Barriers. 
 Shock tms("AGRICULTURE","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("MINING","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("FOOD_BEV_TOB","JAP","SING") = -1.2891; 
 Shock tms("TEXTILES","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
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 Shock tms("WEAR_APP","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("LEATH_PROD","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("WOOD_PROD","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("PETROL_COAL","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("CHEM","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("NM_MIN_PROD","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("METAL_PROD","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("TRANSPORT","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("ELECTRONICS","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("MACH_EQUIP","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("OTHER_MNFCS","JAP","SING") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("AGRICULTURE","SING","JAP") = -2.8040; 
 Shock tms("MINING","SING","JAP") = -0.2853; 
 Shock tms("FOOD_BEV_TOB","SING","JAP") = -21.4300; 
 Shock tms("TEXTILES","SING","JAP") = -7.9541; 
 Shock tms("WEAR_APP","SING","JAP") = -9.2772; 
 Shock tms("LEATH_PROD","SING","JAP") = -13.9119; 
 Shock tms("WOOD_PROD","SING","JAP") = -0.2888; 
 Shock tms("PETROL_COAL","SING","JAP") = -3.6834; 
 Shock tms("CHEM","SING","JAP") = -1.3176; 
 Shock tms("NM_MIN_PROD","SING","JAP") = -0.4743; 
 Shock tms("METAL_PROD","SING","JAP") = -0.5261; 
 Shock tms("TRANSPORT","SING","JAP") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("ELECTRONICS","SING","JAP") = 0.0000; 
 Shock tms("MACH_EQUIP","SING","JAP") = -0.1361; 
 Shock tms("OTHER_MNFCS","SING","JAP") = -1.9468; 
Note: We use a shock (.SHK) file when there are a large number of shocks and trade liberalisation covers all 
tradables including services. These .SHK files are available via RunGTAP. In the case of Scenario 1, the long 
list of sectoral shocks is replaced by the following two lines of command:  
 
Shock tms (TRAD_COMM,"JAP","SING") = select from file tms.shk; 
Shock tms (TRAD_COMM,"SING","JAP") = select from file tms.shk; 
 
The files reported in the following table are obtained beforehand for each simulation. The 
GTAP.TAB file is the computer version of the GTAP model that incorporates monopolistic 
competition and scale economies, while the GTAP.STI is the stored input file that contains 
all the responses to prompts from the TABLO program in order to condense the model and 
generate the GEMSIM auxiliary files, GTAP.GSS and GTAP.GST. The latter two files are 
needed by the GEMSIM program (via WinGEM) prior to any simulation exercise. 
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FILES NEEDED FOR MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION EXPERIMENT 
File Purpose 
GTAP.TAB The theory, in GEMPACK code, of GTAP. 
GTAP.STI The condensation file for TABLO to generate auxiliary files. This 
file available via RunGTAP. 
GTAP.GSS GEMSIM auxiliary file 
GTAP.GST GEMSIM auxiliary file 
Sα _β _MP.CMF Command file for Scenario α  with defined assumption on services 
trade barriers, β . E.g. S1_NSvcs_MP.CMF is the command file for 
Scenario 1 under monopolistic competition (MP) in the absence of 
service trade barriers in the base data. 
SETS.HAR The GTAP set definitions. 
BASEDATA.HAR The original aggregated GTAP dataset (β  = NSvcs) or the adjusted 
dataset for services, (β  = SvcsH, SvcsNH). 
PARM.PRM Parameters file for Sα _β _MP.CMF including data for SCALE. 
TMS.SHK Import tariff shock file for free trade, available via RunGTAP. 
SAVESIMS 
(folder) 
Stores the solution (.SL) files for all simulation runs under 
monopolistic competition assumption. 
UPDATA (folder) Stores the updated data files for all simulation runs under 
monopolistic competition assumption. 
Note: α  = Scenario 1, …, 9 and β  = NSvcs (no services trade barriers), SvcsH (services trade barrier are built 
in and maintained), SvcsNH (services trade barriers are built in and eliminated). 
 
SETS.HAR and BASEDATA.HAR contain the GTAP 6.0 Beta (Release 5, Nov 2004) sets 
(regions, tradable commodities, primary factors etc) and database aggregated to our version 
respectively. For settings involving both monopolistic competition and services trade 
barriers, we modify the dataset using RunGTAP (ALTERTAX.TAB) to account for the 
latter first. Refer to Appendix 1 for the procedure.  
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The PARM.PRM file originates from the GTAP database but several modifications are 
subsequently done. First, ESUBM is set equal to ESUBD for all sectors to incorporate a 
non-nested Armington structure. For the perfectly competitive agricultural sector, the 
substitution elasticities are drawn from the GTAP database. The implied CDR and  
are set equal to zero (that is, no unrealised scale economies) and mark-ups MU  equal 1.00. 
For the monopolistically competitive sectors, the standard coefficients for the substitution 
elasticity between varieties are replaced by 1/Implied CDR, where 
SCALE
MUMUCDR /)1( −=  Implied . The MU  estimates for manufactures are derived from 
Martins et al (1996) for the OECD members and Francois (2000) for other regions. The data 
was adjusted to our sectoral aggregation using unweighted averages.85 This same approach 
was adopted by Francois et al (2005), from which we obtain the  estimates for services. MU
 
Next, we set parameters SUBPAR and INCPAR to zero and one respectively for all sectors 
and regions in order to impose Cobb Douglas preferences, since weak separability is needed 
when modeling monopolistic competition.86 In addition, we limit the sectoral mobility of 
labor by assuming the primary factor is no longer perfectly mobile but sluggish in 
responding to changes in relative returns across sectors. The elasticity of transformation for 
sluggish primary factor endowments (ETRAE) is set to -7.5 for skilled and unskilled labour. 
This adjustment helps to keep the system convex enough to solve.87 In what follows, we 
                                                 
85 Francois J. 2000. “The Economic Impact of New Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Intermediate Report” was 
prepared by the Tinbergen Institute and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) for DGII of the 
European Commission. This paper is not readily available to public but I managed to get a copy from the author.   
 
86 SUBPAR and INCPAR are the substitution and expansion parameters in the private households’ Constant 
Difference of Elasticities (CDE) expenditure function respectively. The function shows the minimum 
expenditure required to attain a pre-specified level of private household utility, given the vector of prices these 
households face. SUBPAR determines the compensated own-price elasticities of demand, while INCPAR 
determines the targeted income elasticities of demand. A CDE can be simplified to exhibit Cobb Douglas 
preferences by setting SUBPAR to zero. Refer to Hertel and Tsigas (1997, 26 - 27) and Dimaranan et al (2002, 
20 - 5) for more details. 
87  In the default setting, labour and capital are perfectly mobile and ETRAE does not apply to these primary 
factors. The binary parameter SLUG allows users to change the default setting and switch the specification of an 
endowment from perfectly mobile to sluggish by choosing a value of zero for perfect mobility or one for 
sluggishness in the parameter file. We set the values of SLUG for skilled and unskilled labour to one. 
 
If ETRAE is close to zero, then the allocation of factors across sectors is nearly fixed, and therefore factor supply 
is unresponsive to changes in relative returns. As ETRAE becomes more negative, the supply of factors will 
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present step-by-step instructions to synthesise and utilise all the necessary program files for 
simulations using WinGEM. 
 
Step 0: Preliminaries 
Two sub-folders need to be created manually to store the solution (.SL4) files and keep the 
updated data. We assign folder SAVESIMS and UPDATES for these purposes respectively. 
These sub-folders, the GTAP.TAB, the GTAP database and parameters files should be in 
the same folder. The user directs WinGEM to this folder through File | Change both default 
directories…  
 
Step 1: Prepare the .GST and .GSS Files 
Run WinGEM and ensure via File| Check Both Default Directories that the desired folder 
(where the .TAB and .STI files reside) is designated. Select Simulation| TABLO 
Implement… and select the relevant GTAP.TAB file. Then go to OPTIONS| Run from STI 
file, select the desired .STI file, and click on the Run button. The TABLO program will 
generate the following files, (1) GTAP.GSS, (2) GTAP.GST, (3) GTAP.MIN, (4) 
GTAP.INF (GTAP Setup information file) and (5) gpxx1.TXT and wg.TXT. The latter two 
are LOG files that record what happened when TABLO runs. 
 
Step 2: Preparing the Command (.CMF) File 
The GEMSIM program takes its inputs from the GEMPACK command (.CMF) file for 
simulations. The commands concern the following, 
(1) Specification of Closure 
(2) Specification of Shocks 
(3) Tells GEMSIM program which pre-simulation files to read from. 
                                                                                                                                         
become more and more responsive to relative returns. When ETRAE approaches negative infinity, the factor is 
no longer sluggish, but is perfectly mobile. Setting ETRAE for sluggish labour to –7.5 implies that they are more 
responsive to changes in relative returns than land (-1.0) and natural resources (-0.001). Capital remains 
perfectly mobile (SLUG value = 0). Refer to Dimaranan et al (2002) for more details. 
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(4) Specification of solution (.SL) filename 
(5) Tells GEMSIM program which post-simulation files to write to. 
(6) Specification of the Solution Method 
To edit the command file, go to WinGEM main menu and choose File| Edit File…. The 
lines beginning with an exclamation mark are comments and will not be recognised by 
GEMSIM as commands. Go to Help | CMF Syntax when there is a problem with the codes. 
 
Step 3: Carrying Out a Simulation 
Go to Simulation | GEMSIM Solve… and select the desired .CMF file (one for each 
scenario). Then click on Run. Once the program has finished running the simulation, go to 
ViewSOL. The GEMSIM program should have generated a solutions (.SL4) file, which is 




















APPENDIX D TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION FOR SYSTEMATIC 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS USING THE GUASSIAN 
QUADRATURE APPROACH 
 
The Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) approach to SSA views an economic simulation as a 
problem of numerical integration. Sets of information called quadratures are utilised in 
formulas to solve for the best numerical estimates of integrals, which are the moments of the 
simulation results. Key exogenous variables are treated as random variables under 
distributional assumptions in the process.  
 
Economic Simulation as a Problem of Numerical Integration 
In this section, we briefly explain the theory underlying the GQ and Monte Carlo 
approaches to SSA.88 Suppose the general form of a GE model is,  where 0),( =axG x  is 
the vector of endogenous variables and , the vector of exogenous variables. Let a solution 




)]([ aHE ( ){ }2)]()( aEaHE − [H  of the simulation results. Since a  is 
random, we have an integration problem:  
 
∫= daagaHaHE )()()]([  
( ){ } { } daagaHEaHaHEaHE )()]([)()]([)( 22 ∫ −=−  
 
Where  = multivariate (probability) density function or distribution of . )(ag a
 
Numerical approximates to the integrals (i.e. RHS) can be obtained through the Monte Carlo 
or GQ method. Both methods are similar in the sense that we define a set of points (or 
vectors of parameters) and associated weights, evaluate the model results (i.e. the integrand) 
                                                 
88 For more details, please refer to Arndt (1996) and DeVuyst and Preckel (1997). 
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at each point and produce the relevant expectations as weighted sums of functions of the 
model results. In the univariate case, we have the integral ∫ , where ba dzzgzf )()( z  is a 
singular exogenous variable (whose value we will vary) and the integral is approximated by 
. J represents the total number of evaluations of  and  represents the 
weight associated with each evaluation.  
∑ =Jj jj zfw1 )( (.)f jw
 
The principal difference between the Monte Carlo and GQ approaches is the way in which 
we select the points. In the former, one generates J pseudo-random numbers from the 
distribution  over the interval [a, b], evaluate the integrand J times, and attach a weigh 
of 1/J to the result from each evaluation. Solving for 
)(zg
∑ =Jj jj zfw1 )(
(.)f
 yields the estimate of 
the first moment (mean) for the distribution of results. The estimate of the standard 
deviation is then straightforward to obtain. However, this approach requires J to be large for 
the sensitivity analysis to be reliable. When the integrand  is difficult to evaluate (for 
example, due to a complex model), one might wish to keep J small. Furthermore, since the 
Monte Carlo method is probabilistic, there is always positive probability that the J pseudo-
random numbers selected might concentrate in a portion of the domain of integration, thus 
resulting in substantial bias in the estimate of the integral. 
 
There are formulas to obtain the best numerical estimate for the integral. They produce 
points  within the interval [a, b] and the corresponding weights . These sets of points 
and weights are called quadratures. In the case of GQ, the univariate problem is transformed 
into a system of d + 1 equations, 
jz jw
 
∫∑ == ba ssJj jj dzzgzzw )()(1   (A) 
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Where  for an order-  GQ. It turns out that one can always solve the 
system of equations with 2J pieces of information, where J is the least integer greater than or 
equal to . For an order-three GQ, J would equal 2 and we require only 2J = 4 
pieces of information (point  and associated weight  for j = 1, 2). This is dramatically 
less information than that needed by the Monte Carlo analysis, and we need only solve the 
integrand twice. 





SSA using Stroud (1957)’s Order-Three GQ 
RunGTAP provides two approaches for drawing order-three GQs based on the formulas by 
Stroud (1957) and Liu (1997, Chapter 2). These formulas extend to the multivariate case 
where z  is a vector of random exogenous variables. Arndt (1996) compared the order-three 
approximations with that of order-nine in a three-good, three-region aggregation of the 
GTAP model. While GQs of order-nine should be more accurate since more information is 
used, the former set of approximations was found to match the latter up to 4 decimals, which 
is quite good. We adopt Stroud’s quadrature in our analysis. 
 
The Stroud formula assumes the exogenous variables are distributed symmetrically. This 
means the probability that a value is V less than the mean μ  is the same as the probability 
that it is V greater than μ . There are two distributions to choose from: triangular or 
uniform. In the former, the graph of the probability distribution function consists of two 
straight lines, one from the minimum value to vertically above the mean and the other from 
vertically above the mean to the maximum value. This means that the exogenous variable is 
less likely to assume values near the extremes than those near the mean. For a uniform 
distribution, each value is equally likely to occur. Values lie between a fixed minimum and 
maximum in both types of distributions. We assume that the exogenous variables (both 
parameters and shocks) have independent, symmetric and triangular distributions with the 
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mean μ  at the value resulting from aggregation of the GTAP parameter file (Arndt and 
Hertel, RIE, 1997). 
 
Implementing SSA in our Study 
Recall from the univariate case that, with an order-three GQ, we need J = 2 points ( ) 
and have to solve the model twice for solutions and  in order to estimate the 
integral. For a model with n random exogenous variables (n values varying independently), 
we will require 2n points or solves. This requirement is preserved in Stroud (1957).
21 , zz
)( 1zf )( 2zf
89 For 
example, if ESUBVA varies independently across 20 sectors, then the model must be solved 
40 times. For simplicity, we assume that the variations of substitution elasticities 
(ESUBVA, ESUBT, ESUBD) are perfectly correlated across sectors and for ETRAE, across 
endowments. Similarly, demand elasticities (INCPAR, SUBPAR) are assumed to vary 
together across sectors and regions. This reduces the number of solves dramatically. In the 
preceding example, our SSA would require only 2 solves. For reasons stated in Chapter 6, 
we allow shocks on tariff equivalents to vary independently across sectors. This setting will 
involve much more solves of the model (20 to 120 solves instead of 2), but adds realism to 
the SSA. 
 
Technical Details of SSA using RunGTAP 
SSA of parameters: Solve for the simulation results first. Then, in the main menu of 
RunGTAP, go to Tools | Sensitivity and choose the option, w.r.t. Parameters. Select the 
parameter (INCPAR, SUBPAR, ESUBD, ESUBT, ESUBVA or ETRAE) to vary. Tick the 
Vary together option box for the variations of the parameter to be perfectly correlated across 
tradable commodities, TRAD_COMM. Select Percent Variation for ESUBD, ESUBVA, 
INCPAR or SUBPAR, and input a value of 30 in the textbox. In the case of ESUBT or 
ETRAE, select Ordinary Change and input a value of 0.5. Check that the Type of 
                                                 
89 In the case of Liu (1997), we will need between 2N + 1 and 4N points or solves for each exogenous variable. 
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Distribution of the parameter is triangular. Click on the Add to List button to impose the 
related command on the RunGTAP program. Choose Stroud’s quadrature when prompted. 
RunGTAP will generate solution files on the estimates of the mean and standard deviation 
of each endogenous variable in the model. 
 
SSA of tariff shock: Solve for the simulation results first. Then, in the main menu of 
RunGTAP, go to Tools | Sensitivity and choose the option, w.r.t. Shocks. In the Shocks to 
Vary drop-down box, choose the variable, tms. To vary services trade liberalisation only, 
select each services sector individually and the pair of trade partners involved from the 
Elements to Vary drop-down boxes. Set Percent Variation at a value of 30 and check that 
the Type of Distribution is triangular. Do not tick the Vary together check box so that the 
variations of FTA shocks are independent across sectors. As an illustration, for JSEPA only, 
there should be two lines of command per sector for varying the reduction in tariff 
equivalent (of services trade barriers) that exist in Singapore for Japanese exports and vice 
versa. We have the following commands for 30 percent variation in bilateral services trade 
liberalisation in Other Private Services, 
 
Vary tms ("OTH_PTE_SVCS","SING","JAP") = 30;PIII TD 
Vary tms ("OTH_PTE_SVCS","JAP","SING") = 30;PIII TD  
 
Therefore, for five services sectors, there should be ten command lines (and independent 
variations) requiring twenty solves of the model.  
 
If there is uncertainty in the extent of liberalisation in both services and merchandise trade, 
select all tradables ALL_TRAD from the Elements to Vary drop-down box. The other steps 
are the same as before. For example, in the case of USJFTA, the following two lines of 
command apply to all twenty sectors (five of which are services). There are forty 
independent variations altogether and we require eighty solves of the model.  
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Vary tms (TRAD_COMM,"US","JAP") = 30;PIII TD 
Vary tms (TRAD_COMM,"JAP","US") = 30;PIII TD 
 
 
Choose Stroud’s quadrature when prompted. We use the mean and standard deviation 
estimates to construct the 95% confidence intervals for EV, ( YY σμ ˆ5.4ˆ − , YY σμ ˆ5.4ˆ + ). 
Refer to Table 6.1 for the SSA output. 
 
 
----- Thank You ☺ ----- 
